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ABSTRACT 
The primary objective of this research is to make a critical 
analysis of the current methods of defences for preventing undue 
acquisitions of small to medium companies by large companies. 
Although these defences have been practised by the commercial 
community  for  a  very  long  time,  it  is  maintained  that  their 
effectiveness  should still  be  questioned.   The protection of  the 
minority  shareholders  in  a  company  is  one  of  the  reasons  for 
using these defences but, in reality, either they are squeezed out or 
they themselves surrender to the acquiring company. 
Most of the published works tend to support the current 
defence tactics, but in this research an attempt has been made to 
demonstrate how these techniques have become rather ineffective 
and the means by which they may be strengthened. This research 
also  demonstrates  that  from a  societal  standpoint  the  rationale 
behind acquisitions should be reviewed. As this process simply 
creates  unemployment  and most  of  the  merged companies  feel 
rather uncomfortable after acquisitions and mergers. The issue of 
the protection of the minority shareholders should be taken very 
seriously  so  that  small  shareholders  may  be  encouraged  to 
contribute to the capital  formation process in small  to medium 
size  corporate  entities.  The  protection  of  the  minority 
shareholders should also be considered as a part of the concept of 
corporate social responsibility. 
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1. Introduction
As per the analysis presented in the research of Ivanov and Xie, it can be maintained that 
not  all  takeovers  (whether  friendly  or  hostile)  may  be  eventually  welcomed  by  the  target 
companies.  There  could  be  various  primary  reasons  that  force  the  directors  of  the  target 1
companies for opposing any bid. As for instance, they might oppose a bid in order to promote 
their  own  personal  interests,  as  after  a  successful  takeover  bid,  the  chances  of  losing  their 
positions in the business world may become precarious. The analysis of DePamphilis in his book 
of “mergers, acquisitions and other restricting activities: An integrated approach to process, tools, 
cases, and solutions” emphasised the fact that the directors might also oppose a bid to promote 
the  interests  of  the  shareholders  or  they  might  claim for  a  number  of  reasons  that  the  bid 
undermines the interests of the company. Eventually, the directors may oppose the bid because it 2
might negatively influence the reputation of the stockholders such as: employees, shareholders, 
creditors etc. DePamphilis further added that, the target company, in order to defeat the hostile 
bid  successfully,  could  deploy a  range of  differing  defence  tactics  against  the  bidder. These 3
tactics refers to either squeeze or buy out the company. Defence tactics could either be approved 
by the shareholders or  the board of  directors.  Analysis  of  Cartwright  and Cooper identified 4
various techniques which may be adopted by the shareholders of the target company to ensure 
Ivanov, V.I. and Xie, F.,. Do corporate venture capitalists add value to start-up firms? Evidence from IPOs and 1
acquisitions of VC-backed companies. Financial Management (2010)  39(1), pp.129-152.
 DePamphilis,  D.,.  Mergers,  acquisitions,  and other restructuring activities:  An integrated approach to process, 2
tools, cases, and solutions. Academic Press. (2009)
 Ibid 23
 Haleblian, Jerayr, Cynthia E. Devers, Gerry McNamara, Mason A. Carpenter, and Robert B. Davison. "Taking 4
stock of what we know about mergers and acquisitions: A review and research agenda." Journal of Management 35, 
no. 3 (2009): 469-502.
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that they present an appropriate defence. These techniques are known as, white knight, Pac man 5
defence, golden parachute and the charter amendment.6
Hostile  bids  often  reveal  a  serious  conflict  of  interests  between  shareholders  and 
directors, who may have share options.  As a consequence, shareholders are offered a chance to 7
sell their shares, usually at a significantly “above the market price” prior to a bid. Furthermore, 
employees are always in a mode of resistance owing to their fear of losing their job.  As per the 8
theoretical perspective stated in the research of Bradley et al, directors should only recommend a 
bid  unless  they  have  a  good  chance  of  getting  a  better  offer.  The  justification  for  the 9
implementation of such hostile bids, is to replacement of the incompetent management. Fund 10
managers are usually rewarded for the technique they adopt to establish a good performance of 
their funds over a short period of time. They may not find it necessary to stay for a long term.11
This  research  study  includes  both,  secondary  and  primary  data  collection  method. 
However,  the  research  is  primarily  developed  on  primary  sources  of  information  such  as 
statutory law, the City Code, Federal, State laws on takeovers, and Takeover Directives. The 
secondary sources of  information  includes critical  analysis  of  published books,  articles  and 
research work based on takeover and comparative analysis of defences in England and United 
States.
Cartwright, Sue, and Cary L. Cooper. Managing mergers acquisitions and strategic alliances. Routledge, 2012.5
 Ibid 56
Haleblian, Jerayr, Cynthia E. Devers, Gerry McNamara, Mason A. Carpenter,  and Robert B. Davison. "Taking 7
stock of what we know about mergers and acquisitions: A review and research agenda." Journal of Management 35, 
no. 3 (2009): 469-502.
Bradley, Michael, Anand Desai, and E. Han Kim. "Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division 8
between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms." Journal of financial Economics 21, no. 1 (1988): 3-40.
 Ibid 89
Buckley, Peter J., and Pervez N. Ghauri, eds. International mergers and acquisitions: A reader. Cengage Learning 10
EMEA, 2002.
Gaughan, Patrick A. Mergers, acquisitions, and corporate restructuring. John Wiley & Sons, 2010.11
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In order to understand the defence acts and techniques used by the targeted companies it 
is highly important to understand the concept of takeovers and it influence on that company. 
Study of Shleifer, Andrei and Robert stated that takeovers are a critical strategy adopted by many 
large  businesses  in  the  current  corporate  environment.  To  comprehensively  understand 12
takeovers  as  a  corporate  strategy,  it  is  also  pivotal  to  identify  a  company  as  a  legal  entity 
recognised  by  law  which  is  carrying  out  its  operations  independently.  The  company  is 13
considered to be a separate legal entity from those who formed it, having the capacity to take any 
legal actions against or towards the business operation. As per the perspective of business law, 
corporations can be defined as a legal entity that is designed in accordance with the laws of 
a particular jurisdiction. The company that is primarily established as a separate legal entity has 
its own liabilities to settle and privileges to thereto.14
The  term  “takeover”  is  rapidly  becoming  very  common  in  the  light  of  increasing 
globalisation in the business world.  Concept of takeover is adopted and implemented by the 15
large companies as an expansion strategy. In business, the term takeover is taken to mean the 
purchase of a company.16
The acquiring company has the financial strength to push the management of the target 
company  to  sell  off  the  company  and  therefore  helps  in  improving  the  operations  of  the 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. "Takeovers in the'60s and the'80s: Evidence and Implications." Strategic 12
management journal 12, no. S2 (1991): 51-59.
R. Kraakman, P. Davis, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. Hopt, H. Kanda and E. Rock. The anatomy of corporate law: 13
A comparative and functional approach. Oxford University Press, New York (2004)
Carow,  Kenneth  A.  "Citicorp–Travelers  Group  merger:  Challenging  barriers  between  banking  and 14
insurance." Journal of Banking & Finance 25, no. 8 (2001): 1553-1571.
Ellis, Jesse, Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann, and René M. Stulz. Globalization, governance, and the 15
returns to cross-border acquisitions. No. w16676. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011.
 Ibid 1516
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company.  A bidding company in this context is used to refer to the company that has publicly 17
made its intention and ability to buy the target company prior the real purchase. 
From the perspective of Leverage buy out (LBO), an acquirer company takes over 
a  target  company using  capital  that  is  borrowed.  The  Highest  percentage  of  the  acquisition 
capital  is  obtained  from  leveraged  or  borrowed  sources. Under  the  practices  of  LBO,  the 18
company that intends to acquire a target company borrows money from a number of lenders and 
utilise the resources of the target firm to assure the repayment of the borrowed amounts. 
In majority of cases, the assets used as securities of the LBO loans by far exceed the value of the 
loan  hence  provide  assurance  to  the  lenders.  Takeover  practices  under  LBO  are  highly 19
preferred  for  companies  intending  to  acquire  other  substantial  companies  since  they  allow 
potential profitable takeovers. Such transactions enable the acquiring company to engage in the 
takeover bid without necessarily committing a large amount of its money hence eliminating the 
risk of  shareholders  with regards to  losing their  investment  from any risks  arising from the 
transactions.20
However, in this particular research term “mergers” is consistently used by the researcher 
that refers to the mutual consent by two companies operating in the same industry to combine 
together, hence the previous entities cease to exist independently.  
Y. Amihud. Leveraged Management Buyouts: Causes and Consequences. Dow Jones/ Irwin, Homewood, Illinois 17
(1989), pp. 14 - 26.
R. Trehan. The History of Leverage Buyout. Research Papers for Hoteliers (2006). 4 December 2006.18
 Ibid, pp. 24 - 27.19
Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi. "Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the firm." The 20
quarterly journal of economics 112, no. 3 (1997): 693-728.
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In mergers, two entities that resolve to come together may apply for a new identity and 
decide to move forward as a single entity through mutual consequences.  The integration of 21
businesses  allows  having  the  access  of  combined  control  of  resources  and  activities  of  the 
entities. Identically, acquisition is used in the same context to refer to the action of a company in 
implementing the corporate strategy of taking over the control of another firm by buying all the 
assets and establishing itself as the latest proprietors. As per the legal perspective, the target 22
company, which is the core subject of takeover, terminates to exist and the new owner takes 
control of the business operations by adopting new strategies.  Acquisition is initiated by 23
a dominant entity which has the financial resources to buy out the assets of the target. 
Resources may be cash rich from previous asset sale or financial power to raise bank finance. 24
The  major  dissimilarity  between  various  types  of  takeover  that  exist  in  the  business 
community arises from the source of acquisition of capital.  The LBO uses capital obtained 25
from borrowed sources while Acquisitions and Mergers implements various sources to finance 
Smith,  Roy C.,  and Ingo Walter.  "Global  patterns of  mergers  and acquisition activity in the financial  service 21
industry." In Bank mergers & acquisitions, pp. 21-36. Springer US, 1998.
 Ibid 1722
M. Ginsburg and J. Levin. Mergers, Acquisitions and Leveraged Buyouts. Commerce Clearing House, Chicago 23
(1989), pp. 23 - 35.
Zollo, Maurizio, and Harbir Singh. "Deliberate learning in corporate acquisitions: post-acquisition strategies and 24
integration capability in US bank mergers." Strategic Management Journal25, no. 13 (2004): 1233-1256.
Lubatkin, Michael. "Mergers and the Performance of the Acquiring Firm." Academy of Management review 8, no. 25
2 (1983): 218-225.
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the  arrangements. However,  despite  adopting different  techniques  the  outcomes attained are 26
identical. In most cases, the terms “acquisition” and “mergers” are normally used together and 
are  always referred for  the  same or  identical  purpose.  However,  research of  Nahavandi  and 
Malekzadeh  identified  the  fact  that  they  are  slightly  different  since  the  acquisition  involves 
completely buying one company and taking full control of it . Research of Ginsburg and Levis 27
stated  the  fact  that,  in  both  the  cases  of  Acquisitions  and  Mergers,  the  target  entities  are 
extinguished completely and the dominant company obtains all the privileges, assets, rights and 
liabilities previously owned by the merged or acquired company.28
Through the research of Ginsburg and Lewin it is evident that fundamental differences 
exist  between takeovers  and acquisitions,  despite  the fact  that  they both are involved in the 
purchase of the assets formally belonging to a target company.  The takeovers are transacted on 29
the publicly traded companies that are ranked in well-known stock exchanges. For instance: New 
York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange.  The acquisition, alternatively, involves 30
procuring the assets of private companies through private negotiations. The focus of this study is 
however on the takeover of target companies that is listed in the stock exchange.
United States International Trade Commission.. The Effects of greater economic integration within the European 26
Community on the United States: First follow-up report.  United States International Trade Commission Publication 
2268, (1992) Vol. 4, p. 9/17.
Nahavandi,  Afsaneh,  and  Ali  R.  Malekzadeh.  "Acculturation  in  mergers  and  acquisitions."   Academy  of 27
management review 13, no. 1 (1988): 79-90.
M. Ginsburg and J. Levin. Mergers, Acquisitions and Leveraged Buyouts. Commerce Clearing House, Chicago 28
(1989), pp. 42 - 67.
 Ibid 2629
Travlos,  Nickolaos  G.  "Corporate  takeover  bids,  methods of  payment,  and bidding firms'  stock returns."  The 30
Journal of Finance42, no. 4 (1987): 943-963.
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This  research concentrates  primarily  on takeovers  as  a  corporate  strategy adopted by 
different corporations and used as an avenue for expansion, growth risk reduction and proper 
management. In this regard, takeovers are considered as a strategic plan by a dominant company 
to solely or partially procure a target company considered to be less dominant, either by mutual 
understanding with the management or by forceful means that involves legal battles.31
There are two types of takeovers which are generally referred to as a “friendly takeover” 
or “hostile takeover”. Both of these types of takeovers have a similar sole objective that is to 32
attain the control of the target company’s management, operations and resources. Similarly, a 
takeover bid shall be taken to mean any strategic venture, platform or attempts by a dominant 
company to purchase a target company, wholly or to a substantially large part, in a bid to gain 
absolute control of such a company’s management, operations and resources.33
Takeover law with regards to this research has been considered to represent the legal 
standings, directives and code of conduct as enshrined in the company law that primarily governs 
the way, takeover bidders and target companies behave during takeover activity. The activities 
and proceedings must be part of the whole takeover process including the rights, obligations and 
resources available to all the stakeholders in the takeover process.  Takeover bids are subject to 34
R. Brealey and S. Myers Principles of Corporate Finance. Fifth Edition. McGraw-Hill, New York (1996), pp. 112 31
- 183.
 Healy,  Paul  M.,  Krishna  G.  Palepu,  and  Richard  S.  Rubeck.  "Which  takeovers  are  profitable?  Strategic  or 32
financial?." Sloan Management Review 38, no. 4 (1997): 45.
G.  Morse.  Company  Finance,  Takeovers  and  Mergers:  Essential  business  law.  Sweet  and  Maxwell,  London 33
(1979), pp. 68 - 79.
 Ibid, pp. 115 - 133.34
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various regulations in  the market  as  a  result  of  conflicts  that  frequently arise  from different 
prevailing interests between the directors and the shareholders of the 
company.  As for instance, in England there is the “City Code on Takeover and Mergers” that 35
seeks to govern the whole process of making an offer to takeover a company. 
Within the current corporate structure and increasing potential competition, takeovers are 
not  only  restricted  to  friendly  and  hostile  ones;  there  are  other  types  of  takeovers  that  are 
implemented  by  the  companies.  However,  this  particular  research  is  based  on  presenting  a 
critical emphasis and analysis on friendly and hostile takeovers to keep the research objectives 
specific and attain the answer of the research questions.
A friendly takeover could be referred to the procedure in which the bidding company 
negotiates with the management of the target company.  They commence the process by making 36
a purchase offer, which seeks to inform the board of directors and shareholders of the intention to 
purchase. Ideally, the board of directors of the target company takes charge of the whole process 
of accessing the offer and determining whether accepting the offer will serve the best interest of 
the shareholders of the company. In addition to that, friendly takeovers also takes the initiatives 
in which the bidder and the target company’s directors or shareholders, both in regard to the 
intended purchase as well as the value, readily arrived at a mutual agreement and agreed terms of 
the purchase offer.37
 Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why-the peculiar divergence 35
of US and UK takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1727.
Schnitzer, Monika. "Hostile versus friendly takeovers." Economica(1996): 37-55.36
 Ibid, pp. 115 - 133.37
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According to legal experts, in the case of a friendly takeover the agreement reached can 
be termed as synergistic, since they are dealings that occur whenever the management finds that 
a merger with another company is likely to enhance and bring to life a far more competitive 
entity.   The  management  has  the  principal  role  of  acting  with  the  best  intentions  of  the 38
shareholders and the firm while negotiating in such transactions. As has been demonstrated in the 
course of this research, most US jurisdictions proffer the decision rights to accept a takeover bid 
solely  on  the  directors,  of  considerable  consultation  that  takes  place  with  the 
shareholders. Alternatively,  In  England often  confer  the  rights  to  take  decisions  whether  to 39
accept or reject a takeover bid to the shareholders, rather than the directors.40
Judging from the two perspectives of friendly takeovers between the US and the E.U, the 
United States International Trade Commission stated that:
“…. whereas in the United States substantial powers are left to the board of directors to decide 
whether and how to fight (or to accept) a takeover bid, European law or codes of conduct seem 
to curtail the power of the board in favour of the shareholders.”41
Incidentally Article 8 of the 13th European Directive on Takeover 2004 requires that the 
board of directors restrain themselves from making decisions regarding a takeover bid, without 
the express consent of the company’s shareholders, during an emergency shareholders’ general 
A. Fleischer and A. Sussman. Takeover Defence. Fifth Edition. Aspen Law and Business, Englewood Cliffs, New 38
Jersey (1995), pp. 11 - 32.
 Ibid 2539
A. Auerbach. Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1991), pp. 40
5 - 23.
 S. Sudarsanamand A. Mahate. Are Friendly Acquisitions Too Bad for Shareholders and Managers? Long-Term 41
Value Creation and Top Management Turnover in Hostile and Friendly Acquirers. British Journal of Management 
(2006), Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 7.
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meeting. This prevents the board from conducting company business in their own interest but in 
the best interest of the all the stakeholders in the company.42
Hostile  takeovers  being  different  in  approach  discussed  above  are  used  to  mean  an 
instance in which the bidding company approaches the “target company” with the intention of 
acquiring  full  ownership  during  a  period  when  the  directors  and  shareholders  of  the  target 
company are willing to accept.  In a hostile takeover, the dominant company uses its financial 43
strength to influence the acquisition of a less dominant company.44
Hostile takeover can be executed through various strategies. One of the most common 
ways is  by serving a tender offer  to the target  company.  A tender offer  is  made when the 45
dominant company expresses interest publicly to purchase the target company at a fixed price 
usually  above  the  current  value  of  the  company’s  stock.  In  the  U.S,  the  tender  offers  are 46
regulated  and set  by  the  Williams Act  1968;  hence  there  is  proper  channel  to  follow while 
undertaking such a takeover.  The other avenue of initiating a hostile takeover is through the 47
establishment of a proxy fight which involves persuasion of a simple majority of the company’s 
shareholders to replace the existing management with a new management so that it approves the 
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takeover.  The  foremost  and  primary  aim is  to  analyse  the  strategy  that  could  replace  the 48
existing management that can offer opposition to the takeover.
The other hostile takeover method available as a third option involves the silent purchase 
of large stocks on the open market which is also referred as a creeping tender offer. The final 49
step has a sole intention of effecting the change in management through quiet acquisition of the 
shares of the target company. This is generally witnessed when the stock volume acquired from 
the target company commands an adequate voting strength hence the dominant company offers 
the tender offer, which is automatically accepted by the shareholders. The basis for all these 
hostile takeovers lies in the fact that the bidding company has the legal backing to pursue the 
taking of control of the target company.50
Finally, it is also important to find out about other takeovers despite being rarely applied 
in the corporate world. A reverse takeover involves a transaction in which the private companies 
acquire a publicly traded company through instigation of the highly dominant private company.  51
The sole objective of the reverse takeover is to allow the private company to efficiently float its 
position on the market while avoiding the expenses and time involved in transaction of the initial 
public  offering  (IPO).  In  a  reverse  takeover,  the  acquiring  company  takes  the  role  of 
transforming its management and establishing the documentation to allow for new management 
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with the same period of acquisition . The other rare term used in takeovers is the “back flip” 52
transaction that is considered to be more appropriate. In this case, the target company gains the 
control of the acquiring company, and assumes the role of controlling the whole operation.53
Through the above discussion, it can be concluded that two types of takeover including 
friendly and hostile are primarily the most common types of takeovers applied in the corporate 
environment.   Kleiman states that the two dominant takeovers that exist are only the “friendly 54
takeovers” and the “hostile takeovers”.  Kleiman further explained the fact that in a friendly 55
takeover, the board of the less dominant company is prepared to consent to the acquisition if the 
interest of the shareholders is favourably taken into consideration. In a sharp contrast, a hostile 
takeover  according to Kleiman occurs  in  an instance when the board is  actually against  the 
acquisition but the acquiring company insists by following a legal suite in the courts of law.56
In the current business environment, the business experts have noted and tried to project 
the reasons as to why friendly takeovers are rapidly becoming a popular strategy with many 
corporations. Through the search it has been identified that, friendly bidders during a takeover 57
process usually enjoy the cooperation of the existing management of the target company. Hence, 
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rendered an extensive chance to conduct due diligence before assuming control of the target 
company.  In the process, the bidding company takes proper time to study the affairs, policies, 58
resources owned, the market and financial capability of the target company to ensure that the 
takeover bid is financially feasible.59
In  the  process  of  considering  a  takeover,  the  acquiring  company’s  management  is 
expected to conduct a comprehensive, detailed analysis of the target company prior to finalising 
the actual agreement.  According to Galpin and Herndon, the third phase of acquisitions and 60
Mergers process heavily depends on the due diligence to explore any available information about 
the  company.  Both  Lajoux  and  Weston  hold  the  same  point  of  view,  but  insists  that  the 
management of an acquiring company conducts “due diligence” and makes complete use of the 
findings to come up with the most ideal bid prices when negotiating the deal and provide a basic 
point for checking the initial integration process.61
Frequently, it is important for the bidding company to undertake an initial comprehensive 
“due diligence” on the business operation,  financial  strength,  cultural  environment and other 
strategic issues concerning the transactions.  Legally, the process should not be rushed despite 62
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acquiring a thorough knowledge in the target company. The right channels should be followed to 
conduct the “due diligence” process even if the board of directors is well aware of each other, 
because any misleading information that does not undergo any authentication is highly likely to 
render  the  whole  transaction  worthless  before  the  courts  of  law. There  are  a  number  of 63
assumptions  that  require  authentication  at  this  stage  including  the  state  of  the  market  and 
potential, market portion of the target company. Other factors include the major customers of the 
target company, the demand factor of the consumers, main competitors of the company, ability 
and competitive advantages over rivals, the human resource capital and the business practice of 
the target company.64
Furthermore, it is also important to analyse the fact that, hostile bidder on similar basis 
may not have access to the due diligence process and may be required to make assumptions 
using the limited available information that is publicly available. It is also clear to point out that 
the hostile bidders have limited sources to fund the takeover desires as compared to the friendly 
bidders.  In the research of Galpin and Herndon, it is statistically estimated that most of the 65
takeover transactions are financed by extension of bank loan.  Banks analyse and overview the 66
financial projections themselves before advancing any money themselves. 
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In this research, primary attention has been paid towards the strategic legal and practical 
platforms that are available for the companies to fight both friendly and hostile takeover bids. 
The application of takeover defences is available to both the takeover processes as the companies 
seek to deter the change of ownership to the aggressive bidders.   In fact, this type of takeover 67
sometimes is considered to be more of an acquisition than a takeover.  68
Kleiman further stated that:
“…in the market  for  corporate  control,  management  teams vie  for  the right  to  acquire  and 
manage corporate assets and strategies, but when an outside group acquires control of a target 
company, the transaction is often termed a takeover.”69
In the course of the study, a review of the literature and other relevant materials on hostile 
takeovers  are  also  used  to  explain  the  legal  framework,  within  which  bidders  and  target 
companies  may sometimes  decline  or  accept  the  takeover  attempts  depending  on  their  own 
interest in the whole deal.  Examples of such situations include instances, when an acquiring 70
company is seeking to buy out its competition in the market and gain control of the market in 
terms of supply, or when the acquiring entity that is attempting a hostile takeover is driven by 
bad faith.  In both, the US and English legal frameworks, it is vital to note that target companies 71
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have usually a number of legal strategies available to them to apply in a bid, to reject the offers 
and retain its independence against the prospective bidders.72
The background information and discussion have demonstrated an understanding of the 
takeovers in the current corporate environment hence establishing an important foundation to the 
subsequent issues and interests raised in the course of the research. Further insights into the 
actual process of takeovers have been detailed and evaluated. 
At this point, it is indeed vital to agree that the literature and insights into the definitions 
of takeover to a relatively succinct level by law, directives, codes and regulations is currently 
used to govern the whole process of takeovers in England. Significant analysis has also been 
made on hostile takeovers in both the US and England. It is indeed of significance to note that 
the  rapid  increase  in  takeovers  as  strategy  by  companies  in  the  current  business  world  has 
precipitated the emergence of legal tactics against the takeover processes both in the US and 
England. This shall form the principal factor of interest to this research.
2. Literature Review
There are various articles and books on takeover defence tactics in England and the US. 
While studying and investigating secondary data for this research study it is worth mentioning 
that the following authors John Armour, David Skeel, Klaus Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Alexandros 
Seretakis, David Kershaw, Aswath Damadoran and others had concluded various data relevant to 
this  particular  topic.  Therefore,  in  this  research,  all  these  publications  have  been  critically 
discussed and analysed.
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Empirical evidence of takeovers in both the US and England suggest that takeovers create 
significant returns for target shareholders.  However, in spite of this common goal, the US and 73
the  English  systems  contrast  sharply  in  their  takeover  regulations.  As  per  the  US  system, 
Damadoran argued that the regulations allow managers of a target company to employ a variety 
of  takeover  defence tactics  to  discourage bidders  from acquiring the company.  One of  the 74
widely used and the most successful defence tactics in England is the shareholder rights plan or 
the  “poison  pill” .  Through  which,  it  is  a  shareholder  rights  agreement  that  intentionally 75
increases the price of a takeover in an attempt to discourage bidders for acquiring the target 
company . It achieves this either by favouring existing shareholders to regulate the equity of the 76
company by acquiring shares at a very low price, or by compelling the bidder to purchase the 
shares of existing shareholders at a higher price.
As identified, the differences between the two systems lies as to the means prescriber by 
takeover regulations. Within the US corporate system, response of the managers of the target 
companies is considered seriously. However, the situation is completely different in England.  77
When a bidder launches a hostile bid and believes that the managers of the target company are 
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improperly resisting the bid, the bidder files a claim with the Takeover Panel, which comprises of 
representatives from the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange, institutional investors, and major 
merchant banks . The Takeover Panel differs from the Delaware Court in various important 78
aspects. Hopt and Wymeersch argued that the English panel as a formal defence can attend to 
take over issues faster than in the U.S, which follows procedural court proceedings and can delay 
takeover disputes. The English takeover disputes are handled in a more professional way, as the 
panel consists of business financial experts, the cost of litigation is lower as compared to the U.S 
system.79
Achievement  of  synergy  gains  is  the  major  explanation  of  takeovers.  However, 80
takeovers have not always been used to generate value, but are used by the management for self-
interest.  Seretakis  noted  that  most  managers  might  engage  multiple  acquisitions  just  to 81
maximise their power and reputation. He also viewed takeovers as another creation of monopoly 
power, which is currently prohibited by competition laws, and therefore, the target of hostile 
takeovers are inadequately run companies, which a bidder can reshuffle. A market for corporate 
control, especially to companies that are not affected by lack of management seems not to apply 
in the explanation of hostile takeovers.  This power of the shareholders in England pertaining to 82
takeover authorisation is what Seretakis think would bring conflict between shareholders and 
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directors. He further maintained the U.S judicial regulations of takeover defences as weak as it 
does not contain any regulatory rule pertaining to defensive tactics created by managers.83
Armour and Skeel argued that takeovers tactics in U.S and England have been made 
different by differences in the mode of regulation. In England, they argued that takeovers have 
been coined under self-regulation driven to promote institutional investors, while in the U.S, the 
judicial  law-making  has  greatly  favoured  managers  by  complicating  shareholders’ ability  to 
influence the rules.  After a cross-examination of the two takeover regulations in the U.S and 84
England, the authors argued that prospective acquirers could easily enter into negotiations with 
the company’s board and arrive at a friendly transaction in the U.S than in England where hostile 
offers are directed to the shareholders. Also, it is easier for the board members to work on the 
interest of shareholders, only if the board members are well incentivised.  Armour and Skeel 85
argued that, in either way, both the U.S and England takeover regulations have been directed to 
fulfil the interests of board members and shareholders.86
Kershaw analysed the illusion of reconsidering England’s takeover defence prohibition 
and  argued  that  generation  of  value  in  a  company,  which  is  the  main  purpose  of  takeover 
regulations that cannot be achieved without solving the disputing forces between shareholders 
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and board members.  He also noted that the scope of restructuring or selling of an asset is 87
restricted to a board of an English company without the approval of the shareholders. Therefore, 
this defence can be used by the shareholder to buy more time to control the sale process, or as a 
bargaining mechanism. Also, the management to counter attack an excellent value offer in a 
quest to protect their jobs can use it.  The ability of the management to exploit collective action 88
problem is limited under the English takeover regulation for the approval of a sale of an asset. 
This appears in cases where shareholders, who are inactive and have poor financial incentives 
may have low interests with the company’s activities and can block future takeover bid that may 
have  benefits  for  the  company.  Therefore,  the  author  argued  that  shareholder  defence  is 
unnecessary  and  lacks  justification,  and  instead,  the  English  takeover  regulations  should  be 
reshuffled and centred to managers’ incentives.89
Armour and Skeel reviewed the U.S and English divergences of takeover regulations and 
argued that the U.S federal regulations have been meant to benefit managers, while in England, 
they are meant to benefit investors.  The authors also argued that it is due to these unintended 90
consequences of regulation designs that have limited the effectiveness of takeover objectives. 
The self-regulation mechanism under both, U.S and English systems are portrayed as incentives 
to entities and individuals providing the rules. Therefore, the regulators incentives are not in line 
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with social welfare, and, therefore, cannot work in areas exhibited by rapid change. The authors 
considered the English takeover regulation as weak as it promotes institutions rather than private 
individuals.  Just as the companies themselves, shareholders invest and monitor activities. The 91
U.S takeover regulation is also a limiting factor towards achievement of value in a company. 
This is because the court determines the defence mechanism against the sale of asset.92
3. Objectives of the Study
The takeovers  and acquisitions  have rapidly  gained momentum in  the  last  decade as 
business  corporations  are  undertaking  expansion  of  stripping  of  assets  strategies  to  operate 
beyond their borders in a bid to increase their revenues and profitability . The activities have not 93
only been noted in the US but also largely experienced in England until most recently when 
economic  recession  came  into  the  platform.  There  are  several  reasons  that  have  led  and 94
encouraged the current consolidations witnessed in business including potential revenue stability 
of diversification, accruing the benefits of operating in economies of scale, ego-oriented desires 
of  the  business  leaders  to  control  a  particular  market  niche  etc.  On  the  same  note,  the 95
aftermaths of the takeovers are not only numerous and distinct but also may lead to loss of 
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investments  by  the  shareholders  depending  on  the  formation  of  a  particular  company,  the 
management  styles  of  the  leaders  and  the  sole  purpose  of  carrying  out  of  the  takeover 
transactions.96
Notwithstanding  the  uniqueness,  which,  serve  to  highlight  the  contrasts  between 
corporate reorganisations and acquisitions, all takeover scenarios have at least one fundamental 
similarity, creation of a new legal entity of the death of a previously existing legal entity.  The 97
dominant company views the hostile takeover of the target company as an opportunity to expand 
their operations beyond their own boundaries.  After a successful acquisition, the entities lose 98
their original legal identities and a new company results from the consolidation. 
The current research aims at establishing and distinguishing between the several takeover 
bids, which are rationally oriented and psychologically driven. The takeover bids are sometimes 
thought to be motivated by the desire to control or power struggle.  Takeover bids sometimes 99
come  unexpectedly  without  having  to  explain  their  motives  despite  being  financially 
unappreciated.  It  is  of immense benefit to the shareholders,  national economies and target 100
companies if the target companies have the ability and possibility of declining the takeover bids 
 Ibid, pp. 49 – 6896
 United States International Trade Commission. The Effects of greater economic integration within the European 97
Community on the United States: First follow-up report.  United States International Trade Commission Publication 
2268 (1992), Vol. 4, p. 9/19.
 I. Erel, R. Liao and M. Weisbach. World Markets For Merger and Acquisitions. Working Paper Series. National 98
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., Institute for Financial Research (2009), pp. 4 – 7.
 N.  Mangold  and K.  Lippok.  The Effect  of  Cross-Border   on  Shareholder  Wealth:  Evidence from Germany. 99
Journal Of International Business And Economics (2008), Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 315 - 330.
 A. Auerbach. Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1991), pp. 100
5 - 23.
 33
by the dominant company.  The other important issue to note at this point is the fact that legal 101
and practical parameters exist in the form of defence tactics, which may seek to protect the target 
company from unfair and hostile takeovers that are rapidly increasing.
From the study, it is critical to note that target Company may implement all the takeovers, 
regardless of whether it is friendly or hostile.  The directors of a target company are sometimes 102
considered to have different motives in opposing the takeover bids. For instance, sometimes they 
are thought to oppose the bid in order to promote their personal desires since with a successful 
takeover  bid,  they  are  most  likely  lose  their  positions  and  social  class  due  to  change  of 
management.  Alternatively,  “golden  parachutes”  or  “share  options”  that  trigger  to  make 103
substantial financial gains for them. 
From  another  critical  point,  the  directors  of  the  target  company  may  oppose  such 
takeover bids on the grounds that the bid is likely to undermine the interest of the company and 
cause damage to the different stakeholders of the company like the shareholders, creditors and 
the employees.  Further reasons for the decline are discussed in detail in other parts of this 104
research. A target company may decide to reject a takeover bid in order to avoid the continued 
aggression of  a  hostile  bid,  hence deploying a range of  differing defence tactics  against  the 
bidder;  a  process  otherwise  technically  known as  “squeezing out”  or  “buying out”  potential 
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acquirers.  In the case of the European jurisdictions, the shareholders of the company that is 105
being targeted or the board of directors in the context of the US jurisdictions must approve the 
defence teams providing the tactics.106
It is worth noting from the research that there are a number of viable takeover defences 
obtained  from  a  diverse  and  highly  sensitive  literature  in  the  legal  environment.  The 107
significance  of  these  two  settlements  can  be  noted  in  making  an  inventory  of  the  takeover 
defences in contemporary use and providing a critical  analysis  to what  needs to be done in 
England and the US to facilitate the adoption of these viable defences. The hostile takeover bids 
in most cases expose an ugly conflict of interests between the board and shareholders; hence the 
aftermath  is  borne  by  the  shareholders  who  have  made  their  investments  in  the  target 
company.108
From their points of view, the reaction to pursuing anti-takeover amendments becomes 
much more negative in instances when the board of directors is dominated by executives or by 
externally sourced members with a close affiliation with the executives.  They also found that 109
in  circumstances  where  the  board  is  chaired  by  the  chief  executive,  the  anti-takeover 
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amendments are regarded highly since the board sees a chance to increase their stock ownership 
or amplifying share value in the firm if the takeover is allowed to sail.  This study reveals that 110
vigilant monitoring by the government authorities is important and other outside and independent 
stakeholders whenever a company seeks to challenge a takeover bid or when takeover defence 
measures are ignored, especially when CEOs chair the board of directors or when most of the 
board members are stakeholders of the target company.  It is in this understanding (of potential 111
subjective reactions to takeover bids by a board of directors) that experts concur that in most 
corporate control decisions, the decision making process through which directors accepts a deal, 
often proves questionable. It is important for such a research undertaking to clarify the available 
takeover defences,  discuss their  appropriate applicability and contextualise the best  available 
defences against the contemporary legal structures. In order to create potential awareness, public 
knowledge and practitioner  accountability  within the English and the US context  as  well  as 
highlight possible areas of improvement.  The intent of this research has been twofold. Firstly, 112
to  review and  explain  an  importance  of  takeover  defence  tactics  and  to  propose  regulatory 
changes which will allow the Takeover Panel (reviewed in greater detail in subsequent sections 
of the research) to protect and balance the rights and interests of the shareholders in takeover 
bids. Second, to review the most common takeover defence tactics and to analyse the fiduciary 
duties  of  directors  of  English  and US corporations  towards  minority  shareholders  under  the 
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respective legal systems during a takeover attempt.  To propose methods of achieving a fairer, 113
more  effective  means  of  controlling  such  defences  and  also  propose  new types  of  takeover 
defence tactics.  It  is  necessary to carry out research on this topic and propose new types of 
takeover defence tactics, thus explaining the fundamental role that the findings of this study can 
complement the contemporary literature in the area.114
It is worth noting that, while reviewing both the US and English takeover defences, this 
research  made  the  informed  assumption  that  the  US  takeover  legal  framework  was  at  an 
advanced  stage  as  compared  to  that  of  England.  In  effect,  therefore,  this  study  was  biased 
towards evaluating takeover law in England, specifically in regards to takeover defence laws, in 
contrast  to  advances  made  in  the  US  on  the  same.  This  bias  was  consequent  upon  the 115
realisation that Europe has been lagging behind in creating and implementing effective takeover 
regulation policies particularly in the last decade, at a time when the US has advanced to amend 
and even overhaul its regulation on takeovers and mergers.  According to the United States 116
International Trade Commission, “takeovers have not been as common in Europe as they have 
been  in  the  United  States,  and  more  importantly  hostile  takeovers  have  been  fairly  rare  in 
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Europe”.  The Commission further  states  that,  “only in  the  United Kingdom is  the  hostile 117
takeover a common occurrence”.118
An Illustration  of  this  comparative  highlight  is  the  fact  that  in  1987,  a  total  of  250 
takeovers were recorded in England, while most of the EU regions recorded virtually no takeover 
activities.   One of the reasons offered to explain this phenomenon is the fact that takeovers are 119
predominantly in publicly traded companies and there are more of these companies in the US 
and England than in other EU states. In Germany, for instance, there were only 440 publicly 
traded companies in 1987, most of which were held by families and bank groups. This can be 
compared with over 3,000 publicly traded companies in the UK during the same period.120
Consequent  to the occurrences of  takeovers and the level  of  the controversial  hostile 
takeovers, the EU region has seen most “member states reluctant to develop extensive takeover 
regulations”.  The 13th Directive presented to the Council on 19 January 1989, thus became an 121
attempt by the EC Commission to create relevant and adequate takeover regulation based on 
Article 54 of the Rome Treaty (primarily giving the Council a mandate to abolish all restrictions 
previously  hindering inter-nation  freedom in  the  establishment  of  the  European Community, 
 Ibid.117
 A. Auerbach. Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1991), pp. 118
5 - 23.A. Auerbach. Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1991), 
pp. 5 - 23.
 Barney,  Jay  B.  "Returns  to  bidding  firms  in  mergers  and  acquisitions:  Reconsidering  the  relatedness 119
hypothesis." Strategic Management Journal 9.S1 (1988): 71-78.
 Ibid.120
 Sudarsanam, Sudi, Peter Holl, and Ayo Salami. "Shareholder wealth gains in mergers: effect of synergy and 121
ownership structure." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 23.5-6 (1996): 673-698.
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through the issue of relevant directives under its authority).  It would take up to May 2004, for 122
the European Council of Ministers to finally adopt the Directive, and make it a binding legal 
framework governing takeover activities in the EU.123
This researcher thus saw the need to investigate this area with the purpose of providing 
succinct and valid recommendations into the defences available to those of the companies that 
seek  to  defend  themselves  against  hostile  or  friendly  takeover  bids,  within  the  European 
jurisdiction.  Towards this  end,  it  will  be  important  to  review the existing takeover  defences 
allowed in England, as well as those available in the US (the US being the most exemplary case 
study of takeover law (in both principle and practice) by virtue of having the highest number of 
corporate control market deals every year).124
The purpose of the present study is thus construed as to conduct a comparative review of 
defences in the US and English legal contexts and by so doing, evaluate the available takeover 
defences in the US jurisdiction as provided for by their takeover law.  The research further 125
purposes to ultimately recommend the best available takeover defences in the US legal context. 
This research is meant to identify the takeover defences that are applicable in both the 
English and US jurisdictions . The study proposes to recommend the missing links in both 126
 United States International Trade Commission. The Effects of greater economic integration within the European 122
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English and the US defence context. There are a good number of defences available in both 
jurisdictions to cater for the takeover but the study is meant to design a comprehensive analysis 
of strategies of defending the target companies from takeovers and counter the cases presented 
by  the  dominant  companies  in  the  courts  of  law.  It  follows  from the  study  that  the  listed 
objectives will guide the research and help to build a comprehensive argument against takeovers 
of the target companies.
• To  review  and  explain  the  significance  of  the  takeover  defence  tactics  and  propose 
regulatory changes which would allow the takeover Panel to protect and balance the rights 
and interests of shareholders in a takeover bid. 
• To review the most common takeover defence tactics and analyse the fiduciary duties of 
directors of both the English and US companies towards minority shareholders. It further 
proposes an effective means of controlling such defences and discusses possible new types 
of takeover defence tactics. 
The major objectives and aims of the study are broken down into narrow goals in a bid to 
enhance the understanding and attainment of the general  objectives.   It  aims to identify and 
analyse  the  most  relevant  contemporary  literature  on  each  count,  and  use  this  to  build  an 
analytical argument towards a valid conclusion. The two major hypotheses are as listed below:
a. To evaluate the role of takeover defences in contemporary corporate control market.
b. To identify and explain the available and emergent takeover defences in both English and 
the US jurisdictions.
This research has been developed through the following chapters: 
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Chapter  1.  A comparative  study  between  English  and  the  US  practices  of  acquisitions  and 
mergers.
Chapter 2:  An examination of the usual rationale behind Acquisitions and Mergers. 
Chapter 3:  Historical growth and development of Acquisitions, Mergers, and Defences thereto.
Chapter 4:  Types of common takeover defence tactics in England and the US. 
Chapter 5:   Interests and protection of minority shareholders. 
Chapter 6:  Comparisons between the English and US systems in takeover bids.
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CHAPTER  1:  A  comparative  study  between  the  English  and  the  US  practices  of 
acquisitions and mergers.
1.1 Introduction
Maximisation of share prices is the prime target of most of the large and medium sized 
corporate entities; it is odd to mention that corporate control is often directed by these corporate 
entities in this direction.  Depending upon the moment of share performance, often the issues of 
takeovers and mergers receive attention in the corporate world even in disregard of the interest of 
minority  shareholders.   Although  in  England,  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders  is 
attempted  to  be  protected  by  statutory  and  regulatory  measures,  the  shareholders  often 
voluntarily give-in in a take-over or merger process.
In  discussing  take-overs  and  mergers,  most  business  people,  consciously  or 
unconsciously  refer  to  Anglo-American  model,  including  the  defence  tactics  relating  to  the 
process, failing to realise the differences that exist between the two processes.
Where the UK takeovers are regulated by the City Code on Takeovers Mergers which 
was developed and is administered by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, popularly known as 
the Takeover Panel, most of the US takeovers are governed by the Courts of Delaware.  Whereas 
in England, proceedings before a Takeover Panel are conducted in a flexible and an informal way 
by the chosen members of the City of London and/or other professional communities, in the US, 
these activities  are  performed in  courtroom atmosphere – but  this  is  often dictated with the 
atmosphere of a dispute resolution.
The contrasts of takeover regulation remarkably differ between England and the US in 
that in England, the Takeover Code considerably tends to lean towards protecting the interests of 
shareholders, which makes an  impact on undue acquisitions or takeovers whereby shareholders’ 
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interests particularly those of the minorities, are attempted to be protected from coercive bids. 
Management in the US has flexibility in engaging into defensive tactics (provided that these can 
be justified by referring to their fiduciary duties).  In England, in contrast, the Takeover Code 
prohibits management from employing any defensive tactics which would effectively frustrate an 
actual or anticipated bid.   Defensive tactics employed by management in the US have more 127
flexibility  provided  of  course  the  tactics  do  not  run  counter  to  the  fiduciary  duties  of 
management.  One of the interesting contrast between the two systems being that whereas in 
England,  the  takeover  or  merger  regulation  is  shareholder  contract,  in  the  US  there  exist 
significant management discretion in this matter combined with the judicial oversight. 
In London, institutional investors tend to avoid the need for litigation by developing 
certain norms and principles re-enforced by sanctions, in the US institutional investors do not 
seem to own a large number of stocks as have their English counterparts.  Furthermore, the US 
seems to  have been hostile  to  self-regulation,  which works very well  for  England.   In  fact, 
Federal securities legislation enacted during the 1930s prohibited in the US any application of 
self-regulation as it was viewed by them as “soft law”; England, on the other hand, has been a 
supporter of self-regulation which promoted, inter alia, collective investment vehicles.  In view 
of the trust that institutional investors have put in the system of self-regulation, there is no reason 
for  substituting it  by any other  regulatory  system which might  simply disturb  a  very stable 
financial market in the City of London.
Returning to the theme of this research, it may be pointed out that it still remains a matter 
of speculation particularly amongst the academic scholars, the extent to which defensive tactics 
 See  Armour,  J  and  Skeel,  Jo  DA “Who Unites  the  Rules  for  Hostile  Takeovers,  and  Why –  the  Peculiar 127
Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation”, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working 
Paper No 331.
 43
should be permissible in the fact of a hostile bid.  Armour and Skeel maintain that the Takeover 
Code’s “no frustrating action” rule is likely to be preferable, but on the other hand, opposition to 
it, as stated earlier, still exists.   But, the basic differences between the English and the US 128
systems primarily triggered by the institutional shareholders-dominated corporate entities will 
remain at least in the foreseeable future, which also directly impact the issue of shareholders 
defence tactics in the case of acquisitions and mergers of small to middle-sized corporate entities 
in England.
1.2   The Differences between the Takeover Regulations of England and the US
Hostile takeovers should not be the norm; they may not be encouraged in a market 
which believes in corporate governance and self-regulation.  One of the principal objectives of 
acquisitions  and  mergers  is  to  increase  a  firm’s  value.   Before  the  process  starts,  a  tough 
examination of the prospectus of reaching that objective (due diligence) is essential.   In this 
process, the value-orientated business policies, and the promotion of a market should be taken 
into consideration.  In other words, the business policies and the business ethos of a particular 
business community may not be changed overnight.  Furthermore, in England, the issue of the 
protection of minority shareholders may not be disregarded; in fact, they have been provided 
with statutory rights and remedies by the Companies Act 2006.
During the due diligence process, the target company should seriously consider the benefits and 
disadvantages of acquisition,  particularly in regard to the existing employees (a social  issue, 
 op. cit, at 4128
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which has received attention in a section of this work,   in addition to the prospects of striking a 129
beneficial synergy between the possible conflicts in terms of the operation of the business after 
the acquisition, the projected dent that the acquisition may create on the customer’s world, and 
whether a “we-they” situation might be created within the new company so to say.  Much of the 
defence tactics would depend on these issues.  The lack of transparency on the part of either or 
both  the  companies  concerned may present  a  hindrance to  “due diligence”.   Synergies  may 
however take place between companies dealing in totally different product.  The merger between 
Cadbury and Kraft would be a clear example to sustain this argument.  
Academics have, however, came up with various suggestions as to how best to regulate 
the  take-over  market;  for  example,  Easterbrook  and  Fischal  have  supported  takeovers,  by 
maintaining  the  managers  should  not  be  allowed  to  defend  against  a  takeover,  so  that  the 
company’s shareholders would have a free hand to decide whether to accept the bid.   The logic 130
behind this practice has been that otherwise managers’ interest in preserving their employment 
would override the best interests of the acquiring company.  The counter-argument to this has 
been that managers should be allowed to defend a take-over only to the extent necessary to 
achieve the best possible price for the company’s shareholders.  In other words, according to this 
latter view, managers know best. 
Whereas in the United States, the shareholder-orientated approach has been favoured in 
academic debates, the Delaware Courts have discussed this approach stressing the fact that a 
company  is  managed  and  controlled  by  its  directors.   By  contrast,  England  favours  the 
 See Section 2.14 129
 F H Easterbrook and D R Fischel, “The Report Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer”, 130
94 Hansard Law Review (1981) 1161; see also H Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control”, 73 
Journal of Economics (1965) 110
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shareholder-orientated approach in order to recognise that otherwise the English practice would 
unduly disregard the contributions made by the shareholders to the company concerned.
Furthermore, the US regulations allow bidders complete flexibility in bidding for as 
small or as large a percentage of the target company’s stocks as they wish, but their bidding 
practice must maintain equality whereby bidders would be required to pay the same price for 
each of shares they may acquire; incidentally, each bid must be kept open for at least 20 days.131
In so far as the managers of a target company are concerned, they are allowed to use a 
variety of defences against a take-over bid, and the most popular defence is the “poison pill” or 
“shareholder rights place”.  This defence is designed to dilute a hostile bid, for example, if the 
bidder acquires more than a specified percentage of target stock, which are usually 10 or 15%. 
The managers of a company that may have a “poison pill” and a responsible board of directors 
will have almost complete discretion to resist an unwanted take-over bid.132
It is worth mentioning that in the US, in addition to the traditional defences, target firms 
are  also  permitted  to  take  resort  to  other  defences  too,  namely,  “break-up”  fees  and  other 
“lockup” provisions which are designed to cement a deal with a favoured bidder, and keep the 
hostile bidders at bay.   But, the nature of discretion exercised by target-company’s managers is 133
not absolute; managers may sanction fact compelled to remove takeover defences, particularly 
where the defences, in fact, tilt towards one bidder; on the other hand, overall, in the US, bidders, 
 For a brief summary of the US tender regulations (which were enacted in connection with the Williams Act, 131
1968, which amended the Securities and Exchange Act, 1934) see M A Eisenberg, Corporations and Other Business 
Organisations: Cases and Materials 1136-40 8th edition (2000).
 See further L A Bebchunk, J C Coates IV and G Subramanian, “The Powerful Anti Takeover Force of Staggered 132
Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 Stanford Law Review (2000) 885
 See further David A Skeel Jr “A Reliance Damages Approach to Corporate Lockups”, 90 Northwest University 133
Law Review (1996) 564; see also J Costes & G Subramanian, “A Buy-side Model of M & A Lockups: Theory and 
Evidence”, 53 Stanford Law Review (2000) 307.
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in general, have extensive discretion in acquiring a target company – it is really a situational 
issue.  The good news is that almost every State in the United States has enacted anti-takeover 
legislation in order to prevent unwanted takeovers.
In England, on the other hand, takeover regulation is primarily shareholder-oriented.  134
Once a take-over bid has materialised, target companies in England are not allowed to take any 
“frustrating” action, without the consent of the shareholders; poison pills are strictly forbidden.
In England, the compulsory corporate governance system operational within the “listed 
companies” restricts  directors’ discretionary powers  in  regard to  biddings for  take-overs  and 
defends against them.  English company law requires directors to seek authority from the general 
meeting to issue new shares which are usually dominated by institutional investors.   The pre-
emption rules have also oblige directors to offer any new shares first to the existing shareholders 
in proportion to their current shareholdings; furthermore, shareholders have the right to remove 
directors at any time by ordinary resolutions, and the “golden parachute” procedure.  
It is also to be emphasised that the golden parachute provisions in directors’ service 
contracts can restrain the powers of managers in this issue.   Like the US, in England, bidders 135
are subject to an equal treatment rule whereby they are required - to pay the same price to all 
shareholders who may intend to accept a tender offer.  In England, promotion of equal treatment 
of the shareholders in a target company is accorded a very high priority; for example, if anyone 
plans to purchase a controlling stake in a target company, which is usually to the extent of 35% 
 See generally, the Takeover Code (2006); see also W Underhill (ed) Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and 134
Mergers (latest edition).
 See the Companies Act, 2006; Chapter 4A, ss 226B.  See also Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, 135
2002; the Listed Companies are required to publish detailed report on directors’ remuneration and voting pattern at 
general meetings of the company – the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2008).
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or more of the voting rights in the target’s share capital (this system is usually known as the 
mandatory bid system).  The mandatory bid rule however effectively forces bidders to raise 
enough money to acquire entire company – the minority shareholders may thus be “squeezed 
out”.  In sum, compared to the US takeover regulation, the English practice on this matter seems 
to be more shareholder-oriented.   There exists  in England a built-in system to allow hostile 
takeover tactics .136
However, despite certain basic differences between the US and English system of equal 
tactics in hostile take-over bids, in both countries, in general, hostility is the exception rather than 
the rule.  In fact, in England, managers seem to prefer the regime developed by the Takeover 
Code that does not allow managers to use defensive tactics  - returned to shareholders being the 137
primary concern of corporate entities.  In both the US and England hostile takeover bids have 
provoked  controversy.   Whereas  in  the  US these  are  more  or  less  subject  to  regulation,  in 
England, the Takeover Code governs this, but in the latter case in a mellowed way to ensure that 
the minority shareholders rights are respected.  In a subsequent section of this work, the adverse 
effect of takeovers has been briefly discussed.  It would be opportune at this stage to examine the 
reasons for takeovers.
 See further R Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Comparative Law: A Comparative and Practical Approach (2004).136
 See further Ronald J Gilson, “Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and what we can do about it”,) 26 Delware Journal of 137
Corporate Law (2001) 491; and Luciar Agu Bebchuk, “The Case against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers”, 69, 
University of Chicago Law Review (2002) 973.
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1. 3 Why Takeovers?
Takeovers, whether friendly or hostile, are executed for a variety of reasons, namely, 
this is a tactic of removing underperforming managers in a company ; the desire to achieve 138
more efficient between an acquiring company and the target company, but this need not happen 
when two companies are in the same business; the classic example to justify this point would be 
the takeover between Cadbury and Kraft.  Thirdly, the desire of “empire building” by bidding 
managers which may not guarantee the creation of any value for their shareholders – under the 
English practice, this process might not receive much support; and finally, a desire to police a 
market, which incidentally runs counter to the competition policy in business.  But the most 
sustainable justification for takeovers may be “value connection” for both the corporate entities 
concerned.
Controversies  surround  the  issue  of  whether  bidder  shareholders  gain  much  in  the 
process of takeovers or lose.  According to Andrade, Mitchell even where losses accrue, to them 
they  are  insignificant  to  the  gains  to  target  shareholders,  implying  that  such  transactions 
nevertheless create a significant amount of net value for shareholders.139
Sundarsanam & Mahobe’s studies on the effect of hostile takeovers in the UK and a 
corresponding study carried out by Bhagah et al  in the US suggest that the effect of hostile 
takeovers provide positive return to acquirer shareholders.   According to Aramour and Skeel 140
 See further Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers, Evidence and Regulation, 9 Yale Journal on Regulation, 138
(1992) 125-155.
 G Andrade, M Mitchell & E Stafford, “New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers” 15.2 Journal of Economic 139
Perspectives (2001) 103; see also J R Franks & R S Harns, “Shareholder Wealth Effects of Corporate Takeovers: 
The UK Experience”, 1955-85, 23 Journal of Finance and Economics (1989) 225.
 S Sundarsanam & A Mahale, “Are Friendly Acquisitions Too Bad for Shareholders and Managers? 140
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(Jr) English restrictions on defensive tactics would be preferable to the US approach.   Indeed, 141
US acquirers  now seem to  be  more  likely  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  target  companies’ 
Brands than to make a “hostile offer direct to shareholders”.   Briefly, whereas the English 142
system requires managers to remain more directly accountable, to shareholders, in the US, it may 
be  possible  for  corporate  entities  to  conduct  around  manager-friendly  regimes  but  at  high 
financial  costs.   It  is  ingrained in the English system of  corporate  governance and all  other 
aspects of corporate issues to protect the shareholders’ interests.
1.4 The Modes of Takeover Regulation
In the US, judicial authorities and regulators are involved in all aspects of takeovers; 
however the tender offer itself is regulated mainly by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
In  the  event  of  a  take-over  bidder  believing  that  a  target  company’s  managers  are  unduly 
blocking the bid, the bidder may file suite in the Delaware Chancery Court, claiming that the 
managers have breached their fiduciary duties, and that the managers may not be allowed to rely 
on their defences in order to ensure that the shareholders of the target could consider the viability 
or pros and cons of the proposed takeover bid.  In the US, again, takeover issues fall  to be 
considered by lawyers and judges; but lawyers who can inform the parties concerned of the 
hurdles  and  costs  to  which  they  may  be  subject  if  they  allow  the  courts  to  deal  with  the 
differences put forward by targets.  The best example in support of this view would be the battle 
of Oracle to take over PeopleSoft in which case ultimately, the managers of PeopleSoft agreed to 
 op. cit., at 13141
 13 See further G W Schwert, “Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder”; 55 Journal of Finance (2000) 142
2599.
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the takeover.  However, many hotly contested takeover cases are still resolved by lawyers in the 
Supreme Court in Delaware.
By contrast, hostile take-over defence cases are dealt with by the Takeover Panel in 
England  which  consists  of  representatives  from  the  London  Stock  Exchange,  the  Bank  of 
England, the major merchant banks and institutional investors.  Of course, Panel will come into 
the picture  only when a  hostile  bidder  launches a  takeover  bid and believe that  the target’s 
managers are interfering with the bid, which prompt the hostile bidder to lodge a protect with the 
Takeover Panel.  Thus appointed and is governed by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
Despite the implementation of the EU’s Takeover Directive which has been given a statutory 
status.  The new law has been designed with the express objective of maintaining the features of 
self-regulation.  In England, lawyers’ role in such cases is almost nil; hostile takeovers bids and 
the defences thereto are treated as fact-based issues .143
The basic differences between the US and English practice on this issue may be summarised in 
the following ways:
Takeover  Panels  in  England  deal  with  the  takeover  issues  promptly;  the  Panel’s 
Executive requires participants to give it regular updated on compliance.  Panels seem to dislike 
a target Board’s interference with a bid or advise the bidder to provide additional disclosure. 
Panels work on a very informal basis.
On the other hand, Delaware Courts also provide a very prompt service in response to 
takeover challenges; it has to be pointed out however that although the challenge hearings take 
 See also G K Morse, Controlling Takeovers – “The Self-Regulation Option in the United Kingdom”, Journal of 143
Business Law (1998) at 58; T Peter Lee, “Takeover Regulation in the United Kingdom, European Takeovers: Law 
and Practices”, Klans Hope & E Wyneersch (Eds) 1992, at 133; and Lord Alexander of Weedon, Takeovers: The 
Regulatory Scene, Journal of Business Law  (1990) at 20.
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place without much delay, and the cases is decided as soon as the oral arguments of the parties 
concerned are completed, the overall process usually takes weeks and sometimes months.
In England, the takeover panel is able to adjust its regulatory responses to the parties as 
well as the changing dynamics of business within the City of London.  As the Panels are actively 
engaged with the parties, the Panel’s Executive are able to tailor the regulatory requirements (for 
example, compliance conditions or waiver rules etc.) to adjust to the circumstances of each case.
Finally, in England, lawyers play rather insignificant role in Takeover Panel oversight. 
The Panel’s members are derived from the principal shareholder and financial groups and the 
staff are primarily business and financial experts – in order to ensure that the Panel is business-
oriented; whereas in the US, in takeover issues lawyers are very heavily engaged.  Furthermore, 
as stated earlier that the Panel is very conscious of the fact that time is of the essence; thus, in 
order to minimise the time-scale of uncertainty for the target company, the Panel strictly adheres 
to the Takeover Code as to the time-scale prescribed by it for each stage involved in a take-over 
bid.  Again, for the sake of resolving bidding situation as quickly as possible, tactical litigations 
are usually avoided.
Unless the shareholders’ consent has been obtained, the Panel usually forbids the target 
board from initiating legal action regardless of the perceived merits of the claim in question.  The 
Panel’s decision is however subject to judicial review if a party should wish to challenge it.144
It is worth noting however that in England, according to the Court of Appeal, relief, if 
any granted at the judicial review stages, would only be declaratory as to the future conduct of 
 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815144
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the parties before a Panel rather than having any reflection on the validity of the decision which 
has been taken.145
By  contrast,  the  US  take-over  market  is  not  code-bound;  there  does  not  exist  any 
limitation of time as to how long an offer may remain open or as the times for which a bid may 
be repeated.  In the US, litigation as a defensive tactic is often employed by target boards.  For 
example, when in 2003, Oracle bid for PeopleSoft, the latter’s first response was to sue Oracle on 
the  alleged  grounds  of  deceptive  business  practice  and  tortious  interference  grounds 146
PeopleSoft persuaded the US Department of Justice to challenge the proposed acquisition on 
antitrust grounds.  Eighteen months later the government’s antitrust challenge had been rejected, 
and Oracle’s grounds prevailed.   Under the US practice,  target managers are allowed to use 
defences as stalling tactics. 
As to the litigation costs, in so far as England is concerned, this cannot be a worrying 
issue because hostile takeovers are hardly litigated in England; the Takeover Panel usually offers 
guidance to resolve the problems free of charge.  Their operations are funded by a free charge in 
relation to formal offers and shall levy paid on significant dealing in shares on the London Stock 
Exchange.147
By contrast, hostile takeovers in the US are litigated and litigations there are extremely 
expensive.  Thus, in England, the balance tilts towards friendly solutions of hostile takeover 
incidents
 op. cit., at 841-842145
 D Millstone & G Subumanian, Oracle v PeopleSoft: A Case Study, 7 September 2005, available at SSRN. Com.146
 The Appendix to the Takeover Code is an instructive document which details these charges.147
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Whereas  the  English  regulatory  regime  is  proactive  to  responding  to  market 
developments –  the US system, in general, is extremely regulatory.  Furthermore, in England, 
the Code of Committee of the Takeover Panel meets several times a year to familiarise itself with 
the most important market developments, and the operation of the market, in order to determine 
whether any amendments to the Takeover Code would be necessary, but in the US, changes in 
the market place lead to litigation, and the courts’ main practice would be to pronounce on the 
behaviour of the parties concerned in regard to hostile takeover bids.
In sum, in the US, whether to defend a bid or not is a matter of target managers, whereas 
in England, shareholders’ decision on this matter would be a deciding factor.   The principal 
decision-makers  in  the  US are  Congress  and the  Delaware  Courts,  in  England,  by  contrast, 
informal regulation by the Takeover Panel  becomes the most  important  factor.   The English 
system is more informal and market-oriented than the US system.
1.5  Some  of  the  Causes  of  Differences  between  the  US  and  the  UK  Defences  against 
Takeover Bids
1.5.1 The US position
Although the US takeover regulation came to the limelight when a number of Delaware 
takeover  cases  which  came before  the  Delaware  Courts  in  the  1980s.   The  history  of  such 
regulation may be traced much earlier.  A series of New Deal banking and Securities law reforms 
in the 1930s were initiated in the US.  Three decades later, after the emergence of hostile tender 
offers by virtue of the corporate law reforms and the amendments by the Williams Act to the 
securities  laws  the  Congress  to  pass  new securities  laws  the  following  year.   The  takeover 
regulation issues were then left to the Delaware courts.
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The 1929 crash preceded by the early years of depression led the US to correct the 
incidence of market abuses of the 1920s by imposing an anti-fraud regulation  in consequence 148
of  which  the  1933  and  1934  Securities  Acts  were  passed.   The  1934  Act  established  the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to serve as the principal regulatory body for regulating the 
market.   During the same period, the then Congress also enacted important banking legislation 
which  separated  commercial  banking  from  investment  banking,  and  established  deposit 
insurance to protect US savings.149
One of the objectives of the banking reforms was to break the near monopoly of, for 
example,  JP Morgan and a small  group of  other  banks had on US corporate finance and to 
diminish banks’ role in the governance of the largest corporations in the US.
In the US, takeovers did not enter the market in any significant way until 1954, where 
Robert Young launched his movement for control of the New York Central Railroad.   Although 
Young’s initiative for contract of New York contract railroad was quite successful, Wall Street 
believed in bidder’s powers and the satisfaction of company’s shareholders.
Hostile tender offers became increasingly common in the US in 1960s rising from 79 
between 1956 and 1960, to nearly twice this number from 1964 to 1966  which was primarily 150
because of the fact that the governance benefits of takeovers were defended at a governmental 
level.  However, the Wall Street investment banks and law firms refused to represent bidders in a 
hostile  takeover;  however,  some small  firms became the leading takeover  lawyers  by taking 
cases which larger firms refused to deal with.
 See further the work by Skeel, op, cit at 75-106148
 See also G Lass-Stengall Act and the Banking Act, 1935.149
 See note “Case Tender Offers”, 83 Harvard Law Review, (1969) at 377150
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In 1967, amendment s to Delaware’s General Corporation Law was made and as a result 
of the recommendations of a “Revision Committee” of 1967, Delaware passed its most radical 
corporate  law  reforms  since  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century.   By  virtue  of  the  1967 
amendments, the following developments occurred, in particular: (a) a sharp expansion of the 
powers of corporations to indemnifying their directors; (b) reviews of self-interested appraised 
rights.  These  reforms  were  aimed  at  addressing  concerns  that  were  frequently  raised  by 151
managers.
By the early 1960s, the pre-eminence of Delaware as the leading State of incorporation 
had started to decline.  The 1967 amendments triggered an increase in incorporation and re-
incorporation,  but ironically, by the 1980s, judicial challenges to hostile takeovers began, and 152
these were primarily dealt with in the Williams Act, 1968 which required disclosures by any 
party who had made a tender offer of more than five per cent of the target company’s stock; gave 
the shareholders the right to withdraw stock they had initially tendered to the bidder but this right 
was limited to the first seven days of the offer; this Act also requires a bidder to purchase stocks 
on a pro-rata basis, rather than purchasing first from the shareholders who tendered first; the offer 
would be kept open at least for forty days.   The overall purpose of this Act was to prevent 153
bidders from requiring shareholder to take a rapid decision, and making the offer available on a 
first come, first served basis (the so-called “Saturday night special” tender offers) by introducing 
 See further S Samuel, A & WK Stapleton, “Delaware’s New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes”, 23 151
Business Law (1967) at 75
 See,  for  example,  W W Bratton  and  J  A McCaleny,  “The  Content  of  Corporate  Federation”  (unpublished 152
manuscript) 2009 at 21-22.
 See further Note in 86 Harvard Law Review (1973), 1250, 1254-60153
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this  rule,  the  Act  aims  at  preventing  bidders  from  using  tactics  that  they  had  sometimes 
employed.  Managers of corporate entities benefited from the new rules, since they under the Act 
had enough time to launch their campaign against a hostile bidder. 
The 1980s saw another takeover boom in the US; this was primarily for the following 
reasons: (a) discovery of the financing potential of high yield debt; (b) deregulation; and (c) a 
rather lenient  approach adopted by the Reagan Administration to anti-trust regulation.  Target 
managers were able to fight back with a variety of defensive strategies, the most important of 
which was implementation of poison pills pioneered by Marty Lipton of Wachtell.  As poison 
pills seemed to be capable of shopping bidders, they challenged pills and other defences as an 
impermissible interference with their efforts to make a tender offer to target shareholders. 
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court issued three important decisions that completed 
the US tender offer regulation.  In Moran v Horse hold International Inc,  the Supreme Court 154
held  that  poison  pills  were  not  per  se  impermissible,  despite  the  fact  that  any  discriminate 
between the tender offer bidder and other shareholders of the target company.
In  Unocal  and Redlock,  the  same Court  identified the  initial  limitations  of  target 155
manager’s  use  of  poison  pills  and  other  defences.   In  order  to  defend  against  a  takeover, 
managers were now required to demonstrate that the hostile offer represented a threat to the 
corporation and that the defence was reasonably proportionate to the threat.  If the proposed 
takeover  became  clear,  target  would  still  be  allowed  to  get  the  highest  price  for  their 
shareholders.  In other words, the take-over bid must be fair to the shareholders.
 500 A 2nd 1346 (Del 1985)154
 493 A 2nd 946 (1985); Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc 506 A 2nd 173 (Del 1985)155
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The Delaware decisions seem to have persuaded other States also in the US and by the 
end of the 1980s, over forty States enacted anti-takeover legislation that protects the managers of 
the  companies  incorporated  in  the  State.   Briefly,  by  that  time,  state  legislatures  provided 
managers  of  target  corporations  with  new tools  for  resisting  takeover  bids  which  would  be 
considered to be unwanted.156
1.5.2 The English Position
        In  England,  hostile  takeovers  began  in  the  early  1950s,  which  was  triggered  by 
opportunities for asset arbitrage which was really occasioned by the economic upheavals of the 
post-war period.   Charles Clove’s takeover of shoe retailer of Sears in early 1953 is a good 157
example.  Clove realised that owing to inflation, Sears’ portfolio of city central assets where 
substantially undervalued in its accounts.  Investor’s valuation of shares was largely based on 158
dividend yields, but this was not regulated in its share price.  Thus, Clove made a tender offer 
directly  to  shareholders,  which  was  an  enormous  shock  for  city  establishments,  in  general. 
 See  further  “Corporate  Managers’ Success  in  persuading  state  legislatures  to  pass  anti-takeover  statutes  is 156
analysed in Roberta Romano, “The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes”, 73 Vanderbelt Law Review (1987) 111
 Dividend restrictions imposed by the government in the UK prompted many companies to hoard cash; see The 157
Economist,  Accounting Principles and the City Code: the Case for Reforms (1970);  however,  surging post-war 
inflation increased the value of fixed assets, see “The Shareholder Today”, The Economis, December 19, (1993) at 
904; see also Brian R Cheffins, Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The Reparation of Ownership and 
Control in the United Kingdom, Working Paper, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Law, 2005 – the value of 
corporate assets arose, dividend restraints caused share prices fall.
City Notes, The J Sears offer, The Times, 5 February, 1953 at 10158
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Although the Sears board promised to increase dividends and to revalue the firm’s property to 
reflect its higher value, the large majority of Sears accepted Clove’s offer.159
Initially, the advent of the takeover bid outrages the British Business Community to 
such  an  extent  that  they  believed  that  they  were  harmful  for  industry.   But,  things  started 
changing  when  in  1953,  Harold  Samuel,  another  financier  specialising  in  take-overs  began 
buying shares of Savoy Hotel Ltd.  Samuel’s intention was to convert the Savoy’s Berkley Hotel 
into commercial offices, and the Savoy’s board arranged instead for the Berkeley Hotel to be sold 
to a new entity, Worcester (London) Ltd and leased back to Savoy on condition that the building 
would be used only as a hotel.  The voting shares in Worcester were allotted to the trustees of 160
Savoy’s Pension Fund; this proved to be difficult for Mr Samuel to convert the label into offices 
even if he succeeded in ousting the Board.161
The Savoy episode was found to be extremely controversial by the City of London; 
indeed, this led to an investigation of the Board of Directors’ conduct initiated by the Board of 
Directors.  The  investigation  report  which  was  prepared  by  Mr  E  Milner  Holland,  QC 162
concluded that the Savoy Directors had overstepped their power as their motive was to disable 
the stockholders from varying the decision of the Board of Directors; however, by virtue of not 
being a court judgement, that finding had no legally binding force.   Savoy, on the other hand, 163
 See City Notes: J Sears’ Property Sales, The Times, 5 March 1954 at 13159
 Savoy Group’s New Company, The Times, 7 December, 1953, 12 December 1953 at 832-832160
 See LCB Gover, Corporate Control: The Battle for the Berkeley, 68 Harvard Law Review (1955) 1176161
 The Economist, Battle for the Savoy, 12 December, 1953, 831-832162
 Gower, op. citg., at 1192-1193163
 59
sought advice from another practising barrister, Ronald W Moon, according to whom the scheme 
was perfectly lawful.164
Then came the British Aluminium (BA) episode.  In 1958, the British Aluminium was 
approached  by  two  rival  companies  -  US  Reynolds  Metal  Company  and  the  Aluminium 
Company  of  America  (ALCOA).   Without  notifying  their  shareholders  British  Aluminium’s 
Board rejected US Reynold, and agreed to deal with ALCOA, indeed BA issued about one-third 
stake  in  the  company to  ALCOA.  But  Reynolds  having known this  deal  between BA and 
ALCOA, Reynolds directly made an offer to BA shareholders, which prompted BA to offer its 
shareholders a generous dividend increase.  This act on the part of the BA obviously angered the 
business community particularly on the fact that ALCOA had been permitted to buy a large block 
of shares at an undervalued price.   Incidentally, under the BA’s constitution, issuance of new 165
shares did not require shareholders’ approval. 
It was the British Aluminium incident that provoked calls for takeover regulation in the 
UK.  In July groups representing merchant banks, institutional investors, the largest commercial 
banks and the London Stock Exchange to develop a Code of Conduct to regulate takeover bids. 
Presumably, the business politics behind it was to ensure that this matter should not have been 
taken out of the hands of the City of London by legislation.
In the autumn of 1959, the Bank of England’s Committee announced the “Notes on 
Amalgamation  of  British  Businesses”,  which  contained  a  series  of  guidelines  in  order  to 
 Ronald W Moon, Business Mergers and Take-over Bids: A Study of the Post-War Pattern of Amalgamations and 164
Reconstructions of Companies, (1976 – 5th edition) at 128-132
See The Economist, Battle for British Aluminium, 6 December, 1958 at 913-915; see also The Economist, Choice 165
in British Aluminium, The Economist 13 December, 1958 at 1005-1006; 
“British  Aluminium  Reveals  Contract  with  Alcoa”;  The  Times,  29  November  1958;  also  “British  Aluminium 
Board’s Statement, The Times, 6 December, 1958 
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safeguard  the  interests  of  shareholders.   It  is  important  to  note  that  the  first  of  the  Notes 
announced by the Bank of England contained four main principles:‑166
(a) that there should be no interference with the free market in shares;
(b) that it was for the shareholders themselves to decide whether or not to sell their 
shares;
(c) that the shareholders must be provided with sufficient information in order to 
enable them to reach a considered decision; and
(d) That  the principle of  shareholder  primacy and the board neutrality must  be 
maintained .167
This Note of the Bank of England seems to have the effect of demands for legislation to have 
intervention.  However, the Notes were generally well-received by the City of London but were 
revised and improved in 1963   but the at the material time, the UK takeover market lacked 168 169
the mechanics for adjudication and enforcement.
In 1967, a battle between two bidders for the control of Metal Industries Ltb (“MI”), 
started, but a third party bought a block of shares in the market and sold them to one of the 
  the Editorial of the Times entitled “Take-over Ethics” dated 31 October, 1959 at 7.  Incidentally, although the 166
Jenkins Committee made more extensive proposals in relation to takeovers, they were never implemented.  See 
further  Board  of  Trade,  Report  of  the  Company  Law Committee  (The  Jenkins  Report)  Cmnd 1749  (1962)  at 
265-294.
See, for example, “City Code of Conduct on Take-over Bids”, The Times, 31 October, 1959 at 5-6; see also The 
Economist, 31 October, 1959 at 440-442
 See The Revised Code on Take-over Practices, The Times, 31 October, 1963; see also Take-over Bids: Principles 168
and Procedures, The Economist, 2 November, 1963 at 511.
 But, the Queensbury Rules (named after the drafter of the Rules, the Marquess of Queensbury) were also drafted 169
to regulate prize-fighting, but it  did not seem to have produced long-lasting effect on the City; see further The 
Economist 31 October, 1959 at 442.
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bidders in order to allow it to secure control over the Metal Industries Ltd,  which efforts were 170
analogous to the British Airways.
The  Bank  of  England’s  first  Note  did  not  last  long  primarily  owing  to  widespread 
evasion of it.   In July 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson emphasised that statutory rules 171
would not be the answer to regulate the City.   Within days, the Bank of England’s Working 172
Party had recommended starting the drafting of a new set of take-over rules, which led to the 
formation of a new Code which was very shareholder-oriented, but one of its special features 
was  that  its  form was  rather  specific.   It  consisted  of  ten  general  principles,  which  were 173
primarily based on the experience in the takeover transactions of the previous years.  Generally 
speaking, none of the important issues in take-over bids, namely, issuing of shares by companies, 
disposal of material assets or entering into important contracts would not be allowed without the 
approval of the shareholders; and that the principle of equal treatment of shareholders must be 
maintained.  Moreover,  a body of individuals were entrusted with the task of “adjudicating” 
disputes arising from the application of the rules.  The City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers was 
thus born on 27 March, 1968 – the Panel members (nine in number) would be drawn from city 
experts  who were  pro-actively  involved  in  mergers  and  take-overs.   There  were  yet  certain 
criticisms of the new system, namely, on the grounds that aggressive bidders were still running 
 The Times, Coup Behind the New Bid for MI of 8 June, 1967.170
 The Times, “Time for a Tough Line in the City”, 10 July, 1967 at 23.171
 The Economist, (1967) at 338172
 “A Momentous Stride forward for the City”, The Times, 27 March, 1968 at 27173
 62
“coach and horses through the Code”,  but the then Parliament approved the introduction of 174
any legislation to the City along the lines of the US, but would be prepared to enter amendments 
into the Code, if necessary.  Interestingly enough, within the next few months, the Panel was 
given a full-time executive staff paid for by the City institutions.  The former Attorney-General 
and President of the Board of Trade (Lord Shawcross) was appointed a non-executive Chairman, 
and an experienced take-over specialist, (Mr I Fraser from SG Warburg) was also appointed as an 
Executive Director-General.  An Appeal Committee was also constituted, but most importantly, 175
the Stock Exchange was given the power to  censure,  suspect  or  expel  a  company from the 
Official  List,  and  the  Board  of  Trade  had  similar  authority  over  licensed  share  dealers. 
Moreover,  the various trade associations represented on the Working Party agreed to impose 
sanctions upon recalcitrant member and even to expel them from the Association concerned, if 
asked to do so by the Panel.   This action, in effect, introduced what may be described as a 176
“clean-up” process of the securities market.  The Code’s Preamble incorporated rather 
“The Code has not, and does not seek to have, the force of law, but those who wish to take 
advantage  of  the  facilities  of  the  securities  markets  in  the  United  Kingdom should  conduct 
themselves in matters relating to take-overs according to the Code.  Those who do not conduct 
themselves cannot expect to enjoy those facilities and may find that they are withheld.”
  “Familiar Techniques of a Quaint World in the Ear”, The Times, 15 June, 1968 at 13 6174
 Enter the New Police Chiefs”, The Economist”, 1 March, 1969 at 76175
 “Support Grows for City’s New Code”, The Times, 30 June 1969 at 19. 176
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Despite the much welcome Code, the City had a fear that the Labour governments of the 
1970s would provoke legislation intervention.  177
In 1971, David Rowland, a shareholder in Venesta International, started to purchase its 
shares heavily in the markets  But his view was that by so doing he planned to preserve the value 
of his investment so that the company did not face any takeover – a kind of attempt to pre-empt a 
takeover of the company.  Eventually, he obtained a controlling interest in the company without 
making the bid.  The Panel came to the conclusion that Rowland’s open market purchases denied 
the  Company’s  shareholders  the  opportunity  to  sell  at  favourable  terms  which  Mr Rowland 
offered.   The Panel responded to this problem by requiring any person who purchased 40% or 178
more of a company’s share to make a bid for the remainder, and this threshold was amended to 
30% in 1974, which has still remained the practice in the City.   Unlike the US, where this kind 179
of  problems  are  governed  by  regulations  and  courts’  involvement  is  almost  invariably 
compulsory, in the UK on the other hand, self-regulation of the dealers remained the norm and 
the Panel would be invited to rule on any misconduct in relation to take-overs and mergers.  Sir 
John Donaldson, MR (as he then was) remarked on the Panel in the following way:
“The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers is a truly remarkable body.  Perched on the 20th floor of 
the Stock Exchange building in the City of London, both literally and metaphorically it overseas 
 “Who should  regulate  the  City?”,  30  May 1974,  at  1;  The  Times;  The  Stock  Exchange  Attacks  Alarming 177
Prejudice of Labour Green Paper”, 18 July 1974 1t 21; see also Take-over Panel, Report for the Year Ended, 31 
March 1975, and 1976 at 3
 See, for example, The Times, “New Problem for the Panel”, 18 December 1971, at 19178
 The Times, “Revised City Code Sets  Out New Rules on Mandatory Bids”, 6 June, 1974 at 19179
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and regulates a very important part of the United Kingdom financial market.  Yet it performs this 
function without visible means of legal support.”180
This discussion of the Code-based conduct and regulation -based on conduct would be 
enough to draw certain conclusions in regard to both the market.
1.5.3 Summarising the Similarities and Difference between the two systems
Both the US and the English Take-over  and Merger  markets  share  certain  common 
features as they also differ between themselves on certain issues.  The common features between 
them  would  be  making  of  capital  whether  for  the  securities  market  and/or  for  incidental 
beneficiaries.  Both the markets support the idea that the securities markets must be clean in 
order to invite investors in them, but the differences exist between them on the method(s) of 
keeping the markets clean; but the intentions of both the markets are the same.  In both the 
markets, the issue of ethics in business is a point of concern.  Furthermore, both the markets 
seem to believe in the soundness and predictability of the market; after all, without investors, 
securities markets would come to a standstill, in consequence of which economies will adversely 
suffer.  But, market regulation is largely an issue of market traditions; this is where the difference 
in the methods of regulating securities markets arise.
Whereas the US system does with the managers of corporate entities to extent their 
control  over  the  take-over  regulation,  primarily  because  corporate  managers  may  otherwise 
always look for better opportunities if the state is insufficiently attentive to the managers’ needs; 
hence in the US, lawmakers have powerful incentives to keep corporate managers happy.181
 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datfin plc [1987] QB 815 at 824180
 J Armour and David A Steel, Jr op. cit, at 42181
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By contrast,  in England (and the UK) which maintains a loose federalist structure, corporate 
managers  exert  far  less  influence.   Interestingly  enough,  as  stated  earlier  that  in  the  US, 182
corporate managers do influence the shape of state corporate law, particularly with respect to 
takeover bids, yet, under the US federation Delaware law seems to be more manager-friendly 
than the laws of other States.
Next,  that  in  both  the  jurisdictions  take-over  laws  do  not  seem  to  differ  much  in 
substance but in the mode of regulating the markets; whereas the US looks to the formal law 
believing that courts would be most effective institutions to enforce the law, the English (the UK) 
market believes in good conduct of the players on the security markets by means of Codes of 
Conduct  - a self-regulation system by the institutional investors.183
Incidentally,  by  the  1990s,  the  UK corporate  governance  system was  in  place,  and 
indeed, the large British companies, including  the financial institutions became a catalyst for the 
development of corporate governance, the effect of which was to provide more confidence in the 
minds of investors;  furthermore, their role in developing formal and informal norms which, 184
actually work for the City of London, still govern the operation of corporate enterprise.  This last 
practice is not so conspicuously available in the UK financial markets.  Again, it was through the 
financial institutions and large corporate entities, in the main, that, for example, both pre-emption 
rights and take-over defences, the introduction of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(which also dealt with the issues of board structure, tenure and compensation) in addition to 
, G Miller, “Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of Contrast between the United States 182
and England”, Columbia Business Law Review (1998) at 51.  
 See also J Armour and David A Steel, Jr op. cit at 43183
See, for example, Sir Adrian Cadbury, Report of the Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 184
(“The  Cadbury  Report”)  (1992);  see  also  Paul  L Davies,  “Institutional  Investors  in  the  United  Kingdom”  in 
Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (D D Prentice and I R Hollands eds) (1993) at 69
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strengthening of Listing Rules requiring shareholder consent for major corporate transactions 
occurred.185
In England, a kind of co-ordinated lobbying for rule that would maximise the benefit 
and welfare of institutions investors are taken seriously.  In this context, it ought to be pointed 
out that  institutional  investors were involved at  every stage of the drafting of the Take-over 
Code, as these investors have a clear interest in rules which would maximise the expected points 
to shareholders.  One can therefore maintain that England maintains a pro-shareholder approach 
to takeover regulation.
The Battle for British Aluminium was enough for the City to withdraw their support for 
any  pre-management  agenda  –  the  total  support  must  be  preserved  for  the  shareholders  in 
corporate entities.  Indeed, the Bank of England also seems to have received the message, and at 
subsequent  Working  Party  meeting  the  City  organisations  became  very  heavily  involved  in 
drafting of Notes.   This must be accepted as a major difference between the approaches at 186
takeovers by City organisations in England and the organisations in the US.  Furthermore, this 
attitude towards shareholder-orientate markets has been ingrained in the mind of the City for a 
very long time indeed. 
The  pro-management  take-over  deals  had  its  weaknesses  also,  in  addition  to  much 
reliance  on  rules  which  were  often  in  breach  by  the  US  corporate  world.   The  New Deal 
reformers  (1935)  believed that  that  NYSE’s  regulatory efforts  were  inadequate  in  that  more 
disclosure was needed.  As part of the campaign to modify the existing practice as well as to 
minimise  the  influence  of  Wall  Street  insiders  in  US  corporate  governance,  the  reformers 
 See  generally,  B  Black  &  J  C  Coffce,  “Hail  Britannia?”  Institutional  Investor  Behaviour  under  Limited 185
Regulation”; 92 Michigan Law Review (1994) 1997
 See, for example, The Economist, “Rules for Take-overs”, 17 October 1959 at 270186
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hardened up the Securities Act, providing in it, inter alia, that the primary source of securities 
regulation would be mandatory, and that the US Congress must have the power to oversee the 
behaviour of the securities market in the US securities market.187
The English practice of organising the financial world had directly or indirectly shaped 
the US finance world in that closeness of the players on the market by concentrating in a small 
geographic area, known as the City of London, prompted the players on the US financial markets 
to concentrate in Lower Manhattan whereby they could jointly reach their decisions made more 
promptly than ever before, although unlike in the UK directors’ fiduciary duties are still regulated 
by some of the States (example: Wilmington and Delaware).  But the US still maintained its 
basic  practice  –  management-dominated  and  not  shareholder-dominated  financial  market. 
Furthermore,  in  England,  the  financial  market  may  not  disregard  the  role  of  corporate 
governance in keeping the market orderly and predictable in its movement.188
In so far as the takeover bids are concerned, the US SEC’s authority was limited to 
ensuring adequate disclosure and policing of fraud.  In other words, at the end of day, it is for the 
courts to decide whether a bid was fair or unfair; this is where the differences emanate from a 
Code-based market and a regulation-based market.
The US justification for regulation-based markets has been that by so doing the courts 
will be final decision-makers on take-over bids, and that in their decision-making process, they 
will be governed by the possibility whereby the financially stronger party may compel the other 
 See the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; see also Roberta Karmel, “Realizing the Dream of William O Douglas: 187
The  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  takes  Charge  of  Corporate  Governance”,  30  Delaware  Journal  of 
Corporations (2005) 79
 See further J Armour and D R Steal, Jn op. cit., at 56188
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side to come to the court, and win the game.   This view also maintains that this system would 189
be better than Code-based conduct system to protect the interests of individuals or a group of 
litigants.   But  one  must  also  overview that  the  first  bidder  will  have  no  choice  other  than 
worrying about the high costs involved in litigation.  From this point of view, a decision of the 
Take-Over  Panel  would  be  quicker  and  less  expensive.   Furthermore,  according  to  Coffce, 
judicial precedents tend to exhibit a pro-management bias owing to judges’ unwillingness to give 
multi-million dollar liabilities on directors where their conduct is not morally reprehensible.190
There exist certain similarities however between the two systems particularly in regard 
to the issue of proportionality of defence to the perceived threat.  In Criteria Properties plc v 
Stratford UK Properties LLC.  This case was eventually referred to the House of Lords, the 
decision of which was similar to that of the Court of Appeal but on different grounds.  It is a 
defence against a bid to a take-over plan, the target company implements an onerous lock-up 
agreement, as a ‑ “poison pill” in the context of a defence against a prospective take-over bid. 191
Carrwalter,  LJ who rendered the leading judgment  stated that  a  lock-up might  be justifiable 
against a hostile acquirer who threatened the company’s existing business, but also stated that the 
arrangement in question was disproportionate to the perceived threat; the action was directed not 
only at the particular bidder, but also aimed at bringing in changes in the management of the 
company.  In Unocal,  the Delaware Courts also applied the “proportionality test”.192
 See further M J Bailey and P H Rubin, “A Positive Theory of Legal Change”, 14 International Review of Law 189
and Economics (1994) at  467; see also K N Hylton, “Information, Litigation and Common Law Evolution”,  8 
American Law and Economics Review (2006) at 32
 John C Coffce, Jr and Donald E Schwartz, “The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal 190
for Reform”, 81 Columbia Law Review (1981) 261, 316-318
  [2009] 1 WLR 2108; see also [2004] 1 WLR 1846191
 See further B Clarke, “Regulating Poison Pills”, 4 Journal of Corporate Legal Studies (2004) 51192
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Despite the merits and disadvantages between the defence tactics between the US and 
English systems, the reasons for which have already been identified and critically examined, the 
fact remains that take-over defence tactics in any jurisdiction seem to be very much guided by 
the business policies practiced by a financial world over a long period of time.  Thus, it would be 
difficult  to expect  any radical  changes to be introduced into either  of  the systems discussed 
above.
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CHAPTER 2: An Examination of the usual rationale behind Acquisitions and Mergers.
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter an attempt is made to examine the validity of the rationale that is usually 
put forward by an acquiring company in justifying the acquisition of the target company with a 
view to merging it in the future. In the business world there seems to have developed certain 
identifiable  practices  including  defences  against  mergers  in  the  process  of  Acquisitions  and 
Mergers and this chapter thoroughly examines those processes. Fundamental objective of this 
chapter is to identify the rationale for acquisitions and mergers of such companies. The primitive 
reason for this activity is to attain the expertise of smaller companies by a larger company. But in 
this process everybody belonging to the latter mainly employees, management staff, shareholders 
and stakeholders will have same impact on each of them.193
In the context of this chapter, it is not deemed necessary to go into details of all forms of 
acquisitions and mergers. But a brief account of the process has nevertheless been identified to 
justify the need for takeover defences. Furthermore, under the English Companies Act 2006, it is 
obligatory  to  protect  the  interests  of  minority  shareholders  of  the  company.  The  perception 
requires the need for raising defences against acquisitions and mergers. 
2.2 Acquisitions
An Acquisition refers to the process of a firm or business entity acquiring another firm or 
a business entity. When the two companies merge to form one business entity given that the 
 Ibid 97193
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previous companies cannot survive on their own, then the fore mentioned firms are said to be 
consolidated.194
In some of the acquisition deals, the acquiring firm may buy the target company with 
cash, stocks or even a combination of the two. The offeror acquires all the resources of the target 
firm. In this process, when the acquiring firm purchases all the assets of the target firm with cash, 
the target firm will eventually have only cash and perhaps some debts too. Consequently, the 
target firm is more of a skeleton company and can eventually liquidate or invest in another type 
of profitable business.
It  can  however  be  hard  to  comprehend  certain  types  of  acquisitions.  A  reversed 
acquisition is one such type that happens in a very dramatic way. It occurs in such a way that a 
private firm acquires a publicly listed firm.  It happens when the private company has strong 195
financial projections and is eager to expand, therefore purchases a skeleton of publicly listed 
company usually with limited assets.
Despite different organisational structures, they share a common goal. They are destined 
to develop a synergy that would make it worth for the joint firm to be competitors over other 
companies in the same business. Provided, this synergy can be achieved, then the mergers or 
acquisitions are likely to become a profitable venture.196
Ericsson,  K.  Anders,  Ralf  T.  Krampe,  and  Clemens  Tesch-Römer.  "The  role  of  deliberate  practice  in  the 194
acquisition of expert performance." Psychological review 100, no. 3 (1993): 363.
Ravenscraft, David J., and Frederic M. Scherer. "The profitability of mergers." International journal of industrial 195
organization 7.1 (1989): 101-116.
Ravenscraft, David J., and Frederic M. Scherer. "The profitability of mergers." International journal of industrial 196
organization 7.1 (1989): 101-116.
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2.3 The differences between acquisitions and mergers
Commonly, the terms “acquisitions” and “mergers” have been used to denote the same 
concept.  Even so, the truth is that there exist differences in the meaning of the terms. Whereas, 197
acquisition means taking over another company completely, merger refers to consolidation of the 
businesses. In acquisitions, the overtaking firm clearly establishes itself as the eventual owner of 
the firm. From a legal standpoint, the target firm no longer exists. On the other side, a merger 
happens  when two firms,  notably  the  acquirer  and the  target  correspond together  and move 
forward as a single corporate entity instead of operating themselves independently.  
An actual merger of matches is something rare to come by. It usually happens when one 
of  the  companies  buys  the  other.  One  major  reason  that  promotes  the  rationale  behind 
considering acquisitions as mergers is the negative reputation associated with being bought. This 
has therefore led to deals that are more of acquisitions being considered as mergers for the sake 
of making the takeover appear more agreeable. But ultimately it is not pleasant as one side’s 
management is more dominant of the other side’s management, and they invariably lose their 
jobs. Another point is that often an acquisition triggers divestments.  As the acquirer may not 198
want the entire acquired package of companies and separate themselves of the companies that do 
not fit into their core business.  
The occurrence of Mergers is also initiated by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) to push a 
decision from the shareholders when the management believes and agrees that their union is in 
the best interest of each of the firms. In a situation where the deal turns out to be aggressive it is 
Eccles,  Robert  G.,  Kersten  L.  Lanes,  and  Thomas  C.  Wilson.  "Are  you  paying  too  much  for  that 197
acquisition?." Harvard Business Review 77, no. 4 (1999): 136.
  The meaning of “divestment” is the action or process of selling off subsidiary business interests or investments. 198
p58, Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford University Press, Second edition, 2005
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considered as a hostile acquisition.  A deal may be considered as either an acquisition or a 199
merger  depending  on  whether  it  is  aggressive  or  friendly  and  also  on  how  it  has  been 
communicated.  All  the  same,  the  distinction  lies  on  how the  deal  has  been  announced  and 
perceived by the  targets  firm’s  shareholders,  board  of  directors  and shareholders  are  among 
others.200
2.4 Synergy
The term “synergy” refers to those factors that create room for enhanced cost efficiency 
of the new business. It is usually a symbol of revenue enhancement and saving cost.201
Unfortunately, synergy is more of an ideology than an aspect in practice. They may not talk 
of synergy, but that is what they want by restructuring/rationalisation etc. Its opportunities only 
occur in the minds of the corporate leaders and those involved in striking the deal. This has great 
influence on the activities of mergers as it is the base upon which a merger is formed. The CEOs 
and the investment bankers have been looked down upon when it comes to facilitating mergers. 
Investment  bankers  double-check  the  cash  flow  and  assumptions  before  financing  such 
operations. They do not want to be “locked in” to a bad loan and risk getting their investment 
 Ibid pp. 201199
Nguyen,  Han,  and  Brian  H.  Kleiner.  "The  effective  management  of  mergers."  Leadership  &  Organization 200
Development Journal 24.8 (2003): 447-454.
Weber, John A., and Utpal M. Dholakia. "Including marketing synergy in acquisition 201
analysis:: A step-wise approach." Industrial Marketing Management 29, no. 2 (2000): 157-177.
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stuck. Even where there is no value to be created, the CEOs and the investment bankers who are 
most likely to benefit from the deal do create an image of enhanced value.202
Quite often when two companies merge, they expect to gain from several aspects of the 
union:
I. Economies of scale
This  has  an  advantage  when  it  comes  to  making  purchases  of  the  newly  formed  firm’s 
operations such as stationary supplies and other orders.  This is due to the vast size of the 203
operating firm, which implies enhanced power of acquiring orders at lower prices and effective 
negotiation ability. In the long run, the firm is able to save more on cost and expenses. 
II.  Improved market proximity and industry visibility 
One of the major reasons which motivate the firms to combine is that they expect to reach 
new markets and improve their earnings and revenues. A merge has the potential of expanding 
the marketing and distribution capacity of the two firms, availing the anticipated increased new 
sales. It has the ability to raise a company’s standing with the investment fraternity.204
III. Staff reductions
A merge of two firms has an intermediate effect of the staff with regard to the management of 
the new firm. In the process, there is staff reduction across the firm. 
 Ibid 122202
Datta,  Deepak  K.  "Organizational  fit  and  acquisition  performance:  Effects  of  post-acquisition 203
integration." Strategic management journal 12.4 (1991): 281-297.
 Where bigger firms have more advantage raising capital as compared to the small firms204
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The law of redundancy differs in the US between the component States. In England, the law 
is much stronger and this is not allowed to happen, in case they do, they have to pay the statutory 
legal minimum in England. CEOs/Directors often have a much better deal than others.
IV. Reduction/Rationalisation of officer or manufacturing capabilities  
It is important to be up to date with the technological advancements. Such motives create 
lucrative opportunity for a larger firm to take over another firm may it be small or large but have 
unique technological systems and applications.  The reason for the acquirer opting for this may 205
be that in their case they have not been investing in research and development and have been 
paying high dividends. Any acquisition opportunity to acquire technology or new products aids 
them out of this problem.206
Even so,  it  is  not  that  easy  to  achieve  synergy  as  it  is  often  perceived  by  the  business 
community. Occasionally, and contrary to the business community’s expectation, some of the 
firms fail to acquire economies of scale.  It is noted that in many instances the mergers have 207
resulted with the value of the final merger being less than the value of the two firms combined.
2.5 Types of Acquisitions
The types of acquisitions are defined principally by the kind of business structure that the 
acquisition exists in. In this context, one should consider more aspects, which are distinguished 
Nahavandi,  Afsaneh,  and  Ali  R.  Malekzadeh.  "Acculturation  in  mergers  and  acquisitions."   Academy  of 205
management review 13.1 (1988): 79-90.
 Ibid 67206
Cartwright, Sue, and Cary L. Cooper. "The psychological impact of merger and acquisition on the individual: A 207
study of building society managers." Human relations 46.3 (1993): 327-347.
 76
by the relationship that exists in between the companies that are acquiring.  Acquisitions can take 
the  following  main  forms;  horizontal,  vertical  market  extension,  product  extension, 
conglomeration, purchase and consolidation.  The perception that usually prompts an acquiring 208
company to take a target company over is mainly to benefit through synergy, the assets and 
expertise in the last company with a view to make larger profits by taking a larger share in the 
concerned market. In this process as stated earlier, the target company totally disappears from the 
market  as  it  converts  onto the other  one.  The latter  company must  be very particular  about 
identifying  the  defences  needed  to  be  put  forward  against  proposed  acquisitions.  Where  an 
acquisition  and  takeover  process  derogates  from  the  legislative  requirements,  it  is  for  the 
Takeover Panel to consider that issue and deliver their solution on it.  Thus, defences against 209
acquisitions and takeovers have a regulatory protection mechanism. When an acquisition and 
takeover process becomes hostile, the issue of defences becomes ever more significant. However, 
before going into the details of acquisitions and takeovers, it is very necessary to briefly examine 
the basic characteristics of acquisitions and takeovers. 
Horizontal acquisition: This acquisition refers to an acquisition where the merging corporations 
share the same product lines and markets. The products produced by the firm are similar and 
hence are said to be strategically fit to operate as a single entity.  Although there are examples 210
 Ibid 112208
Fowler,  Karen  L.,  and  Dennis  R.  Schmidt.  "Determinants  of  tender  offer  post-acquisition  financial 209
performance." Strategic Management Journal 10.4 (1989): 339-350.
Ibid 121.210
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to establish that companies manufacturing different products can also merge such as Cadbury 
UK Limited and Kraft Foods Group Inc.    
 Vertical acquisition (forward or backward integration): This is an acquisition in which a 
company  may  acquire  with  its  customer  (forward  integration)  or  similarly  a  company  may 
acquire with its suppliers (backward integration).  A more literal example is where a bakery 211
may come together  with a  wheat  vending firm. Two companies along the same value chain 
combined is a vertical acquisition, for example: a supplier and manufacturer acquiring. They are 
commonly done to gain economies/synergy and to increase competitive advantage within the 
marketplace. 
Market extension acquisition: Here exists two firms dealing in the same product line 
but  have  different  geographical  markets.  In  this  acquisition,  the  firms  operate  in  different 
location, but management is centralised.  The different firms serve different market locations 212
depending upon the requirements and the needs. This means that it is a “risk reduction” strategy 
and that they are not dependent economically on one geographical area and also would not be 
vulnerable to currency movements. 
Product extension acquisition: This acquisition involves firms dealing in distinct but 
related products, which they sell in a common market. The products can be related in various 
ways and aspects . They can obtain synergy by using the same distribution channels for the 213
products. 
Hennart, Jean-Francois, and Young-Ryeol Park. "Greenfield vs. acquisition: The strategy of Japanese investors in 211
the United States." Management science 39.9 (1993): 1054-1070.
Cartwright, Sue, and Cary L. Cooper. Managing mergers acquisitions and strategic alliances. Routledge, 2012.212
 Ibid 99213
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Conglomeration:  This  particular  type  of  acquisition  is  one  that  has  its  constituent 
dealing in totally different business areas. In conglomeration, a company owns the controlling 
stake in  the company that  is  being acquired with.  Conglomerates  “core” business  is  closely 
associated with management. The management of very diverse types of businesses comes into 
this category.214
Another form of classification that may categorise the acquisition is based on how the 
acquisition is financed. Each category has associated implications on the involved firms and the 
investors. 
Purchase Acquisitions: Purchase acquisitions occur when one firm buys out the other. 
Considering that the sale is cash or rather through issuance of some sort of debit instrument, it is 
taxable.  This  acquisition is  highly preferred by the acquiring firms owing to its  ability  to 215
provide them with tax benefits. Similarly, the assets that have been acquired can be written up to 
genuine buying price,  and the disparity between the purchase price and the book value may 
appreciate annually, thereby, lowering the taxes payable by the acquiring firm. 216
Consolidated Acquisition: In this type of acquisition, a new firm comes into existence 
and the two companies are bought into one. In the end of the process, there only exists one major 
Marks, Mitchell Lee. "Consulting in mergers and acquisitions: Interventions spawned by recent trends." Journal 214
of Organizational Change Management 10.3 (1997): 267-279.
McDonald, Michael L., James D. Westphal, and Melissa E. Graebner. "What do they know? The effects of outside 215
director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance." Strategic Management Journal 29, no. 11 (2008): 
1155-1177.
 Ibid 43216
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firm. In this case, the terms and conditions of the taxes are the same as those of a purchase 
acquisition.217
Regardless of the structure or the category, that they may fall in, all the acquisitions have a 
common objective. They are designated to develop a synergy that combines the value of the joint 
firms exceeding the sum of the two firms individually. An achievement of a synergy determines 
the success of an acquisition.218
2.6 Reasons for Acquisitions
When the  process  of  execution  and  takeover  process  becomes  friendly  then  there  is 
hardly any need for a target company to put any defences. It may be safely presumed that making 
the management of the target Company and shareholder has reached a decision on this issue 
whereby no defences are required . Defences are very much required in the case of hostile 219
acquisitions and takeovers.
Every successful acquisition is associated with certain merits in which both companies 
have considered towards making that decision . The research of Sammons emphasised on the 220
fact that the main purpose for or rather rationale behind acquisition is increasing the revenue by 
optimising the production standard and increasing the value of the firm to an extent that is greater 
Roll, Richard. "The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers." Journal of business (1986): 197-216.217
 In a case where the synergy is not achieved, the merger or acquisition is likely to fail or the acquirer themselves 218
becomes vulnerable for a subsequent takeover by someone else. 
Pinker, Aron, C. Smith, and Jack Booher. "Selecting effective acquisition process metrics." Acquisition Review 219
Quarterly 4, no. 2 (1997): 189-208.
 Ibid 117220
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than the sum of the values of the two firms combined.  Furthermore, it was also analysed that 221
the principle fostering acquisitions is: 3 + 3 =10.  In a more realistic example we may take two 222
firms that could be supposed as C and D, where C has a value of 3 billion and D has 3 billion 
British pounds. When the two firms merge, their total value becomes 6 billion. Even so, in the 
joining, the acquisition of a company is expected to create additional value, which is referred to 
as “synergy” benefits.223
As per  the  research of  Chatterjee,  synergy could be defined as  the  concepts  that  the 
esteem and execution of two organisations consolidated will be more prominent than the whole 
of the different individual parts.  Synergy is a term that is regularly utilised as a part of the 224
setting of mergers and acquisitions.
 A synergy value may have three phase names; revenues, expenses and cost of capital. It is 
expected that when a company is acquired, higher revenue than the one including of the sum of the two 
firms should be achieved.  Alternatively, the expenses are expected to go down as compared to when 225
the two firms work separately e.g. productivity, redundancies. 
Out of the three contributors to the synergy value, expenses play the most important role. Often 
firms acquire in order to minimise the costs resulting from avoiding recurring costs such as Accounting, 
Sammons, Peter A.  Buying Knowledge: Effective Acquisition of External Knowledge.  Gower Publishing, Ltd., 221
2005.
 Ibid 119222
 Ibid 99223
Chatterjee,  Sayan.  "Types of  synergy and economic value:  The impact  of  acquisitions on merging and rival 224
firms." Strategic management journal 7, no. 2 (1986): 119-139.
 Ibid 89225
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Information Technology, Human Resources and also increased bargaining power . Effective and 226
efficient acquisitions are associated with a number of strategic reasons for acquisition amongst others 
strategic positioning, gap filling, organisational competencies, and broader market access.
Simple  positioning  implies  taking  advantage  of  opportunities  that  may  arise  and  can  be 
exploited when the firms come together . For example, where a telecommunications company would 227
improve its position in the market in future by acquiring a broadband service company. Firms have to 
develop strategies in order to take advantage of the emerging trends in the market place. Due to 
changing environmental factors such as technological change, and change in legislation. One of the 
firms may have a weakness in an area such as logistics unlike the counterpart, which may be stronger 
because they have more advanced technology.228
Organisational competencies involve acquiring human resources and intellectual capital would 
in  developing  creative  thinking  within  the  firm.  However,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  strategic 
individuals will stay post the merger of two companies.229
Similarly, cross border acquisitions provide opportunity of internationalisation of markets but 
this might be restricted by the corporate direct investment legislation of the country. Beside the strategic 
 Ibid 100226
Cartwright, Susan, and Richard Schoenberg. "Thirty years of mergers and acquisitions research: Recent advances 227
and future opportunities." British journal of management 17, no. S1 (2006).
Weber, Yaakov, and David M. Schweiger. "Top management culture conflict in mergers and acquisitions: A lesson 228
from anthropology." International Journal of Conflict Management 3.4 (1992): 285-302.
Schilit, Bill. "Why e-Read? Finding opportunities in the merger of paper and computers." The Future of Print 229
Media (1999).
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principles and reasons behind takeovers, acquiring companies look to acquire assets on the cheap 
diversification, short-term growth and undervalued targets. 230
Beginning with a bargain purchase, it may be quicker to acquire distinctly another firm as 
compared to making internal investments. For example, when a company is planning to reinstate 
fabrication facilities and there is a firm somewhere with the much-needed facilities that are lying futile. 
It would be more affordable and quicker to acquire the company with the idle facilities than construct a 
new one altogether. Diversification is another basic reason for takeovers.  A company may look for 231
cash flow and maintain long-term growth and profitability.  This is the case with the exhaustive firm 
where further growth is very unlikely owing to the lack of investment, old technology or a stagnant 
industry. 
When target firms become oppressively undervalued, when they themselves are not exhibiting 
“synergy”,  they  tend  to  be  potential  investment  targets  for  companies.  Some  acquisitions  are 
undertaken for strategic reasons; e.g. financial reasons. A vivid example is Kohlberg, Kravis and 
Roberts taking over the poor performing firms and replacing their management.  Restructuring the 232
company, initiating asset sales or spinoffs. Often in the case of leveraged buyouts  they are under 233
pressure from the banks via covenants in syndication documents to sell off parts of the company to get 
the level of debt to a much more manageable level. They ultimately in leveraged buyouts want to get 
Giacomazzi,  Franco,  et  al.  "Information  systems  integration  in  mergers  and  acquisitions:  A  normative 230
model." Information & management 32.6 (1997): 289-302.
Weber, Yaakov, Israel Drori, and Shlomo Y. Tarba. "Culture-performance relationships in mergers and acquisition: 231
The role of trust." European Journal of Cross-Cultural Competence and Management 2.3-4 (2012): 252-274.
 “Kohlberg, Kravis and Robert’s History”,  http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/kohlberg-kravis-232
roberts-co-history accessed on 22 June 2016 
 The meaning of “Leveraged buyout” is the purchase of a controlling share in a company by its management using 233
outside capital.  p1006, Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford University Press, Second edition, 2005
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the value of the asset sales and remaining company before re listing worth more than they paid for the 
total company in the first place.
2.7 The stages of acquisitions
Stage 1: Pre Acquisition Review 
An assessment of the firm’s financial performance is usually important in determining 
whether an acquisition is profitable. Where a firm may foresee future difficulties in maintaining 
core  competencies,  return  on  capital,  market  share  or  any  other  performance  element,  then 
acquisitions would be a recommended resolution.  This is not necessarily the case, companies 234
may employ a “company director” or “turnaround specialist” to bring a company back from the 
brink . 235
Similarly,  it  is  important  for  a  firm  to  consider  its  value  and  whether  the  firm  has 
“hidden” assets . It is upon the management of the firm to maintain or improve the value of a 236
firm, if they fail to do so then they are not achieving synergy and they may find themselves on 
the  receiving  end  of  an  acquisition  bid.  Consequently,  any  prior  measures  that  should  be 
undertaken by a firm include valuation of the company including assets difficult to value such as 
brand names, undervalued property or new products about to come on stream. Further, should the 
Lodorfos, George, and Agyenim Boateng. "The role of culture in the merger and acquisition process: Evidence 234
from the European chemical industry." Management Decision 44.10 (2006): 1405-1421.
Pallonen, Unto E., James O. Prochaska, Wayne F. Velicer, Alexander V. Prokhorov, and Nelson F. Smith. "Stages 235
of acquisition and cessation for adolescent smoking: an empirical integration." Addictive behaviors 23, no. 3 (1998): 
303-324.
 Hidden assets are intellectual property etc. 236
 84
acquisition be appropriate the target should also gauge whether the activity would increase the 
value of the firm.237
The major focus of the acquirer in the first  stage is to gauge whether certain growth 
targets over a period of time are achievable. As for instance, an acquiring firm would want to see 
whether it is possible to have 20% growth in the next few following years.  If that were not the 238
case, then the acquisition team would identify and establish criteria through which the acquiring 
firm can grow by a way of acquisition. An effective plan is highly essential to the pre-acquisition 
stage. It should define the way in which the growth will be achieved through an acquisition.  239
This may entail the firm collecting data on the target. At this early stage it is possible that a 
number of targets may be identified for initial tracking /investigating further. 
Stage 2 - Search and Screen Targets
In this phase, the major business involved in the process for active search of possible takeover 
candidates. The target companies have to accomplish a set of criteria so that the Target Company 
becomes a “good strategic fit” with the acquiring company. For instance, the target and facilitators of 
performance may complement if the acquisition is friendly.   The ability to be compatible and fit 240
should be assessed across a range of criteria depending on the size, type of business, capital structure, 
organisational strengths, core competencies, market channels, etc. The acquiring company undertakes 
Stevens, Donald L. "Financial characteristics of merged firms: A multivariate analysis." Journal of Financial and 237
Quantitative Analysis 8.2 (1973): 149-158.
 Ibid 118238
Ibid 142239
Bruner, Robert F. Applied mergers and acquisitions. Vol. 173. John Wiley & Sons, 2004.240
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the process of search and screening by conducting through research and evaluation.  This identical 241
process can also be done by an investment bank, which will search for takeover candidates because 
they want to finance the deal and obtain substantial advisory fees in a protracted takeover battle. 
Alternatively, they may employ outside advisers to identify targets. These are often revealed to the top 
managers of their “lead bank” who they require to help by putting the financial package together as the 
syndicate leader. This information is highly confidential and involves “Chinese walls” with other areas 
of the bank to prevent insider-dealing occurring.  However, it is also evident that “Chinese walls” may 
not work if insider dealing is allowed.242
Stage 3 - Investigate and Value the Target: 
The third phase involves the performance of a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the target 
company. At this point, the acquiring company is concerned with making sure that the Target Company 
is  actually a good fit  with the acquiring company. This requires a comprehensive assessment of 
operations, strategies, financials, and other aspects of the Target Company. The comprehensive review 
process is  known ‘due diligence.’ In particular,  first  phase of  the process,  “Due Diligence” is 243
commenced immediately when the target company is proposed and selected. The focal objective is to 
identify different synergy values that can be realised through the Target Company. The investment 
Larsson, Rikard, and Sydney Finkelstein. "Integrating strategic, organizational, and human resource perspectives 241
on mergers and acquisitions: A case survey of synergy realization." Organization science 10.1 (1999): 1-26.
Braem, P. Boyes. "Acquisition of the handshape in American Sign Language: A preliminary analysis." In From 242
gesture to language in hearing and deaf children, pp. 107-127. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1990.
Forstmann, Stephan. "Managing cultural differences in cross-cultural mergers and acquisitions." DE GRUYTER 243
STUDIES IN ORGANIZATION (1998): 57-84.
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bankers are often involved at the beginning advising the acquirer company of the viability of the 
takeover venture.244
One of the significant aspects of “due diligence” is the valuation of the target company.  In 245
the preliminary phases, the acquirer determines the total value for the joint company. The value of the 
acquiring company is determined as well as all other costs associated with. The calculation can be 
summarised as follows:
Value of Our Company (Acquiring Company) xxx
Value of Target Company xxx
Value of Synergies per Phase I Due Diligence xxx
Less Cost (Legal, Investment Bank, etc.) xxx
Total Value of Combined Company xxx
Controversies exist as to effectiveness of the due diligence when it is one of certain jurisdictions which 
do not believe in transparency. 
Stage 4 - Acquire through Negotiation 
This stage involves the process of negotiating acquisition. Questions formulated will be used to develop 
a negotiation plan for the transaction: 
▪ How much resistance will be encountered from the Target Company?
▪ What are the benefits for the Target Company?
Weber, Yaakov, and Israel Drori. "Integrating organisational and human behaviour perspectives on mergers and 244
acquisitions: Looking inside the black box."  International Studies of Management & Organisation  41.3 (2011): 
76-95.
 Ibid 110245
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▪ What are the benefits the acquiring company is trying to achieve as this may influence any 
strategy?
▪ What will be the acquiring company’s bidding strategy?
▪ How much is offered in the first round of bidding?
The general approach used to acquire another company for the management of both companies 
is to reach on an agreement through which a negotiated merger is to be formulated.  The negotiated 246
arrangement is often known as a "bear hug."  In situations where opposition is expected from the target, 
the acquiring firm will obtain a limited interest in the target; otherwise referred to as a "toehold 
position."  This toehold position ensures that the target company initiates negotiation without sending 247
the target into panic mode. Sometime acquirers build up a holding quietly just below the threshold and 
after which they are required to launch a bid.248
In situations where the target is expected to push over any takeover attempt, the acquiring 
company will advance a tender offer directly to the shareholders of the target, avoiding the target's 
management. Tender offers are bear in mind the following:
• The price presented is above the target's prevailing market price.
• The offer applies to significant and outstanding amount of shares of stocks.
• The offer is open for a definite period of time; and, 
• The offer is made to the public shareholders of the target.
Berger, Allen N., et al. "The effects of bank mergers and acquisitions on small business lending."  Journal of 246
financial Economics 50.2 (1998): 187-229.
Hogarty, Thomas F. "The profitability of corporate mergers." The Journal of Business 43.3 (1970): 317-327.247
 Ibid 133248
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The tender  offers  are  generally  more  expensive  than  negotiated  Acquisition’s  due  to  the 
opposition of target management and the fact that the target is vulnerable and are likely to attract other 
bidders.
The other vital element when two companies merge is Phase II of the Due Diligence process. 
As mentioned earlier, Phase I Due Diligence starts when the acquirer chooses the target company. The 
Phase II Due Diligence sets off an intensive negotiating process that will ultimately lead to the takeover. 
The merger  and acquisition  involving the  two companies  will  launch a  very  detailed  review to 
determine if the projected merger materialises.  This requires a very detailed review of the target 249
company - financials, operations, corporate culture, strategic issues, etc. Statutory accountants carrying 
out this process can be deemed guilty of “professional negligence” if something later comes out of the 
woodwork. 
Stage 5 - Post Acquisition Integration:
The two companies make an announcement concerning the agreement  to merge the two 
companies in an instance of successful negotiation. The contract is completed in a formal merger and 
acquisition agreement. This result to the fifth and final phase of the process represented as the merger 250
of the two companies. 
The companies are different in terms of culture, information systems and strategies. This makes 
the Post Merger Integration Phase the most “complicated” one in the process. The two companies are 
brought together in order to work as a single unit. This requires widespread planning and design 
Keeton,  William R.  "Do bank mergers  reduce lending to  businesses  and farmers? New evidence from tenth 249
district states." Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 81.3 (1996): 63.
Datta,  Deepak  K.  "Organisational  fit  and  acquisition  performance:  Effects  of  post-acquisition 250
integration." Strategic management journal 12.4 (1991): 281-297.
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throughout the entire organisation.   This may be completed over quite a long timeframe. The 251
integration process usually passes through three stages which are full, moderate and minimal levels. At 
the full level, the functional areas include operations, marketing, finance, human resources etc. In this 
level, all these areas are merged into a single new entity. The new company will adopt the best practices 
used by either of the companies.  At the second level, major functions or processes like production and 
management are merged together. The strategic decisions are centralised in a single company, but day 
to day operating decisions will remain independent. Unlike the two levels already described, at the final 
stage it involves the selection of particular functions that are merged together in order to minimise 
redundancies. At this level, the strategic and operating decisions are decentralised. In a situation of 
successful post-merger integration, synergy values should be generated. It is important to understand 
the realities of acquisitions before undertaking a formal acquisition programme.252
One should also consider that whether integration always takes place in completing a merger 
process, in view of failure of mergers in England this issue deserves some attention. 
2.8 Strategic Alliances 
A strategic  alliance  is  simply  an  agreement  or  a  consensus  between  two  or  more 
individual companies, launched so as to develop common goals and as well secure common 
interests.  An example of an alliance is an “airline alliance” which is defined as agreement 253
between two or  more airlines  on a  significant  level  to  advance their  goals  and protect  their 
 Ibid pp. 22251
 Ibid pp. 23252
 Ibid pp.24253
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interests. The companies involved maintaining their legal independence, particularly, the singled 
out  airline  alliances  are  the:  Star  Alliance,  One  world  and  Sky  Team.  Alliances  do  avail  a 
communication network and convenience for the international persons. As a result of their legal 
independence these arrangements cannot be deemed to be an acquisition.254
2.9 Critical Analysis on the Types of Take Overs
2.9.1 Friendly-Takeovers
Morck, Randall and Robert in their research highlighted the fact that, acquirer prior to 
proposing a bid consults the board of directors of the target company. With regards to whether 255
the offer suits the interest of the shareholders or not, the board makes a decision to accept or 
reject the offer. The research further emphasised on the fact that, an ideal situation is formulated 
when the board feels that the offer made meets the interests of the shareholder and protect the 
stakeholders of the target company, it recommends to the shareholders to accept the bid.
This group of takeovers are common for private corporations in which the board is formed by the 
shareholders.  Coupled  with  this  fact,  the  agreement  between  the  acquirer  and  the  target 256
company is easily as well as quickly manoeuvred. In that case, when a bid is proposed, the board 
King,  David  R.,  et  al.  "Meta-analyses  of  post-acquisition  performance:  Indications  of  unidentified 254
moderators." Strategic management journal 25.2 (2004): 187-200.
Morck,  Randall,  Andrei  Shleifer,  and  Robert  W.  Vishny.  "Characteristics  of  targets  of  hostile  and  friendly 255
takeovers." In Corporate takeovers: Causes and consequences, pp. 101-136. University of Chicago Press, 1988.
 Ibid 136
Ranft, Annette L., and Michael D. Lord. "Acquiring new technologies and capabilities: A grounded model of 256
acquisition implementation." Organization science 13.4 (2002): 420-441.
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evaluates the provisions and whatever decision they arrive at serves as a stand of the company’s 
shareholders. 
2.9.2 Reversed-Takeover
Weidenbaum  and  Stephen  presented  research  opposite  to  the  above  discussion  by 
emphasising on the fact that, a reversed takeover is only implemented when a private company 
acquires or merges with a public company.  This happens when a large company is influenced, 257
with an intended aim of the private company floating itself effectively while at the same time 
avoiding some of the experiences and time consumed in conventional  Initial  Public offering 
(IPO).  Reversed takeover warrants  special  attention when it  comes to due diligence Merger. 
Reversed takeovers are a very popular way for small start-up companies to "go public" without 
all the trouble and expense of an Initial Public Offering (IPO).  Reverse mergers, as the name 258
implies, work in reverse whereby a small private company acquires a publicly listed company 
(commonly called the Shell) in order to quickly gain access to equity markets for raising capital. 
This approach to capitalisation (reverse merger) is common practice with Internet companies like 
stamps.com, photoloft.com, etc. 
For example, I charge it; an e-commerce company did a reverse merger with Para-Link, a 
publicly listed distributor of diet products. According to Jesse Cohen, CEO of I charge it, “an 
Weidenbaum,  Murray,  and  Stephen  Vogt.  "Takeovers  and  stockholders:  Winners  and  losers."   California 257
Management Review 29, no. 4 (1987): 157-168.
 Ibid 138258
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IPO would  have  cost  the  company 3  -5  million  US$ and taken over  one  year.  Instead,  the 
company acquired a public company for $ 300,000 and issued stock to raise capital”.259
Quite  a  few  of  these  transactions  happened  in  the  1960s  when  plantation  owning 
companies were stripped of assets by newly independent governments leaving London Stock 
Market listings with no assets in them. 
The problem with reverse mergers is that the shell company sells at a serious discount for 
a reason; it is riddled with liabilities, lawsuits, and other problems. Consequently, very intense 
due diligence is required to "clean the shell" before the reverse merger can take place. This may 
take six months. Another problem with the shell company is ownership. Promoters who hold the 
stock in “street name” which mask’s the true identity of owners sometimes push cheap penny 
stocks. Once the reverse merger takes place, the promoters reject this idea and the stocks’ price 
drastically  drops  down.  Therefore,  it  is  absolutely  critical  to  confirm  the  true  owners 
(shareholders) of shell companies involved in reverse mergers.  
2.9.3   Back Flip Takeover
A back flip takeover refers to any kind of takeover in which the acquirer turns itself into a 
subsidiary of the target company.  This type of takeovers is uncommon among raided firms and 
normally occurs when the acquired company is far better or rather larger than the acquiring company. 
 One  reason  that  keeps  firms  away  from certain  defence  strategies  such  as  this,  is  the  after 260
implementation benefit. It is essential to ensure that when singled out the diverse defence strategies, 
 Joseph McCafferty, “Shell Games: Reverse mergers are making a comeback, but so are the scam artists that 259
peddle them” http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/2987622> accessed 19 November 2015
More  information  in:  <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/backflip-takeover.html#ixzz1kgtTBFPJ> 260
accessed 12 March 2016
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there are certain issues such as whether they are their timely, worth the effort and monetary value that 
must be considered. This will be indeed being helpful in determining the kinds of funding option that 
will precede the takeover defence adopted.
2.9.4 Hostile-Takeover
In the case of hostile takeovers defences become very important. A hostile takeover raises 
issues  relating  to  corporate  governance.  In  this  scenario,  the  defence  mechanisms that  have 
developed  to  challenge  the  takeover  are  considered  in  detail.  These  defence  strategies  are 
complex corporate  weapons and have the sole  aim of  securing the target  companies  from a 
hostile acquisition. Despite of their popularity and implemented generally, many of these defence 
tactics  remain controversial .  According to the advocates of  these anti-takeover techniques, 261
they heighten the ability of the target company’s management to extract higher prices for the 
shares  or  see  off  the  bidder  and  also  to  protect  the  labour  contracts  and  pensions  of  the 
employees in the target company.
In regard to  the laws of  the  State,  firms in  the United States,  through the boards  of 
directors of target companies often implement the defence techniques when responding to hostile 
tender offers. One such defence is “White Knight “where the company seeks a friendly acquirer. 
Others  are  “poison pill”,  ”crown jewel”,  the  selling  of  the  company’s  most  valuable  assets, 
“green mail”,  paying off the hostile acquirer for accepting to quit,  “Pac Man”, and ”Golden 
Parachute”.  Further illustration of these concepts has been presented in the third chapter of the 262
thesis.
  Franks,  Julian,  and Colin  Mayer.  "Hostile  takeovers  and the  correction  of  managerial  failure."  Journal  of 261
Financial Economics40, no. 1 (1996): 163-181.
 Ibid 142262
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2.10 Due Diligence
In general, business practice the target company usually do not carry out due diligence 
over the acquiring company but this issue needs a thorough review. The term “due diligence “is 
one with diverse meaning and varies according to the context in which it is applied. However, 263
in this case it shall be regarded within the context of corporate takeovers. An ordinary definition 
within the legal framework refers to it as a measure of discretion and prudence, regarding an 
activity in the way it is carried out by a sound and circumspect person, and its measurement is 
based on relative facts surrounding the situation and not on any absolute standards. It can also be 
said to be an analysis undertaken by or on behalf of the investors by their statutory accountants 
with the intention of understanding the prospects of success in an investment with respect to 
issues such as operation and management, and the verification of material facts.  To a potential 264
acquirer, due diligence would mean the surety of reaping from the investments they have made.
A common example of due diligence in various industries is the process through which a 
potential  acquirer  evaluates  a  target  company  or  its  assets  for  acquisition.  The  term  "due 
diligence" first came into common use as a result of the United States' Securities Act of 1933.265
In Section. 11 of this Act, referred to the "Due Diligence" defence, which could be used by 
broker-dealers when accused of inadequate disclosure to investors of material information with 
Angwin, Duncan. "Mergers and acquisitions across European borders: National perspectives on pre acquisition 263
due diligence and the use of professional advisers." Journal of World Business36, no. 1 (2001): 32-57.
 Ibid 145264
Larsson, Rikard, and Sydney Finkelstein. "Integrating strategic, organizational, and human resource perspectives 265
on mergers and acquisitions: A case survey of synergy realization." Organization science 10.1 (1999): 1-26.
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respect to the purchase of securities.  As long as broker-dealers exercised "due diligence" in 266
their  investigation  into  the  company  whose  equity  they  were  selling,  and  disclosed  to  the 
investor, they would not be held liable for non-disclosure of information that was not discovered 
in the process of the investigation.267
The entire broker-dealer community quickly institutionalised, as a standard practice, the 
conducting of due diligence investigations of any stock offerings, in which they were involved. 
Originally, the term was limited to public offerings of equity investments, but over time it has 
come to be associated with investigations of private offerings as well.  The term has slowly 268
been adopted for use in other situations.
The  framework  of  due  diligence  can  be  categorised  into  various  classes  notably: 
Production  Audit,  Financial  Audit,  Macro-environment  audit,  Marketing  audit,  Information 
Systems  Audit,  Production  Audit,  Management  Audit,  Legal  or  Environmental  Audit  and 
recently Compatibility Audit and Reconciliation Audit.  If the failures are to be avoided then 269
the concept of shareholder value analysis should be associated with due diligence.  Two audit 270
areas have surfaced with the passage of time, which are referred as,  compatibility audit  and 
Helfat,  Constance  E.,  and  Margaret  A.  Peteraf.  "The  dynamic  resource-based  view:  Capability 266
lifecycles." Strategic management journal 24.10 (2003): 997-1010.
Barkema, Harry G., and Freek Vermeulen. "International expansion through start-up or acquisition: A learning 267
perspective." Academy of Management journal 41.1 (1998): 7-26.
 Ibid 99268
Harvey MG and Lusch RF, "Expanding the Nature and Scope of Due Diligence", Journal of Business Venturing 269
1995, 10: 5–21. Kroener PH and Kroener MH, "Towards more successful ", International Journal of Technology 
Management 6(1/2 ) 1991: 33–40 
Gillman, Luis Due Diligence, a Strategic and Financial Approach (2nd ed. 2010). Durban: LexisNexis. ISBN 270
9780409046991
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reconciliation audit. The compatibility audit is charged with the responsibility of overseeing the 
strategic components of a transaction and especially those that sum up shareholder value. The 
reconciliation  audit  unites  other  audit  areas  through  a  formal  valuation,  so  as  to  determine 
whether there will be an increase in value for the shareholders.271
In any potential business investments, due diligence process has a varied framework each 
depending on the nature of the company, even though, the vital areas of concern do include the 
legal, labour, tax, IT, financial, environment and market situation of the company. In addition to 
intellectual  property,  insurance  and  liability  coverage,  real  and  personal  property,  debt 
mechanism  review,  employee  benefits  and  labour  concerns,  immigration,  and  international 
transactions.272
In  acquisitions  the  role  of  due  diligence  entails  understanding  of  all  the  obligations 
conferred  on  a  firm.  These  are  debts,  long  term  customer  contracts,  warranties,  leases, 
employment contracts, distribution agreement, pending and viable law suits and compensation 
agreement amongst others. Due diligence, therefore will answer many diverse questions raised 
by  a  potential  investor.  It  is  supposed  to  investigate  and  appraise  a  business  investment;  it 
denotes a general duty to exercise care in any business dealing; as such, it involves carrying out a 
detailed analysis into all the significant aspects of a target company in the past, current and in the 
future. Due  diligence  sounds  extraordinary,  perhaps  owing  to  the  process  that  has  to  be 273
Sirower, Mark L. The synergy trap: How companies lose the acquisition game. Simon and Schuster, 1997.271
Gary M. Lawrence, Due Diligence in Business Transactions, (Law Journal Press 1994, updated as needed). ISBN 272
978-1-588-1.
Hayward,  Mathew  LA.  "When  do  firms  learn  from  their  acquisition  experience?  Evidence  from  1990  to 273
1995." Strategic management journal 23.1 (2002): 21-39.
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undergone though it. Eventually it transforms into an opinion about the prospective business and 
ensuring that the acquirer is not duped.
Even so, in some instances due diligence is hard to comprehend and create difficulties in 
an acquisition and merger  process.  Investing in software companies  is  a  controversial  issue. 
Getting into a deal over something that is one cannot see or touch and one is yet to invest fortune 
into it.  Any ordinary investor without technical knowledge and experience in software would 274
view it as a viable investment. It is there a requirement to have due diligence programs in place 
to ensure “effective and efficient” transactions.
It seems that due diligence merely involves understanding of a target firm in all aspects even 
though it requires a pool of professionals to examine the entire process. These professionals may 
be accountants,  investment bankers, lead and co-investors, corporate development staff,  bank 
loan  officers  and  lawyers  who  may  be  required  to  undertake  an  independent  due 
diligence. Quite often the “management of the target” assist the concerned individuals that are 275
apprehensive by providing due diligence information that might be relevant to this. There are 
considerable risks if the acquirer takes any information provided by target at its face value, as 
they may have vested interest in seeing the target sold. 
The  emergence  of  a  potential  business  opportunity  can  be  the  commencement  of  a  due 
diligence process.  It is characterised by the collection of varied data from different sources and 276
the commencement of the due diligence evaluation which continues until the final decision is 
made to acquire or reject the project. Prior to the signing of a binding contract, a comprehensive 
 Its creativity and development lies in ideas of the employees of that software firm.274
 Ibid 140275
Porter,  Michael  E.  "From competitive  advantage  to  corporate  strategy."  Readings  in  strategic  management. 276
Macmillan Education UK, 1989. 234-255.
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due diligence has to be conducted. This is done after the involved parties have considered over 
the proposed deal and have consented to proceed with the deal.
In conducting a due diligence, the professionals provide a checklist of all the required and 
relevant information required by the possible acquirer on the target.  It is the obligation of the 277
target firm that the management prepares and provides some of the information such as audited 
financial statements, business plans and other documents.  Interviews and site examinations are 
conducted, where necessary. Of value to the process to acquire information are the suppliers, 
trade  organisations,  industry  experts,  receivables  and  market  research  firms  among  others. 
Receivables and bad debt analyses are particularly important and of interest  to the acquirers 
lending banks.
The degree to which the due diligence might be required to be conducted is not within an 
arguable range as the factors considered are many and vary with the situation. These factors may 
include initial experiences, the chances of closing a deal, the magnitude of a transaction, cost 
factors,  risk tolerance,  and availability of resources.  It  may not be possible to gather all  the 
information  about  a  particular  firm.  It  is  recommended  that  the  acquirer  gains  enough 278
information at an appropriate level to allow a well informed decision, so as to keep any possible 
risks at bay. Unnecessary an excessive due diligence on a target firm is also not advisable as it 
may turn away the target from engaging in the deal. It also causes what is known as “analysis 
paralysis “which hinders the completion of a transaction or allow for time in which a competitive 
offer may materialise.  Accordingly, due diligence should be conducted with the aim of covering 
Haleblian, Jerayr, and Sydney Finkelstein. "The influence of organizational acquisition experience on acquisition 277
performance: A behavioral learning perspective." Administrative Science Quarterly 44.1 (1999): 29-56.
Roodman, David. Due diligence: An impertinent inquiry into microfinance. CGD Books, 2012.278
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the  most  critical  aspects,  accompanied  by  a  sensible  level  of  trust  in  the  target  company’s 
honesty. 
The completion of due diligence is a by-product of various factors such as the circumstances 
surrounding the deal and agreements involved. Numerous preliminary agreements identify the 
time line by which the due diligence should be conducted. The period under which an offer is 
usually open is short and therefore the acquirer should consider allocating adequate time for the 
due diligence process. The professional undertaking of the investors should give due attention to 
the various priorities if all the due diligence objectives are to be achieved. For instance, when 
pursuing a company for a new product that is yet to introduce into the market, the current status 
of any projected completion date of the product is important. The product may, for example, in 
the case of new pharmaceutical products have to be cleared through any clinical testing stages in 
both the US and England in order to be sold.279
After  understanding  the  entire  process  of  due  diligence,  come the  costs  involved  in  the 
process. Often the bankers financing a transaction run their own financial models checking cash 
flow assumptions or checking any asset sale plans within a particular timeframe. Therefore, the 
banks conduct their own “risk analysis” of the takeover to ensure they are not making a bad 
investment.
For due diligence process to accomplish its tasks, it has to harmonise with other aspects 
of the deal. This simply implies that it should avoid anything that might sabotage the deal such as 
“confidentiality”. Particular activities in the due diligence process have a tendency to infringe on 
 Ibid 124279
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the confidentiality  expected.  In many situations,  the experts  involved in the due diligence 280
process have to go on the basis of customers' feedback on the nature of that satisfaction of the 
targeted product. More often than not it has triggered networking rumour concerning the sale of 
the company. It is uncommon that an acquirer during the due diligence process realises that the 
target is near to liquidation. They walk away from the target only to go back 6 months later to 
“cherry  pick”  the  parts  of  the  company  buying  them  from  the  liquidator  at  a  much  more 
advantageous price. 
The success or failure of a transaction with respect to due diligence is an idea that cannot be 
guaranteed. Having a well conducted due diligence plan in place does not mean an automatic 
success,  but  merely  improves  the  chances  of  success.  Risks  to  business  deals  can  never  be 
completely being eliminated and that explains why success can never be assured. Would failing 
to conduct due diligence in turn be a criminal offence?  The answer to this question is very 
obvious in the framework of the contemporary litigious world. One may be sued against just any 
issue  and failure  from undertaking an adequate  procedure.  The parties  concerned may be 281
surprised  when  the  their  clients,  investors,  customers,  suppliers,  employees  and  other 
stakeholders sue them for failure to have in place proper due diligence programme or pursuing a 
liability that was imprudently assessed by the due diligence. Poor due diligence carried out by 
Healy,  Paul  M.,  Krishna  G.  Palepu,  and  Richard  S.  Ruback.  "Does  corporate  performance  improve  after 280
mergers?." Journal of financial economics 31.2 (1992): 135-175.
 Ibid 105281
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accounting firms on behalf of the acquirer may subsequently result in professional negligence 
cases.282
2.10.1 Application of Due Diligence 
Evaluating the viability of any proposed acquisition, it would be useful to go through the 
following  stages:  A careful  analysis  of  the  target  company  should  make  it  clear  that  an 
investment in that company likely to fulfil the investment needs and objectives. The management 
of  the  offeror  company  undertakes  an  insightful  research  into  the  viability  of  making  their 
investment in the target company before proceeding to make the offer to the company. This 
procedure is known as “investment fit” .  On the other hand, a strategic fit is used to represent 283
the plans, objectives and goals formulated by both companies intending to merger and carrying 
out  their  activities  together.  The  managements  combine  their  efforts  by  advancing  their 
weaknesses and strengths in terms of running the operations of the firm. The functioning of the 
acquirer  undertakes  the  spirit  of  synergies  to  operate  towards  achievement  of  the  set  goals. 
Strategic fit therefore details a situation where the strategies set by the two merging companies 
tally  with  one  another  to  ensure  the  smooth  combination  of  activities  despite  functioning 
independently .  Acquiring company is also carry out a marketing fit exercise which involves a 284
process of determining the way services and products produced by both the companies are able 
Healy,  Paul  M.,  Krishna  G.  Palepu,  and  Richard  S.  Ruback.  "Does  corporate  performance  improve  after 282
mergers?." Journal of financial economics 31.2 (1992): 135-175.
Lebedow, Aaron L. "M&A: Due Diligence: More than a financial exercise." Journal of Business Strategy 20, no. 1 283
(1999): 12-14.
Angwin, Duncan. "Mergers and acquisitions across European borders: National perspectives on preacquisition 284
due diligence and the use of professional advisers." Journal of World Business36, no. 1 (2001): 32-57.
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to complement with one another in the market. In a marketing fit, the management is charged 
with determining the way of combining the various aspects attached to the marketing strategies 
of the firm such as promotions, prices,  matching the demand of the market etc.  This is also 
essential  to  determine  the  way  the  operations  of  the  two  merging  firms  can  be  carried  out 
together without compromising the normal activities. The management in this case determines 
whether the different departments of the firm are able to function together to achieve the desired 
goals.  This exercise is known as “operating fit” .285
When the management of the merging companies evaluates the existing management of the 
two companies and identifies the desirable talents or expertise that can run the operation of the business 
after the mergers. The management therefore will be able to work together if the leadership styles, 
strategic thinking and ability to adopt change by both firms are compliant. 286
Often one side’s management is stronger in an acquisition and in that event a large numbers of 
redundancies will occur. There is no guarantee that the target company’s management will stay unless 
they are satisfied with continuing career prospects and financial compensation. An acquiring company 
must also do what is known as a “financial fit” to examine the validity of the proposed acquisition. 
This involves looking at whether the sales, profitability, return on capital; cash flow of the two firms 
can be improved to work together towards achievement of similar objectives. 
The aspect of Due diligence is broad and specific. It goes beyond the functional areas such as 
the finance, production, human resources etc. This is very vital since due diligence is particularly meant 
Harvey, Michael, and Robert F. Lusch. "Beyond traditional due diligence for mergers and acquisitons in the 21st 285
century." Review of Business 19, no. 3 (1998): 17.
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to  highlight  all  the  major  risks  related  to  the  proposed  merger.  The  areas  of  risk  that  requires 
investigation are markets, customers, competition etc. 287
The due diligence process must be aggressive in terms of collecting as much information as 
possible concerning the target company. In other instances, the process requires some undercover work, 
such as  sending out  people  with  false  identities  to  verify  vital  issues.  It  is  important  that  most 
information be collected in order for due diligence to work. This information is: financial records, tax 
records, regulatory (compliance), debt records, asset records and unemployment. 
The failure by an offeror to conduct due diligence can be disastrous. The status of the acquiring 
company can be severely damaged if a publicly announced merger is written off.
The merger between Hospitality Franchise Systems Incorporation and Comp-U-Card (CUC) 
International Inc exhibits an instance where situations may go wrong. A few months after the merger 
was announced, it  was disclosed that there were considerable accounting discrepancies. After the 
discovery, the newly created company, Cendant, lost $ 14 billion in market value. In the late 1998, 
Cendant's Chairman had tendered his resignation, investors had filed over 50 lawsuits, and nine of 
fourteen Directors for CUC had also tendered their resignation.288
The process of due diligence is extremely crucial for uncovering potential problem areas, 
revealing risks and liabilities, and to ensure that there are no surprises after the merger is announced.  289
However, in the current rapid business environment, some companies may overlook the due diligence 
Woodcock,  C.  Patrick,  Paul  W.  Beamish,  and  Shige  Makino.  "Ownership-based  entry  mode  strategies  and 287
international performance." Journal of international business studies 25.2 (1994): 253-273.
 David J. Morrow “Cendant finds $115 Million Accounts Error”, 16 April 1998, The New York Times, http://288
www.nytimes.com/1998/04/16/business/cendant-finds-115-million-accounts-error.html accessed 10 May 2016
Chatterjee, Sayan, et al. "Cultural differences and shareholder value in related mergers: Linking equity and human 289
capital." Strategic management journal 13.5 (1992): 319-334.
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process and make an offer based on competitive intelligence and public information. This can be very 
risky. The statistics below show the trend in due diligence processes.
Results of a Survey on Due Diligence by Braxton Associates:290
Duration of Due Diligence - Successful Mergers 4 to 6 months
Duration of Due Diligence - Failed Mergers 2 to 3 months
 2.10.2 Financials
The major goal of due diligence is to eliminate distortions from the financial statements of the 
target company. This is essential so that the acquiring company can establish a more sensible value for 
the target.  There are several issues pertaining to the Balance Sheet as outlined below:291
• Understating of liabilities like pensions and allowances for bad debts. 
• Low quality  assets  -  what  are  the  relative  market  values  of  assets?  Some assets  may be 
overvalued or undervalued.
• Hidden liabilities, such as contingencies for lawsuits not recognised.
• Overstatement of receivables - receivables may not be collectable, particularly inter-company 
receivables. Level of bad debits/possible writes offs. 
• Overstatement of inventories - increasing levels of stock over time indicates obsolescence and 
poor marketability. The application of LIFO reserves may lead to distortion of inventories.
 Ravindhar  Vadapalli  “Mergers  Acquisitions  and Business  Valuation”,  p19,  First  Edition,  Excel  Books,  New 290
Delhi, India (2007)
Dyer, Jeffrey H., and Harbir Singh. "The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational 291
competitive advantage." Academy of management review 23.4 (1998): 660-679.
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• The valuation of short-term marketable securities – in situation where the Target Company is 
holding marketable securities, is they properly valued? If the target is holding investments that 
are not marketable, are they overstated?
2.10.3 Intangibles
 Some of the intangibles like the brand names can be extremely undervalued. Brand names can 
be the reason for a takeover in the first place as a less utilised brand name can be put on to other 
products. In most cases, significant differences exist between book values and market values. If the two 
are not considerably different, then due diligence should conduct insightful research to ensure that there 
is no manipulation of values. Similarly, the Income Statement should comprise of "quality" earnings. 
The integrity of the income statement is determined by the consideration given to cash earnings and the 
accrual earnings.292
The mergers are in most cases projected towards reduction of costs, while the process of due 
diligence might result in numerous upward adjustments to earnings for the target company. This is 
particularly true where the target company is a private company and the excesses are common. The 
examples of this situation include:
• The officer's salaries are excess in respect to the work performed.
• High salaries with high pension commitments.
• Bonuses, expensive travel, and other perks.
• The vehicles and other assets that are available are said to be unnecessary.
Trautwein, Friedrich. "Merger motives and merger prescriptions."  Strategic management journal  11.4 (1990): 292
283-295.
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• When family members are on the payroll of the company and they play no role in running the 
business.
• The consultants with close ties to management are providing needless services.
The process of due diligence requires insightful and comprehensive research; this may also 
comprises of issues such as cultural and human resource. It is these individuals’ oriented issues that are 
exceptionally important when it comes to actually integrating the two companies.  It is from this 293
viewpoint that the process of due diligence gains relevance as it helps to set the foundation for post-
merger integration of the companies. Many post takeovers have an “integration” team, which looks at 
the issues that arise integrating post the takeover.
Cultural due diligence focuses on corporate cultures and attempts to ascertain an organisational 
fit between the two companies intending to merge. Each of the two merging company post a takeover 
possess their own culture, obtained from several components - corporate policies, rules, compensation 
plans,  leadership  styles,  internal  communication,  physical  work  environment,  etc.  Cultural  due 
diligence attempts to deduce the reasons change and the manner of adapting to a different culture. 
When the cultural gap becomes wide, the integration of the two companies becomes even more 
complicated. As a result, cultural due diligence identifies issues that are decisive to integration and 
assists the management in planning the necessary actions for resolving these differences before the 
merger is made public. 
On the other hand, human resource due diligence attempts to identify and evaluate the way 
people  are  managed  between  the  two  companies.  The  following  issues  require  analysis  for  an 
understanding of this aspect. 
Vermeulen, Freek, and Harry Barkema. "Learning through acquisitions." Academy of Management journal 44.3 293
(2001): 457-476.
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• The mechanism of ensuring the continuation of maximisation of the value of human resource 
capital;
• The appropriate mix of pays and benefits for the new organisation;
• The incentive programmes needed to retain the necessary personnel after the merger is made 
public;
• The mechanism of compensating the employees by the target company;
• A comparison between base pay and the marketplace fragments;
• The ways of dealing with the pension plans and severance pay.  Pension plans post a takeover 
may create difficulties for example; the target employees may find themselves transferred from a 
“final salary” scheme to a “money purchased” scheme. This may result in less pension benefits.
It is vital to get the Human Resource Department engaged in the merger and acquisition 
process in time because they have insights into cultural and human resource issues. The failure to tackle 
cultural, social, and human resource issues in Phase II Due Diligence is a major reason behind failed 
mergers. It is important to include the "people" issues in Phase II Due Diligence (which commence the 
moment the Letter of Intent is signed). This issues is explained by Galpin and Hendon in the book The 
Complete Guide to: 294
“In an era of widespread acknowledgement that mergers entail disproportionate risks and failures, the 
surprising fact is not that "culture" should become such a critical issue during integration, rather what is 
surprising is that organisational culture and other issues essential to integration have not yet become 
more central to executive-level deal making.”
Social effect on unemployment job cuts during takeovers
Galpin, T and Herndon, M 1999, The Complete Guide to , second edition, Jossey-Bass, New York294
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Though mergers and takeovers are ways of improving productivity and profitability in 
some companies, they may not be good for employees. Mergers and takeovers are associated 
with company redundancies, which leave social tension concerning their positions or changing 
culture of the company. Employees need to prepare for anything when they get to know that their 
company is likely to undergo Acquisitions and Mergers. Redundancy is likely to occur when 
companies  combine  since  the  acquiring  company has  the  mandate  to  reduce  the  number  of 
employees.  If  employees have the required skills  in the new company, they are likely to be 
retained. The general point is that merger and acquisition may result in unemployment, which 
negatively affects the society. 
2.11 Shareholders ‘Interests
Shareholders are institutions including corporations or persons who legally own shares or 
part of the stock in a firm or company though not the company it. They are also known as the 
stockholders  and  are  constituents  of  the  stakeholders  in  a  company.  Shareholders  are  of 295
various  categories  namely,  the  controlling  shareholders  (majority  shareholders)  and the  non-
controlling shareholders (minority shareholders). They are usually accorded special privileges 
based on the class of shares and such rights include:
1. The right to buy new shares issued by the company;
2. The right to sell their shares or part of the stock of the company;
3. The right to the dividends whenever they are declared;
4. The right to the assets that might remain after liquidation has occurred;
5. The right to vote on those directors nominated by the board;
 Stakeholders in a company among others include directors, employees, suppliers, consumers, creditors.295
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6. The right  of  nominating directors  which is  however difficult  in  practice owing to the 
protection of minority shareholders; and
7. The right to propose resolutions
It is worth noting that those stockholders in the primary market who purchase Initial Public 
Offering  shares  (IPOs)  avail  capital  to  the  companies.  Even  though,  most  of  the  majority 
shareholders fall in the secondary market, which provides no direct capital to the firms. Perhaps, 
it may seem peculiar to consider the situation in US Public corporations, which is contrary to the 
common opinions  regarding the  shareholders.  They are  not  owners  of  the  firms,  neither  the 
claimants of the profits nor investors but are considered as the “contributors of capital”. 
2.11.1 Majority Shareholders interests
Majority  shareholders  are  the controlling shareholders  or  owners  of  a  firm. They are 
attributed with vast interest in the activities of a firm. They are the investors who have obtained 
most of the stocks in a firm.  Thus the majority shareholders or groups of shareholders have 296
rights to make decisions and to oversee the entire operation of the firm. In the US takeover 
regulations regarding trust and equity, the fiduciary duties of shareholders. The delegated duties 
require that the majority shareholders be expected to be loyal towards the rest of the investors 
and employees of the firm. In particular,  they should act in way that would not devalue the 
investments that have been made by other shareholders and would interfere with the financial 
Vermeulen, Freek, and Harry Barkema. "Learning through acquisitions." Academy of Management journal 44.3 296
(2001): 457-476.
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stability of the organisation. In England the bulk of the majority shareholders are institutional 297
investors such as fund managers, pension, insurance funds, and investment trusts etc.  
2.11.2 Minority Shareholders Interests
These are the non-controlling shareholders in a firm, who have very minimal interests in 
the activities of the firm. They can also be identified as shareholders owning minority stakes in a 
company that is under control of majority shareholders. The majority shareholders influence the 
value of shares in a firm; it can be a group of connected shareholders. In this way, the minority 
shareholders are more than often deprived of any say in the management of the company and the 
firm is run in such a way that it benefits the majority shareholders at the expense of the minority 
shareholders.
Owning  a  large  amount  of  shares  may  not  mean  that  one  automatically  becomes  a 
majority shareholder. It therefore means that becoming a majority shareholder may depend on 
other factors such as the structure of the company.  A shareholder may have vast amount of 298
shares,  but  lack  control  in  the  activities  of  the  company;  this  includes  non-controlling 
shareholders. In that regard, there are laws installed to guard minority shareholders even though 
they are not effective as expected. Perhaps, in a country with an effective judicial system, the 
minority shareholders may not be flagrantly cheated but there are mechanisms through which 
majority shareholders can favour themselves. The majority shareholder does prefer dealing with 
group companies such as the other subsidiaries of the parent company.
Richard Hall “United States of America Takeover Guide”,  Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP p 7  published in 2014 297
on http://www.ibanet.org/Search/Search.aspx?query=takeover%20guide%20usa
 Ibid 166298
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2.12 An Analysis of the Rationale of Takeovers
Those who support takeovers have a variety of reasons for doing so, the reason being the 
advantages  of  takeover  transactions.  This  research  refers  to  the  driving  force  that  make 299
companies opt for takeover deals instead of taking other available options, such as starting new 
business ventures. In one school of thought, takeovers or the possibility of takeovers are seen by 
the shareholders as a tool to ensure that directors are accountable. Armour and Skeel argue that 
takeovers present: 
“A key  mechanism  for  rendering  managers  accountable  to  shareholders  in  the  market  for 
corporate control, namely, the threat that if the managers fail to maximise the share price, the 
company may become an acquisition target”.300
The only way the shareholders can make gains on their investments when purchasing a 
company’s stocks is when that company consistently pursues a greater share price. 
When the share price increases, shareholders make capital gains on their investment and 
are thus motivated to invest even more in public companies. Without this motivation, such as 
when the share price remains stagnant or even depreciates, shareholders make losses on their 
financial investment. This means that most shareholders will have no motivation to commit their 
finances into such a company . Takeovers come in to threaten executives who may ignore the 301
plight of their shareholders and pursue other subjective goals. If such executives fail to increase 
the share price, there is always a potential acquirer who could increase that share price and create 
Johanson,  Jan,  and  Jan-Erik  Vahlne.  "The  internationalization  process  of  the  firm-a  model  of  knowledge 299
development and increasing foreign market commitments." Journal of international business studies (1977): 23-32.
United States International Trade Commission. The Effects of greater economic integration within the European 300
Community on the United States: First follow-up report.  United States International Trade Commission Publication 
2268, (1992).Vol. 4, p. 9/17.
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the desired shareholder profits.  This threat of the possibility of a hostile takeover is according to 
Armour and Skeel, “a mechanism pivotal to making dispersed ownership viable.”  In short, the 302
threat of takeovers enables the stock market to function profitably by attracting investors who are 
in search of capital gains.  
Sometimes, the pursuits of an organisation are misdirected and misinformed, consequent 
to  subjective  interests  of  the  management.  Such a  management  may collide  with  the  profit-
making interests of the shareholders. Often companies appoint incompetent managers who stand 
to ruin the fortunes of a company if they are not removed. At the time that this becomes apparent, 
the managers may be galvanised against removal from office by a contract of tenure that may end 
long after the company is financially dead. At such times, hostile takeovers become a vital tool of 
replace  the  incompetent  management.  A successful  hostile  takeover  bid  may  see  to  the 303
removal of the incompetent management, as an alternative to total liquidation of the company 
before its assets are lost. An injection of a new management by the acquirer may be a successful 
turnaround strategy.
In discussing the theory of the growth of a firm as early as 1959, Penrose argued that 
takeovers  allow  otherwise  incapable  firms  to  secure  growth  opportunities  by  acquiring  the 
opportunities owned by other firms.  The same logic applies in modern takeover contexts. By 304
 G. Tamburrini . Harmonisation ofTakeover Discipline: A Comparative Law and Economic Overview.  June 2009. 302
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1423762
Johanson,  Jan,  and  Jan-Erik  Vahlne.  "The  internationalization  process  of  the  firm-a  model  of  knowledge 303
development and increasing foreign market commitments." Journal of international business studies (1977): 23-32.
J. Armour and D. Skeel. Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why? The peculiar divergence of US and 304
UK takeover regulation. Working Paper, No. 331. September 2006. Centre for Business Research, University Of 
Cambridge, Cambridge (2006), pp. 1 - 77.
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acquiring  IBM’s  computing  division,  Lenovo  benefited  from  IBM’s  technology,  human 
resources, market structures, product lines, goodwill and successful history. It was thus able to 
enter  into a  previously impossible  market  and command the most  dominant  position in  that 
market within less than six months after the acquisition. 
This example illustrates what Penrose must have borne in mind when he described the 
firm as 
“…. a collection of productive assets, whereby the long run profitability of the firm is associated 
with the growth in productive opportunity to use its assets more efficiently (such that)  ... the 
quest for productive opportunity leads the firm to search for new products and markets (via 
takeovers). It is thus understandable why companies will be willing to take over other companies 
is  such  target  companies  have  resources,  products  and  markets  that  would  further  their 
productivity opportunities and thus add value to their operations. ”305
Besides the foregoing possible motives of corporate takeovers (generalised reasons why 
companies are willing to engage in takeover bids and why it is important for national and global 
economies to nurture healthy takeover transactions), scholars have postulated hundreds of other 
possible motives.  In agreement with Seth, Song and Pettit, Porter and Singh argue that, 
“… there are three widely accepted motives for takeovers which have been advanced in the 
literature; synergy, agency and hubris. ” 306
In the synergy motive of takeovers, the hypothesis is that takeovers occur 
 E. Penrose. The theory of the growth of the firm. Oxford University Press. Oxford (1959), pp. 305
23 - 78.
Joshua Porter and Harminder Singh “An empirical Analysis of the motivation underlying takeovers in Australia”, 306
p2
 114
“When the value of combined firm is greater than the sum of the values of the two individual 
firms involved in the takeover deal.  “307
This means that the firm that initiates a takeover anticipates creating more shareholder 
value by accumulating the asset worth of the target company alongside its present shareholder 
value.308
The managers  of  a  company who initiates  a  takeover  bid (potential  acquirer)  always 
embark on a takeover deal to primarily pursue their own personal interests such as to maximise 
their own limits of utility. The managers might be pursuing better compensation or to get the 
benefits and bonuses most often attached to successful takeover bids. According to Porter and 
Singh, such a subjective motive is always pursued at the expense a company’s shareholders since 
in  the  long run;  the  acquired shareholder  value  often becomes negative  as  compared to  the 
shareholders value prior to the takeover transaction.309
Porter  and  Singh  further  postulate  that,  the  hypothesis  is  that  while  not  intent  on 
benefiting themselves from takeover deal managers of the acquiring company may make many 
unintentional mistakes due to over confidence while negotiating the takeover terms. The target 
firm might deem so appealing and lucrative that managers do not conduct a thorough due process 
to establish the realistic worth of the takeover prospect. Other managers may ambitiously over 
expect benefits to trickle in after the takeover, when such benefits would actually be absent or be 
D. Selmer. Hostile Corporate Takeovers: History and Overview. Northern Illinois University Law Review, Vol. 307
203, No. 3, (1988).  pp. 33 - 56.
D. Selmer. Hostile Corporate Takeovers: History and Overview. Northern Illinois University Law Review, Vol. 308
203, No. 3, (1988).  pp. 33 - 56.
T. Giovanni. Harmonisation Takeover Discipline: A Comparative Law and Economic Overview. Selected Works of 309
Dr. Giovanni Tamburrini, November 2009.
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delayed for some person in the long term.  When the takeover deal is executed, it soon dawns 310
on the managers and the shareholders, that the deal did not produce as much benefits as had been 
expected, leading to a great loss of the shareholder value/wealth.
It  is  possible to empirically determine which of the three ranks as the most common 
motive for takeovers. Indeed, Berkovitch and Narayanan conducted such an empirical study.  311
Berkovitch  and  Narayanan’s  study  adopted  a  unique  approach  that  is  common  in  the 
contemporary takeover literature when it comes to distinguishing among the prominent takeover 
motives. The scholars examined the correlation existing between abnormal returns in a target 
firm and total abnormal returns that are gained by the two companies (target and acquiring) in the 
post-takeover period.  They also sought to investigate the correlation which may exist between 312
the abnormal returns of both the bidder and target. 
It is important to note that the study established that “76% of takeovers are primarily 
motivated by synergy as the outcomes resulted in positive abnormal gains to both the acquirer 
and target shareholders. ” It was also found that “agency was the dominant motive explaining 313
the  negative  total  gain  among  the  sub-sample”.  These  findings  were  consistent  with  those 
generated  by  Gondhalekar  and  Bhagwat  in  their  study,  which  examined  the  three  takeover 
motives via a correlations methodology. Gondhalekar and Bhagwat found that synergy motives 
 Ibid 123310
Berkovitch, E and Narayanan, M, Motives for takeovers: An empirical investigation, Journal of Financial and 311
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1993 pp. 347-362.
 Ibid.312
United States International Trade Commission. The Effects of greater economic integration within the European 313
Community on the United States: First follow-up report.  United States International Trade Commission Publication 
2268, Vol. 4, (1992) p. 9/17.
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outdo or dominate most takeovers.  Again, Seth, Song and Pettit also posted similar findings 314
after analysing the occurrence of the three motives in the cross border acquisition deals involving 
US firms (as targets) and foreign firms (as bidders).315
Taking another perspective other than the one provided by the Synergy-Agency school of 
thought,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  contemporary  takeover  literature  concurs  in  that  most 
takeover initiatives are motivated by the need and search for  corporate growth,  for  strategic 
expansion, for corporate restructuring processes, for increasing corporate control of the market, 
and for changes in a company’s ownership. Nonetheless, the need and search for growth ranks as 
the most predominant motivation for most takeover deals (as was also concluded by Seth, Song 
and Pettit, Gondhalekar and Bhagwat, and Berkovitch and Narayanan. Several benefits accrue 
from takeovers’ ability to yield corporate growth, explaining why these deals are the preferred 
options when a company is pursuing growth within a particular market niche or geographical 
area. While some of these benefits/motives are repeated across the various schools of thought, 
there are certain aspects that can complement the points raised in the foregoing discussion.  
Common to all  the schools of thought,  is  that  the first  takeover benefit is  a boost  in 
operating synergy. Synergy refers to the ability of a company to reduce the costs, to combine the 
resources at its disposal, to increase the sales volume, to acquire a greater purchasing power and 
to consolidate the facilities and additional skilled resources that the competing companies have, 
in its current business activities. The second benefit is market power and presence. A company 
may wish to venture into new geographical areas, to increase its market share and presence, or to 
access the untapped vertical markets with its existing product and or service portfolio. This will, 
Ibid.314
Judenhofer,  Martin  S.,  et  al.  "Simultaneous  PET-MRI:  a  new  approach  for  functional  and  morphological 315
imaging." Nature medicine 14.4 (2008): 459.
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in turn, translate into market power adequate to conquer the target market to near monopoly 
levels.  The third benefit of takeovers from a growth perspective is market expansion (which is 316
different from market power in that market expansion refers to increased exploitation of existing 
not new markets).  In market expansion, a company may wish to add related product or service 317
lines that they currently do not deal with, although the same can be traded to the company’s 
existing customer base. The fourth growth benefit of takeover initiatives is their contribution to 
strategic planning. Takeover deals can be an initiative to invest in new technologies, to increase 
the skilled labour in the workforce, to enter into new markets, to reduce competitive forces, to 
attract a new customer base, to reduce costs or to alter a marketing strategy. Fifthly, takeover 
initiatives can help a company to obtain a successful new line of products and or services for a 
new or existing market thus helping it accomplish strategic goals more successfully and faster 
than would be possible if the product or service line were created from scratch. The sixth benefit 
is that takeovers can help fill the gaps in a company such as adding competitive technology, 
improving the efficiency of its sales structure, improving the management structure, amplifying 
marketing results and gaining better production, distribution and sales channels. Stanley supports 
this fact by adding another benefit of takeover initiatives namely, amplifying the efficiency of a 
company’s  management.  This  accrues  when a  company archives  a  return  of  a  company’s 318
through the purchase of a company ran by inefficient managers with the aim of replacing them 
and initiating a management change. It can also be done by making the less efficient managers of 
 Ibid.316
 Ibid.317
T. Giovanni. Harmonisation Takeover Discipline: A Comparative Law and Economic Overview. Selected Works of 318
Dr. Giovanni Tamburrini, November 2009.
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the company to learn and adapt to new requirements set by the acquirer and thus amplifying 
management efficiency, a process otherwise called “differential efficiency”.
Takeover initiatives can also be motivated by the search for financial synergy, which can 
be done by acquiring a company with lower capital costs and then improving its cash flow while 
simultaneously increasing its debt financing capacity.  Takeover can also help an acquirer take 319
advantage  of  a  growth  opportunity  presented  by  a  company  whose  purchasing  price  is 
undervalued,  and  whose  cost  is  lower  than  would  otherwise  be  possible  in  starting  a  new 
company.  At other times, takeovers help solve agency problems where the control of assets 320
belonging  to  an  under  performing  establishment  is  under  inefficiently  dispersed  ownership. 
Finally, takeover deals also help companies attain tax efficiency, where they obtain a tax status 
that is more favourable through acquisitions and mergers than through other growth options. 
Most of the takeover motives explained above are external to the firm. There are however, some 
internal takeover drivers/motives that are purely within the firm, and which propel such a firm to 
seek for takeover opportunities.  In most cases,  internal takeover drivers may be related to 321
management needs or those of the shareholder value of such a company. For instance, takeover 
initiatives  can be motivated by managerial  instances,  where  managers  seek to  increase their 
power and income by increasing the size and revenues of their company.322
 J. Coates. Takeover defences in the shadow of the pill: A critique of the scientific evidence.Texas Law Review, 319
No. 79, No. 2, (2000) pp. 271-382.
 Ibid.320
 Ibid.321
R. Ruback. An Overview of Takeover Defences. In A. Auerback, ed., , University of Chicago Press, Chicago 322
(1988), pp. 49 – 68
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As already discussed previously,  market  conditions,  such as the fierce competition of 
contemporary  markets,  companies  may  be  forced  to  seek  ways  to  fill  their  resource  gaps 
(technology,  customer  base,  distribution  channels,  local  expertise  etc.  or  even  management) 
through takeovers.  Other companies may look to gain economies of scale, amplify synergies, 323
reduce costs and invest in opportunistic to financially profitable transactions, through merging 
with or acquiring other companies. Wubben employs this systemised approach when considering 
the benefits of takeovers, wherein such benefits are classified either based on shareholder value 
or the needs of the management.  In Wubben’s classification, shareholders motives are broken 324
down into eight hypotheses namely, monopoly theory, synergy hypothesis, efficiency hypothesis, 
diversification hypothesis,  information hypothesis,  valuation theory,  market  power hypothesis 
etc.  He  further  suggests  that  management  have  other  motives  for  which  there  are  three 
hypotheses  namely,  managerial  hypothesis,  and hubris  hypothesis  and finally,  free cash flow 
hypothesis.  In the figure below, the motives of takeovers are summarised with a systemised 325
approach to takeovers.
Figure 1.1: A Figure Illustrating a Systemized Approach to the Benefits of Takeovers
 Ibid, pp. 5 - 7.323
 J. Coates. Takeover defences in the shadow of the pill: A critique of the scientific evidence.Texas Law Review, 324
No. 79, No. 2, (2000) pp. 271-382.
 Ibid.325
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Figure 1: Source: Adopted from Wubben (2007, p. 6)
A CHART ILLUSTRATION
It also emerges that cross-border takeovers although more comprehensive, also include 
all of the regular takeover motives as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs.  However, some 326
additional motives specifically are applicable only to cross-border takeover contexts exist over 
and above those of general takeover contexts. The diagram above summarises in a graphical 
manner, the comprehensive motives for takeovers at domestic contexts and further provides the 
extension of these motives to the specific cross-border contexts.  It is important to note that in 327
the following figure, the management and shareholder value motivations also apply to cross-
border takeovers and that the indicated cross border motives are in addition to the management 
and shareholder value motives.  According to Mangold and Lippi, there are specific motives for 328
cross-border takeover transactions. These motives 
“…are  driven  by  favourable  changes  in  government  regulation,  currency  appreciation  and 
macroeconomic performance of the acquirers’ country (and) economic conditions of the target in 
foreign countries (like) special tax free industrial zones, or subsidies for special industry sectors 
like in Italy for example the solar industry. ” 329
These motives contribute to flourishing of a product, taking the textile market in Paris as 
an example. They provide conditions for moderately low labour costs even for highly educated 
N.  Mangold  and  K.  Lippok.  The  Effect  of  Cross-Border   on  Shareholder  Wealth:  Evidence  from Germany. 326
Journal Of International Business And Economics, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2008) pp. 315 - 330.
 Ibid.327
 Ibid.328
 Ibid.329
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specialist-which elaborates the Eastern Europe labour condition. Also, it offers the possibility of 
low tax rates for foreign investors and provides favourable foreign exchange rates. Similarly, 
another cross-border motive is when companies export products to countries where the products 
are unavailable, this practice is largely common for automotive manufacturers. Pursuing cross-
border takeovers allow said automotive manufacturers to ensure timely delivery and intimate 
customer  relationships  with  their  foreign  clients. These  cross-border  specific  motives  have 330
been summarised in the following figure in addition to the general takeover motives.
2.13 Analysis of the Rationale of Takeover Defences
Numerous schools of thought support the idea of takeovers. However, in contrast, there 
are as many arguments to disregard it. Runback shares his opinion as, 
“… It is difficult to determine whether takeover defences are good or bad for stockholders, but 
one way to assess a takeover defence is to examine the rationale for resistance. ”331
While takeovers  contain immense economic advantages for  both ends,  i.e.  target  and 
bidding companies and both economies involved in the process of takeovers as well. However, it 
is also significant to note that not all corporate takeovers are beneficial.332
Occasionally, takeover transactions are ill  advised for a company. Although, there are 
times when the company is out of options to avoid the takeover such as, when said firm had been 
N.  Mangold  and  K.  Lippok.  The  Effect  of  Cross-Border   on  Shareholder  Wealth:  Evidence  from Germany. 330
Journal of International Business and Economics, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2008) pp. 315 - 330.
R.  Ruback.  (1988).  An Overview of  Takeover Defences.  In A Auerback,  ed.,  ,  University of  Chicago Press, 331
Chicago, p. 50.
 Ibid 266332
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facing financial crisis. But when the company is determined to not allow takeovers at any cost, 
both English and U.S jurisdictions provide extensive defence options to avert the acquisition 
bid. Takeover defences are thus applicable whenever target companies seek to deter change of 333
ownership to the aggressive bidder.  As it has been discussed earlier in the previous sections of 334
this research, this is an evaluation of the contemporary literature on hostile takeovers and the 
legal  limitations  which  support  the  target  companies  to  avoid  or  accept  a  takeover.  Also, 
acknowledges  a  bidder  company  its  legal  actions  during  a  takeover  attempt.  It  further 
exaggerates  the understanding of  the fact  that  at  times a  company may recognize their  best 
interest in declining a takeover bid.335
Shareholders may sometimes encourage their managers to initiate defensive strategies 
while  the  managers  would prefer  to  admit  a  takeover  bid.  This  might  happen when offered 
takeover would solitarily serve the subjective interests of the managers while disregarding the 
wealth  interests  of  shareholders.  For  instance,  Rei  affirms that  during  1994 to  2003,  104 336
takeovers out of 760 in his sample proved to be a failure after the execution in the US. Rei 337
attributes such a dramatic failure rate to the fact that most managers are motivated to complete 
R. Ruback. An Overview of Takeover Defences. In A Auerback, ed.,  ,  University of Chicago Press, Chicago 333
(1988), p. 50.
R. Bruner. The poison pill anti-takeover defence: The price of strategic deterrence. Working Research Paper. The 334
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takeover deals based on their incentives of greater pay and more asset control. In such cases, it 338
is advised that the target company rather initiates their takeover defence tactics instead. One of 
the principal justifications to initiate the provisions of takeover defence tactics is to prevent target 
companies from facing the financial  loss of  shareholders during the transactions of  takeover 
while  independence  and  greater  wealth  could  have  been  gained  otherwise  by  practicing  the 
takeover defence tactics. However, this rationale is a reflection of the shareholders’ perspective.
Furthermore,  takeover  defence  might  be  effective  to  creating  more  value  over 
shareholder’s amount of value, prior to the takeover. This is the second principal rationale for 
employing takeover defences, from a shareholders’ perspective.  Ruback argues that, 339
“There is broad agreement that being a takeover target substantially increases the wealth 
of shareholders”.340
A  historical  review  of  estimates  attained  on  the  stock  price  of  target  companies 
consequent to successful takeovers shows that there is an average gain in shareholder wealth by 
over 30% (when takeover tenders are offered) and 20% when a friendly merger is executed.341
Given that  most takeovers bids usually offer target  company shareholders up to 50% 
more on their stock, Ruback concludes that: 
Rei, E Managerial Incentives and Takeover Wealth Gains, A Working Paper, Farmer School of Business, Miami 338
University, Oxford, (2008), p. 2.
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(1988), p. 50.
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“… It does not require a lot of complicated analysis to determine that the right to sell a share of 
stock for 50 % more than its previous market price benefits target shareholders. ”342
The purpose of a takeover defence tactic is to provide the company privileges to avoid proposed 
takeover easily. When a defence tactic is executed successfully, the probability of stockholders’ 
demand of premium offers for their existing shares decreases beside the likelihood of takeover.
Ruback asserts appropriately that:
“… even for an economist, it is hard to argue that shareholders benefit by reducing their chance 
to sell shares at a premium. ”343
To comprehend the contradictory possibility, Ruback identified that all shareholders have 
similar superseding concern, regarding, the market value of their shares. That market value of 344
the  shares  is  a  product  of  the  firm’s  value,  which  in  turn  is  a  summation  of  two  different 
components  namely,  the  value  derived  from  the  firm’s  conditional  retention  of  the  same 
management team that they had prior to the takeover defence. Then, if there is a change in the 
company’s  corporate  control  the  expected  value  change  will  occur.  Ruback  formulated  the 
following formula to calculate the firm’s value in absence or as a consequence of a takeover that 
can be applied in such a case.345
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Market Value of the Firm = Value of the Firm with Current Managers Probability of a Control 
Change X Change in Value from a Control Change
Based on this realistic calculation of firm value, Ruback concluded that, 
“… stockholders  are concerned about  how takeover defences affect  all  three components  of 
value: the value of the firm under current managers, the probability of an acquisition, and the 
offer price if a takeover bid occurs”
To further amplify the effect,  it  is expected that if the continuity of management and 
leadership of the firm stays constant, the value of the firm may become even greater than the 
benefits  of  the  takeover  on  shareholders.  Therefore,  contributing  to  takeover  defences  the 
probability to build the price of a firm’s shares. As Ruback further concludes, 346
“… while takeover defences may lower the probability of being acquired, they may also increase 
the offer price … (in that) “… takeover defences can affect the value of the firm even if it is not 
acquired, that is, the value with its incumbent management team. ”347
The third rationale for adopting takeover defences from a shareholders’ perspective, is to 
free managers from the worries of hostile takeovers and therefore enable them to concentrate on 
their responsibility of increasing the price of a firm’s shares. When managers are constantly 348
worried about potential takeovers, aware of the unpredictability of change in firm’s authority, 
they are unable to perform accurately and efficiently. For this reason, takeover defences support 
the incumbent directors to completely eradicate the possibilities of potential takeovers. Hence, 
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allowing  the  managers  to  perform  efficiently,  consequently,  resulting  in  benefits  for  both 
shareholders and the firm value.  
It  follows  that  the  firm’s  market  price  then  entirely  consists  of  its  value  with  the 
incumbent directors. However, takeover defences can arguably influence the said value towards 
either of two opposite ways.  Firstly, takeover defence guarantees may trigger a decrease in the 349
firm’s value if the directors enjoy their isolation from the possibilities and inconsistencies of the 
corporate control market, thus becoming leisurely and unaccountable.  On the second count, 350
which is relevant to the present argument for rationales of takeovers, there is the possibility that 
the firm’s value could increase since the incumbent managers will  benefit from the takeover 
defence guarantees and instead of wasting their otherwise precious time and valuable corporate 
resources  in  worrying  about  possible  hostile  takeovers,  commit  even  more  devotedly  in 
increasing the shareholder wealth.351
Besides considering the merits of takeover defences from a shareholders’ perspective, it is 
also possible to approach takeover defences from a manager’s perspective.  Managers have 352
three differing objectives to defend against takeover bids. To begin with, managers may believe 
that their firms have hidden values that they could exploit further and more profitably if the 
R. Ruback. An Overview of Takeover Defences. In A Auerback, ed.,  ,  University of Chicago Press, Chicago 349
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takeover is not affected.  Secondly, managers may believe that in resisting a takeover bid, they 353
will  increase the offer  price included in the first  bid and in so doing stimulate even greater 
benefits from the takeover.  Finally, managers may also act out of fear of losing their jobs and 354
in their fear, employ takeover defences in a bid to retain their privileged positions.355
2.14 The Issue of Corporate Social Responsibilities
This  research  however  does  not  require  the  need  for  detailed  comprehension  on  the 
concept of corporate social responsibility but nevertheless it would only be relevant to identify 
what may be described as a “total indifference” to the issue of “social responsibility” which is so 
important to consider in an “acquisition-merger” process. Although, there is a lot of work done 
and published by numerous authors addressing the issue of corporate social  responsibility.  356
There  hardly  exist  any  published  works  on  the  issue  of  social  responsibility  regarding  the 
acquisition merger process. Thus, it would be appropriate to briefly identify the reason for the 
concept of corporate social responsibility falling into the aspect of “defence” against acquisitions 
and mergers. 
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In this context, one is required to reflect on the ulterior motive of an acquisition-merger 
process  -  which  is  primarily  an  attempt  to  derive  financial  benefits  by  taking  over  a  target 
company or the company displaying certain unique assets and to simply promote the prospects of 
amassing more profits; financial and other profits. However, one of the inevitable consequences 
of acquisition-mergers process has been the loss of employment of several employees working in 
the target company. In simpler words, the social aspect of the acquisition merger process has 
been neglected greatly.357
This social issue mentioned above, is of grave importance as a large amount of acquisitions and 
merger processes fail most of the times. Therefore, it would be fair to treat this as a ground issue 
for defence against acquisitions and mergers
2.15 Conclusion
This chapter was barely an introduction to the entire research, containing details of the study 
and defining contextual meanings of the terms that will be used throughout the research and hence, are 
important to be clarified beforehand. The most important consequent aspect in the chapter is the 
anticipated image of the final research paper. The chapter begins with a brief introduction followed by 
the justification behind the study. Certain basic concepts such as mergers, alliances and acquisitions 
have been illustrated. Mergers are activities that make companies to mutually combine for the cause of 
releasing high value synergies. Whereas, acquisitions are activities that allows, after their success, the 
acquirer to gain control over the target company. In contrast, alliances denote an agreement or a 
Capron,  Laurence.  "The  long-term  performance  of  horizontal  acquisitions."   Strategic  management 357
journal (1999): 987-1018.
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consensus between two or more individuals to initiate common goals and deploy secure common 
interests.358
The Types of takeover have also been recognised in this chapter; friendly takeovers, reversed 
takeover and back flip takeovers, to name them. The friendly take overs contribute to the willing 
acceptance of takeover involving improvement of several factors, such as; value, synergy and others. 
Due diligence was discussed in the next section and was considered as an analysis undertaken by the 
investors with intentions of understanding the prospect of an investment with respect to issues, such as; 
operation and management, and the verification of material facts and figures.
 In the context of corporate market, they can be the business parties or groups358
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CHAPTER 3: Historical growth and development of Acquisitions, Mergers, and Defences 
thereto.
3.1 Introduction
The issue of takeover defences initiated over a century ago through various forms. The 
procedure regarding takeovers has advanced over time to become one of the corporate strategies 
that  assist  small  and  big  businesses  to  expand  their  operations  either  domestically  or 
internationally.  Takeovers trace their roots to two perspectives including evolution path and 359
timeline.  In this  section of the research,  the two perspectives of  the takeovers are discussed 
comprehensively  and  their  relationship  to  the  current  takeovers  in  the  business  world  are 
critically analysed. This approach of analysing the history of takeovers particularly looks into the 
issues surrounding it in a chronological manner.  A comprehensive analysis of each historical 360
era in the development of takeovers in business is undertaken.
3.2 Historical Background
3.2.1 The First Period of Takeovers (1887 – 1913)
It  is  believed  that  the  issue  of  takeovers  in  the  face  of  business  activities  began  as 
mergers, acquisitions and buyouts resulting from advantages of operating on a large scale by 
monopolies in business during that period.  The practice is held to have started between 1887 361
Singh, Harbir, and Farid Harianto. "Management-board relationships, takeover risk, and the adoption of golden 359
parachutes." Academy of Management Journal 32.1 (1989): 7-24.
Dickerson, Andrew P., Heather D. Gibson, and Euclid Tsakalotos. "Takeover risk and dividend strategy: a study of 360
UK firms." The Journal of Industrial Economics 46.3 (1998): 281-300.
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(1974): 65-77.
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and 1904 when large business activities began taking shape. During this period, it is noted that 
initially  developed companies  accrued the  advantages  of  monopoly at  both  the  national  and 
regional levels. Such monopolies took advantage of consumers to maximise their revenues and 
heavy manufacturing industries.362
The first period of takeovers initiated from 1887 is of high importance because this Era 
introduced the concept of takeovers in the corporate world and the in this Era, companies took 
the  initiative  to  expand  their  business  through  takeovers  or  mergers.  Therefore,  it  is  highly 
significant to discuss the first period of takeovers.
 Initially,  they were predominantly horizontal  where different  companies consolidated 
their resources to capitalise, redesign their businesses and gain control of the existing market 
share  at  the  time.   It  was  important  that  firms  commanding  a  given  market  niche  sought 
consolidation, partnership or ownership of other firms with the aim of operating effectively in 
other markets in a bid to further their influence in national and global market. Most of the deals 
did not materialise as a result of financial collapse resulting from ineffective management of 
growth and improper objectives of such mergers or deals. The first period is also attributed to the 
rapid economic meltdown of 1903 that contributed to the collapse of the arrangements. In 1904, 
the stock markets of the developed economic countries made impacted adversely on corporate 
financial  activities.  The  control  of  the  market  by  businesses  during  this  period  was 363
characterised by unsupportive legal frameworks in the US. This weakness was rectified by the 
US Supreme Court with the adoption of the Sherman Act of 1890. The Act was intended to block 
D. Selmer. Hostile Corporate Takeovers: History and Overview. Northern Illinois University Law Review, Vol. 362
203, No. 3, (1988). pp. 33 - 56.
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since they were considered not to add value to the corporate market at the time.   During the 364
first period of takeovers in the US, the regulatory measures to protect the interest of the target 
business did not receive much attention. Takeovers were conducted with a view to monopolising 
markets. Particularly after the Sherman Act (1890) came into force, the issue of the minority 
shareholders rights does not seem to have had much attention during this period.365
The Sherman Antitrust Act governed all mergers and takeovers from 1887- 1913.  This 366
law  was  introduced  after  numerous  complaints  from  firms  that  some  were  benefiting  from 
monopolies after. Such takeovers would then raise prices of products and services, produce poor 
quality goods and lax innovation.  However, the introduction of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 367
1890 ensured a level playing field and adequate competition between the merged firms and other 
independent players. However, the Sherman’s Antitrust Act soon developed problems with the 
workers unions, which did not go down well with most courts. Following a legal battle regarding 
the Sherman Antitrust  Act  in the United States v.  E.  C.  Knight  Company (1895),  there was 
significant modification of this Act, which targeted its wording.368
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3.2.2 The Second Period of Takeovers (1914 –1944)
It follows from the initial period that occurred between 1897 and 1913 that the corporate 
control of market share did not materialise as intended.  During the period 1914 and 1944 369
during which there were several were witnessed. The aggressive practice of takeovers is largely 
adopted by oligopolistic firms that aimed to exploit both new and existing markets. It is worth 
noting that this period takes “oligopoly” rather than “monopoly” was the critical considerations. 
An economic factor that helped propel the success of the corporate control market in this phase 
was  the  emergent  economic  boom  recorded  across  the  globe  in  the  post-First  World  War 
period.370
In  this  period  that  initiated  from  1914,  companies  took  the  initiative  to  adopt  an 
aggressive strategy against mergers and takeovers. It was the stage when the companies were 
identifying the concept of takeovers as not only expansion but also to maintain competitive edge 
in the corporate world.
It  was  during  this  period  that  business  firms  rapidly  engaged  in  inter-firms  strategic 
arrangements due to the emergence and advancement of technology resulting from issues such as 
the layout of the railways in different countries, the development of transport aeroplanes and 
motor vehicles. The development of infrastructure such as transport systems enabled companies 
to designed growth and expansion strategies through.  The US government was particularly 371
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instrumental  in  developing  a  series  of  policy  frameworks  that  encouraged  firms  to  trade  in 
partnerships or form companies, policies that were implemented in the early 1920s. Several 372
experts  have  traced  this  as  the  genesis  of  the  American  Corporate  giants,  corporations  that 
currently the global trade scene.373
During the second period acquisitions and mergers were mostly horizontal and took place 
between  entities  that  were  equal  of  size  in  terms  of  the  resources.  The  manufacturing 374
industries sealed most of the Acquisitions and Mergers during this period namely petroleum, 
metal,  chemicals,  food  processing  and  transportation  equipment  industries.  Some  of  these 
products were new in the market and experiencing both low demand and supply in the market. 
Experts attribute the second period to the increase in investment banks hence embracing a pivotal 
role to facilitate the corporate control arrangements.  The major economic downturn of the 375
stock market in 1929 shook the progress made so far in terms of acquisitions and mergers in the 
global economic arena. The economic woes extended into the 1930s hindering further expansion 
and consolidation by companies. The introduction of incentives and subsidies such as tax reliefs 
in the US and England contributed to the provision of inspiration to rejuvenate the new era of 
corporate control deals.376
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3.2.3 The Third Period of Takeovers (1945-1964)
The third period occurred after the Second World War and continued until 1964 when 
there  was  less  activity  in  the  takeover  market  since  it  did  not  fall  under  the  merger  wave 
periods.  From the previous period, various justifications seem to motivate takeovers. These 377
include a search for favourable tax regimes, quest to consolidate operations, past inability to 
achieve business targets, pursuit for bigger market share, a paradigm shift from the bond markets 
to stocks markets  and attraction of  better  employee skills.  This  period of  takeover is  highly 
significant to discuss as it includes the management role in the takeover and in this period, the 
importance of management during the procedure of takeovers was also realised.  
378
The  justification  for  takeovers  during  this  period  further  sought  to  maximise  on 
management skills.  Many companies failed to explore cost  cuts  while  maximising sales  and 
revenues. This situation made such firms vulnerable to acquisitions by their competitors or peers, 
which had leaner management systems in place. In some instances, some firms’ managers were 
sympathetic to implementing tough policies that would again make them profitable. Typically, a 
firm that is underperforming is usually more attractive for takeovers, because the benchmarks for 
improvement are certain. This explains why underperforming firms’ suit acquisition compared to 
Romano, Roberta. "Competition for corporate charters and the lesson of takeover statutes." Fordham L. Rev. 61 377
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their  counterparts.  Even  economists  support  this  position  with  a  general  view  that  the 379
takeovers in the third period catalysed by stakeholders’ quest for discipline and effectiveness in 
overall  operations. Hence, after the shift  to stock oriented business models was to maximise 
stock returns.  Therefore, maximising return on investment for the shareholder.380
3.2.4 The Fourth Period of Takeovers (1965-1980)
The fourth  phase  of  takeover  occurred  between 1965 and 1980 when the  world  had 
recovered  from  the  adverse  effects  of  the  Second  World  War.  This  period  was  greatly 381
characterised by mergers,  acquisitions and takeovers that were largely practised by dominant 
corporations, which had large resources, market capitalisation and dominance.  Experts stated 382
that the corporate control deals were primarily inspired by the high rises in stock prices, stringent 
enforcement of the antitrust laws that were adopted throughout England and the US and the 
progressive  increment  of  interest  rates.  In  this  period  (1965-1980),  companies  with  large 
resources had the opportunity to expand their business by taking over the small companies and 
this process helped them to grow in the market.
The  small  entities  that  overcame  the  period  of  corporate  control  became  subject  of 
takeover targets by bigger corporations as it became more profitable to invest in their stocks in 
financial markets. The corporate financial deals were financed appropriately from equity and not 
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by investment banks that had dominated the other phases of the takeovers.  The investment 383
banks earned large financial sums by acting as advisors to one the parties.  The Attorney General 
of the US announced the government’s plans to split the large transnational corporations by the 
end of 1968.  This development and other regulatory measures were precipitated by the fact 384
that corporations that actively participated in takeovers had poor performance registered in the 
stock markets despite taking part in a takeover of the small companies.  Most of the modern 385
corporate control deals of contemporary time trace their roots in the 1970s. The most notable 
corporate  deal  associated  with  this  period  is  the  famous  United  Technologies,  the  merger 
between INCO and ESB as well as the merger between Garlock Industries and Colt Industries to 
form OTIS Elevator.386
The concept of leveraged buyouts is rapidly becoming an issue of the past in the current 
business  environment.  Trehan  has  indicated  that  leveraged  buyouts  paved  the  way  for  the 
application of contemporary takeovers during that particular period. Financial corporations to 
represent the corporate control deals that would later be changed to mergers, acquisitions and 
takeovers  by  the  existing  market  environment  and  legal  jurisdictions  used  the  leveraged 
buyouts.  The effects of LBOs became so rampant in the 1960s even though it is a concept that 387
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began earlier in the history of takeovers.  The LBOs of the later period of 1960s were known as 388
“bootstrap” corporate  transactions as  attributed to the takeover  trends of  steel  companies by 
Sharon Steel Company that was owned at that time by Victor Posner.389
This approach of studying the history of takeover has been followed by a number of 
corporate experts and researchers. Legal experts have justified the sudden rise LBOs in the 1980s 
to the converging regulatory and economic factors prevailing in the US; the effective government 
policies on antitrust and securities laws that led to the approval of mergers that would previously 
have been challenged. The other aspect is the deregulation of several industries that provided 
opportunities for mergers, acquisition and corporate restructuring.  This ensured that profitable 390
companies consolidated and experienced further growth and controlled competitive forces of the 
market through forceful takeovers otherwise known as buyouts at the time. .391
The LBO experts have stated that the later periods of 1980s experienced a high increase 
in LBO deals that mainly involved buyouts of small and medium sized companies.  The small 392
and medium sized deals did not feature mostly in the headlines like the mega multimillion deals 
that involved very large corporations. It is significant to mention that the LBOs at that time only 
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R. Trehan. The History of Leverage Buyout. Research Papers for Hoteliers. (2006). 4 December 2006,389
R. Trehan. The History of Leverage Buyout. Research Papers for Hoteliers. (2006).  4 December 2006, 390
LBO-Advisers. The History of the Leveraged Buy-Out. LBO-Advisers Website - A Venture capital and private 391
equity directory, (2011).
 Ibid,392
 139
made less than 10% of the overall transactions that took place over the globe since the mode of 
acquiring and merging transformed into the modern practice.393
The other feature attributed to the LBOs in the 1980s is the infamous incident where 
numerous, highly prominent corporate buyouts resulted in bankruptcies of the target companies. 
The companies were worth less than the amounts they owed to other businesses.  According to 394
Trehan, the aftermath is associated and accrued to the fact that leverage ratio was nearly 100% 
and the interest payments were very high hence many companies’ operating cash flows were not 
able to meet the requirements of the contract.  The other vital feature of the corporate control 395
market during this period when LBOs dominated the takeover arrangements was the fact that the 
market  was  initially  created,  sustained  and developed by  large  businesses  of  the  1960s  and 
1970s. 
The reports from the Washington Post in the year 2005 indicated that Kravis Kohlberg 
Roberts and Co. had acquired Merrill Lynch for an amount of over US $ 33 billion.  According 396
to the Harvard Business School records of record-making businesses, Kravis Kohlberg Roberts 
and Co. is famed to have been the pioneer modern day leveraged buyout-type of takeovers in the 
world business history after  they took over Orkin Exterminating Company during the 1960s 
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decade.  However,  according  to  Trehan,  the  first  ever  LBO  that  was  most  similar  to 397
contemporary  takeover  transactions  was  conducted  during  the  spring  season  of  1955,  when 
McLean Industries acquired Waterman Steamship Corp with a US$ 42 million borrowed capital 
and a further US$ 7 million rose through several issues of their preferred stock. Upon execution 
of the takeover deal, McLean Industries sold US$ 20 million worth assets previously belonging 
to Waterman Steamship Corp as well as the liquid cash circulating at Waterman at the time the 
deal was closed. They would be under pressure from the banks financing the deal to reduce the 
level of borrowing by asset sales.398
Levinson who argues that seconds Trehan’s contention, 
“The first leveraged buyout that was most alike to modern takeovers may have been the purchase 
of Waterman Steamship Company by McLean Industries, Inc. in 1955. McLean Industries, Inc. 
was then owned by Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company”.399
The only difference that prevented this particular deal from being a typical takeover deal 
was the fact that McLean borrowed over US$ 42 million of the acquisition capital and raised a 
farther US$ 7 million by issuing preferred stocks. Had the company used its capital  base to 
finance the deal rather than borrow, this would have marked the pioneer version of contemporary 
takeover deals.400
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The LBO at the time was still regarded as a business acquisition meant for both private 
and public companies. The acquisition was predominantly financed by debts given the condition 
of a basic minimum investment on sound equity of the target company. The rapid increase in 
LBO transactions at the close of 1980s decade was associated with an equivalent buyout during 
the  early  1990s  hence  eliminating  the  availability  of  loan  financing.  This  forced  many 
corporations  to  finance  their  takeovers  or  acquisitions  with  the  shareholders  ‘capital  and 
investments.  This  point  of  view  led  to  the  current  system  of  takeovers  experienced  in  the 
corporate environment as business sought to expand their operations and extend beyond their 
borders to tap the markets.  This meant that the acquiring company did not have to use the 401
assets of the target as securities or collateral of their debts as required by the secured creditors in 
the LBOs. Where they had previously guaranteed that interests and principal amount obligations 
of an LBO could be met with cash flows and assets belonging to the target company posed for 
refinancing, most LBO initiators found themselves opting to finance the deals themselves hence 
changing the LBOs into takeover transactions.  The emerging trend in the corporate expansion 402
strategies  was  further  impacted  in  the  1980s  by  a  rapid  development  of  high-yielding  debt 
portfolios otherwise known as “junk bonds” that provided the prospective LBO initiators with 
adequate capital required enhancing the financing of the takeover exploits without the need of 
loans.  During  this  period  the  perception  of  takeovers  changed  in  that  the  US companies 403
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became interested  in  extending their  arms to  include  takeovers  in  the  financial  market.  The 
concept of leveraged buyouts originated, but no particular legislation was enacted to regulate 
them, presumably in the belief that the existing legislation would be sufficient to regulate this 
new market.  
England seems to have taken the initiative during this period, but not on the scale that the 
US did. In England, the takeover issue is usually governed by company legislation and by case 
law. The protection of minority shareholders in the takeover process was not a new phenomenon 
in England. The protection of minority shareholders in takeovers is best reflected in the case of 
Foss v Harbottle.   After the Foss v Harbottle case it was allowed that a minority shareholders 404
could put forward a claim or allegation on behalf of the organisation. This rule in the Foss v 
Harbottle marked the beginning for solutions by minority shareholders. Mr. Starkie Turton and 
Mr.  Foss  were  minority  shareholders  in  a  company  called  “Victoria  Park  Company”.  The 
company had been established in 1835 to purchase land to the tune of 180 acres in Manchester, 
England,  which  later  on  grew  to  be  Victoria  Park.  An  Act  of  Parliament  incorporated  the 
company. The petitioners claimed that the company’s property had been wasted and misapplied 
and that several mortgages were inappropriately taken out secured by the company’s assets. They 
requested that a receiver be appointed and those who were guilty be held liable to the company. 
The court threw the case out stating that when its directors wrong a company it  is  only the 
company that has standing to sue.405
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The takeover issues were also considered by the Takeover Panel, which was set up in 
1968 in London, England, as a regulatory body.   Compared to the US system, the English 406
system of  takeovers  seem to  have  been  more  organised  in  that  it  always  paid  attention  to 
protecting the minority shareholders and judicial measures, the propriety of takeover and mergers 
used to be considered by the Takeover Panel.
During  this  period,  the  Sherman  Antitrust  Act  was  still  in  place  in  the  US  for  the 
regulation of the mergers and takeovers . However, the enforcement was lenient during the 407
Johnson administration years of 1964-1967 because of the sluggish economic growth during that 
period.  Together  with  the  Celler-Kefauver  Act  of  1950  in  force,  many  merged  firms  were 
prevented from unfair competition.408
3.2.5 The Fifth Takeover Period (1981-1989)
From the foregoing section, it is evident that the pioneer corporate deals like the LBOs 
were transformed over time into the current conventional takeover transactions experienced in 
the business world . The immense volume of concentrated market takeover activities of modern 409
times is typical of the takeover boom recorded in the 1980s decade (with takeover deals having 
recently been transformed from the predominant LBOs of previous decades). 
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The period of the 1980s is said to have opened the way for extensive research on the 
activities around the globe to determine the importance and best way of carry out the activity.  410
The three studies that were highly endorsed by the experts at the time was conducted by Walter 
in 1984, Bishop, Dodd in 1987, and finally by McDougall and Round in 1986.  The insightful 411
studies revealed that the rapidly increasing lucrative wealth outcomes generated by the takeover 
transactions and the impressive performance posted by the firms that successfully took part in 
takeover arrangements hence increasing the need for takeovers for the large corporations during 
that period.412
The period of the 1980s is marked as the period in the history of takeovers to record the 
highest  number  of  takeovers  as  denoted  by  the  immensity  of  the  transactions  executed,  the 
volume of all transactions and by the size of corporations engaging in takeover bids, and that 
some of the modern takeover transactions are typical of that particular period.413
This period of evolution in a takeover in the business scene is characterised by breaking 
up of large corporations into small units called corporate breakup or conglomerate demergers. 
This was because the sum of the parts was now less than the breakup value.  The medium-sized 414
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firms experienced growth resulting from favourable market  conditions.  Most  of  the takeover 
targets  launched  growth  initiatives  in  new  markets  outside  their  original  markets  and  core 
business. The companies that needed easy access to the new markets horizons preferred taking 
over the innovative and less capitalised firms, then merging their business operations.415
The major beneficiaries of the corporate control during this period of evolution include 
pharmaceutical industries, oil and gas companies, banking firms and the players in the airline 
industry across  the business  world.  During this  period of  evolution,  the foreign takeovers 416
became more predominant, where the domestics firms initiated cross-border takeovers to tap the 
new potential  in  overseas  markets  for  further  growth.  The increased corporate  control  deals 
specifically  unsolicited  takeovers  fuelled  an  increased  volume  of  previously  profitable,  but 
relatively  small  enterprises  in  order  to  survive  being  forced  to  adopt  new  management 
structures.417
3.2.6 The Sixth period - Takeovers in Modern Times (2000 – 2016)
It is important to note that the takeover arrangements undertaken in the current business 
world are generally taken by entities as expansion strategies and a bid to control a large market 
for  increased  profitability.  In  fact,  Porter  and  Singh  in  their  research  have  associated  the 
contemporary  time mergers,  acquisitions  and  takeovers  to  the  corporate  finance  field  of  the 
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decades.  The arrangements have contributed to the current reallocation of resources in the 418
global economy.  From an investment point of view, takeovers accounts for over 70% of the 419
US foreign investment every year.  This fact makes the takeovers, the single most dominant 420
form  of  foreign  investment  in  the  US  and  the  entire  business  world.  The  arrangements 
(takeovers,) are collectively referred to as the corporate control market.  The corporate control 421
market has rapidly gained popularity and has been by many firms over the last two decades. The 
deals are said to have involved very substantial amounts of money to the tune of billions of US 
dollars per year globally.422
According to Rajan and Hattari, in 1970 the global outward foreign direct investment 
stocks stood at only US$ 14 billion, but it has increased by more than 140 times over by the year 
2007 to about US$ 2,000 billion.  Rajan and Hattari maintained that the most important point 423
to  note  in  regard to  the fact  that  the FDI upsurge has  largely been triggered by a  dramatic 
increase in the corporate control market transactions (in both frequency and capital volume) of 
most existing entities and not because new corporate entities are being created.424
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The trade and development conference hosted by the UN further stated that the number 
and volume of the global corporate control market arrangements witnessed in the year 2006 
netted a value of over $880 US dollars.  The value reached a maximum of US$1200 in the 425
millennium, which was the record for the period.  This can be compared to a negligible volume 426
of pre-1980 and the modest US$ 150 billion worth of recorded at the beginning of the 1990s.  427
As a result, is considered to be a vital platform for growth, diversification of operations, strategic 
international  expansion  and  technological  gain  meant  for  developed,  upcoming  and  the 
developing economies.428
As  justification  for  current  mergers  and  takeovers,  the  corporate  control  market  is 
currently becoming the business strategy of firms that are intending to expand and expand their 
control of a particular market. In fact, the trend has further enhanced competition among the 
firms in various industries, as they battle to maximise their revenues for continued operations. 
The modern corporations are said to be involved in rewriting the traditional rules of.   Modern 429
takeovers  are  closely associated with the adverse effects  of  the economic crises  that  hit  the 
financial  markets  recently  in  the  year  2007. The global  economic crisis  period that  started 430
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around the summer of 2007 and lasted up until the beginning of 2010 revealed, that transactions 
in  the corporate  control  market  have become a strategic  tool  for  growth and a  key tool  for 
strategic management in the 21st Century.  In the process, the dynamics of the corporate control 431
market  transactions  have  evolved to  become the  modern-dayall-around business  strategy for 
strategic growth and or company survival especially in the times of economic recession.432
3.3 Some Salient Trends of Takeover Transactions in England
It is evident that in England, the process of takeovers and mergers are governed by the 
City Codes on Takeovers and Mergers otherwise commonly known as the Takeover Codes.  433
The City Codes as will  be studied in Chapter 5 is  a collection of rules that are written and 
overseen by the Takeover Panel. The Panel is made of people derived from the business and legal 
fraternity who have both insightful and professional knowledge about the issues of takeovers and 
mergers. The Panel in England is charged with regulating, formation and implementation of the 
City Codes in the relevant takeover events.  Through its  two main organs (code and hearing 
committee), the independent regulatory body has the capability of resolving various conflicts 
arising in the corporate world as a result of takeovers deals. The Panel is further attributed to a 
flexible and well-informed fashion to dispute resolutions in the required time. The parliament has 
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conferred upon the body statutory powers to enforce the codes in the corporate scene without the 
interference of the court during such a crucial process. It follows that the court is not allowed to 
introduce the judicial procedure during the actual process of the takeovers and only allowed to 
intervene after the process has been completed.434
The Panel on takeovers and mergers in England is competitive in providing resolution to 
disputes hence appeal to the courts are rare after the Panel has reached a decision. It enjoys the 
advantages of non-interference from the judicial system of the government hence performs its 
duties  independently  to  enhance  the  procedures  in  the  takeovers.  The  takeover  Panel  is 435
considered an effective mechanism to be applied in situations where quick, well informed and 
flexible response to disputes arising during the takeover processes is required. According to the 
experts, the takeover Panel governs and administers the resolutions of disputes in real time to 
enhance the quick process of transition in the takeovers.436
Of significance is  the fact  that  the City Code was formerly a non- statutory body of 
professional  rules  adopted  primarily  to  govern  city  institutions  in  the  corporate  control 
transactions on a relatively voluntary basis.  The City Code became statutory in the year 2006 437
and before then the provisions in it were enforced as an ethical mechanism that firms voluntarily 
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embraced for purposes of good publicity and corporate image. A breach or contravention of the 
Code during corporate control deals mean that the involved firm suffered immense reputational 
damage with real market costs. Poor reputation results  in  loss  of  clients  and  highly 
compromised market  position.  The  companies  that  go  against  the  provisions  risked being 438
excluded  from  the  city  services  predominantly  run  by  prime  institutions  subsequently  not 
enjoying the benefits accrued by other firms. The role played by the City Code in the business 
society enhanced its transformation into statutory status by the parliament providing enforcement 
powers against all the existing institutions in England.439
The fully-fledged implementation and the regulatory arm of the “Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers” also forced many companies that could otherwise default on the Code to think twice 
prior any defiant actions since the Panel is not bound by statutory bureaucracy interests.  It is 440
argued that the success achieved by the implementation, administration and regulation by the 
City Code is that enhance its  adoption into England statutes in 2006.  On adoption by the 441
government in 2006, the parliament conferred upon it the statutory powers to function effectively 
hence became a component part of England compliance with the European Takeover Directive 
2004/25/EC. 
The  Takeover  Code  has  made  England  takeover  practices  to  be  strongly  weighted 
towards the protection of the shareholder’s interests more than it does guarantee the directors’ 
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right  of  decision  making  or  the  interests  of  other  stakeholders  to  the  firms  involved  in  the 
takeover interests.  This issue of the takeover will be further elaborated and given more weight 442
in other chapters of the research. It is vital to mention that the Takeover Code is by large geared 
towards the protection of  shareholder  interests,  making England’s  takeover  transactions very 
dissimilar  in  the  case  of  the  US  corporate  control  market  which  is  greatly  scaled  towards 
upholding  the  liberty  of  a  firm’s  management  board  during  the  decision  making  processes 
following a takeover bid.443
The  takeover  Codes  further  emphasise  the  importance  of  equally  treating  the  firms 
involved in a takeover struggle without the favour of considering the market dominance of either 
firms  or  corporate  clout  commanded  by  either  the  offeror  or  target  company.  The  Codes 444
critically emphasise the requirement of soliciting for shareholders’ consent to takeovers or to the 
adoption of the takeover defences. All the shareholders of a company, in law, must be treated 
equally  or  with  relative  equality  as  emphasised  in  the  company’s  incorporation  charter, 
whichever of the two provides the most protection for the shareholders.  These two equality 445
requirements (for firms and shareholders) are captured with similar emphasis in the Directive 
Article 3 (1) A, saying “all holders of the securities of an offeree company of the same class
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Must be afforded equivalent treatment; moreover, if a person acquires control of a company, the 
other holders of securities must be protected”.446
The Codes have been attributed to excessively offering protective measures for firms 
against hostile bids, such as having numerous mandatory requirements before any prospective 
acquirer  can present  a  takeover bid interests.  The measures are said to have barred many 447
potential acquirers from making their takeover bids to the target companies but instead enhanced 
the pursuit of mutually agreeable bid. The codes are strict to the extent of ensuring that unless the 
shareholder's consent is granted, the Code strictly prohibits a firm’s management from employing 
any defensive tactics that would have the effect of frustrating an actual or anticipated bid.448
In resonance with the Code, the EU Directive on Takeovers and Mergers Article 3 (1) C, 
directs that “the board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a whole 
and  must  not  deny  the  holders  of  securities  the  opportunity  to  decide  on  the  merits  of  the 
bids”.  This scenario as shall  emerge in a later  discussion contrasts  with the US corporate 449
control  market,  where a  firm’s board of  directors  have a  flexible  mandate  to  engage in  any 
takeover  defensive  tactics  without  seeking  the  shareholder’s  consent  first,  as  long  as  the 
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defensive  tactics  can  aptly  be  justified  in  complete  accordance  with  the  legally  recognised 
fiduciary duties of corporate directors.  England context is however different in many ways, 450
primarily as a consequence of the unique feature of the Code interests.451
The takeover Code clearly regulates the type of information that companies should or 
should not release to the general public with regard to a potential takeover bid. It is a requirement 
of the Code that any information relating to a tabled or prospective takeover bid must not be 
released to the public except when and only when such announcements are regulated as such by 
the Code. In this regard, the Code uses a timetable to schedule every aspect of takeover bid 
interests.452
The compulsory minimum incorporation period after a bid’s declaration is also similarly 
captured and emphasised by the Directive Article 3 (1) B, directing that 
“the holders of the securities of an offeree company must have sufficient time and information to 
enable them to reach a properly informed decision on the bid; where it advises the holders of 
securities, the board of the offeree company must give its views on the effects of implementation 
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of the bid on employment, conditions of employment and the locations of the company's places of 
business”.453
The schedules are stipulated in timetables of the Codes allowing the shareholders time to 
meet and deliberate on the bid, give or deny consent to the board of directors on whether to agree 
to or react defensively to a given takeover bid interests.454
According to Kraakman et al. (2004) 
“a final general aspect of information rules in takeover bids is the acceptance of the view that 
information disclosure is ineffective unless shareholders are given enough time to absorb the 
information (or other people’s analyses of the information) before they have to act on it”.455
From  this  perspective,  it  can  be  argued  that  when  the  Code  regulates  bid  response 
timings,  it  is  to  offer  all  concerned parties  a  required  minimum time for  informed decision 
makings, such as 20 days after the initial bid (adequate for the shareholders to convene according 
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to the United States International Trade Commission)  or a relatively shorter period after a 456
revised bid.  The scholars are however quick to point out that, 457
“The main counter-argument against very generous absorption periods is the need to minimise 
the period during which the target’s  future is  uncertain and,  in particular,  during which the 
normal functioning of the centralise management of the target is disrupted”.458
Again, the more the mandatory minimum offer period are, the more chances there are that 
a White Knight will appear ultimately making it a more costly bid.  The Code’s imposition of 459
lengthy mandatory minimum offer period is seen by some experts as delimiting the success of 
takeovers in England at the expense of potential and actual bidders.460
In England, takeover bidders have a set minimum bid level to observe as set out in the 
Code,  which in most  cases follows from the previous purchase of  the firm’s shares.   For 461
instance, it is the requirement of the Code that the offer made by an actual or potential bidder 
must never be of less value than any of the prices that the bidder paid to acquire shares within the 
three  months  prior  to  making  the  big  announcement.  According  to  the  Code,  when  a  firm 
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announces its intention to present a takeover offer, it must always be prepared to match or raise 
the price it has been willing to pay in its acquisition initiative three months prior to such an 
announcement.462
Again in accordance with the bid minimum levels, the Code requires that if the target 
company’s shares are acquired during the deal’s offer period and they are bought at a higher 
price than the offer price, then the firm or entity making the takeover offer must increase that 
offer  price  to  match  or  exceed  the  value  of  the  target  firm’s  shares  during  the  deal’s  offer 
period.463
The Code also greatly reduces the opportunities of a shareholder to initiate a creeping 
tender offer  as  a  takeover strategy.  A creeping tender offer  is  the third available takeover 464
mechanism besides more common friendly takeovers and the less common outrightly hostile 
takeover bids.  The creeping tender offer is so-called creeping because it involves a potential 465
acquirer gradually.  In this takeover mechanism, once the potential acquirer accumulates stock 466
volume that commands an adequate voting power, he or she surprises the target company with a 
tender offer. If the presiding management declines the tender offer, the potential acquirer can 
J. Borer and J. Hohn. Hostile takeovers. International Financial Law Review, (2000). Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 29 -32.462
Hopt, K Comparative Company Law, ECGI - Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 77/2006, 1 December 2006, 463
in M Reimann and R Zimmermann eds., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law,  Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, pp. 1161-1191.
S. Kenyon-Slade. Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK: Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 464
(2004). pp. 67 – 83
A. Jones and B. Sufrin. EC competition law: Text, cases, and materials. Oxford University Press. Oxford, (2007). 465
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effect a favourable change in the target company’s management through a vote and in so doing 
get the tender offer accepted.467
The Code however requires that every shareholder who accumulates stock gradually must 
make the takeover offer known to the target company when his/her/its shareholding volume, 
including the stock volume held by other parties by then acting in a concert (what is legally 
termed as a concert party because they only acquire stock in an identity complementing that of 
the interested shareholder,  reaches the 30% scale of the target’s total share volume. This has 468
been  seen  as  totally  defeating  the  creeping  tender  offer  advantage  in  English  takeover 
practices.469
Again, the Code seeks to reduce malicious schemes between competitors via the use of 
takeover threats that are known to happen in many highly competitive industries. On this accord, 
the Code requires that if there are rumours in circulation or speculations are being made to the 
effect that a certain firm is seeking to take over another, any actual or prospective bidder in the 
rumoured or speculated takeover must necessarily make an announcement to clarify its position 
in regards to that rumour or speculation, if that rumour or speculation has in any way affected the 
 S.  Kenyon-Slade.  Mergers  and Takeovers  in  the  US and UK: Law and Practice,  Oxford  University  Press, 467
Oxford, (2004). pp. 43 – 91
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target company's share trading patterns and prices.  The Code ensures that companies that are 470
in  competition  do  not  start  such  rumours  and  speculations  to  negatively  impact  on  their 
competitors when they have no intention of making a takeover bid, a potentially lethal strategy if 
left unregulated.471
It  should  be  noted  that  in  England,  takeovers  are  also  regulated  in  accordance  with 
stipulations of the European Commission market competition law  a good example of such 472
scenarios is when a takeover transaction threatens the competitive markets envisioned by the 
commission within member states. There are instances that takeovers can be blocked especially 
when such takeovers have the potential to yield uncompetitive conditions in the EU market such 
as is exemplified by Jones and Sufrin where
“The EC prohibited Schneider’s takeover of Legrand on the basis that the concentration would 
lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position on a number of identified electrical 
equipment markets”.473
The discussion featured above has focused only on providing a succinct highlight of the 
most salient trends in English takeovers and takeover transactions based on the most prominent 
statutory and practice regulatory mechanisms, the City Code of Takeovers and Mergers and the 
J. Armour and D. Skeel. Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why? The peculiar divergence of US and 470
UK takeover regulation. Working Paper, No. 331. September 2006. Centre for Business Research, University Of 
Cambridge, Cambridge, (2006). pp. 1 - 3.
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EU  Directive  of  Takeovers  as  overseen  by  the  Panel  on  Takeovers  and  Mergers .  The 474
regulatory  mechanisms  have  numerous  provisions  and  requirements  some  of  which  will  be 
reviewed in a later section of this research in contrast to the US corporate control market trends.  
At  this  juncture,  however,  it  is  vital  to  highlight  that  in  some instances  prior  to  the 
widespread acceptance and binding observance of the Code, and more importantly, prior to the 
statutory  adoption  of  the  Code  in  2006,  English  takeovers  were  legally  regulated  by  the 
Companies  Act  1985 .  The  Act  featured  the  famous  Rules  Governing  the  Substantial 475
Acquisition of Shares, a set of rules that sought to legally control how takeovers were initiated, 
conducted and finalised. When the Code sufficed from the professional circles of the corporate 
control  market,  the  Rules  Governing  the  Substantial  Acquisition  of  Shares  were  then 
implemented and overseen as an accompaniment to the Code. At this time, the Code mainly 
regulated and defined when and how the announcement of pertinent shareholdings levels was 
made  at  the  onset  of  a  takeover  bid.  With  the  improvement  of  the  Code,  its  acceptance, 
successful adoption and subsequent statutory incorporation into England and by extension EU 
takeover law the Rules Governing the Substantial Acquisition of Shares have been abolished.  476
Scholes, Myron S., and Mark A. Wolfson. The effects of changes in tax laws on corporate reorganization activity. 474
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Similar provisions as were apparent in the Rules Governing the Substantial Acquisition of Shares 
are still in existence within England Companies Act 1985.477
3.4 Some Salient Trends of Takeovers in the US
Any analysis of the US takeover context in contemporary times is always cognisant of the 
fact that, “the content of takeover regulation differs just as markedly on the two sides of the 
Atlantic (the US and England)”.  Indeed, one of the most dominant agreement points among 478
corporate experts is  that the US corporate control environment contrasts greatly with that of 
England, more so in the regulation and execution of takeovers.479
In  most  US  jurisdictions,  takeovers  are  governed  under  precedents  set  by  Delaware 
courts,  mainly  because  these  particular  State  laws  were  the  pioneer  to  give  American 
corporations  ‘a  great  room to  manoeuvre,  perhaps  explaining  why  even  up  to  today,  more 
corporations are registered in Delaware than in all other American states combined.480
Armour and Skeel (2006) traced many of the presiding disparities between English and 
the  United  States  takeover  regulation  frameworks  to  their  origination.  Their  discussion 
highlighted several significant insights to the characterisation of the contemporary US takeover 
United States International Trade Commission. The Effects of greater economic integration within the European 477
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environment. As was noted in the foregoing section, the contemporary regulatory environment of 
England was largely initiated by the private interests of corporate professionals and institutional 
investors  (who  originated  the  City  Code  on  Takeovers  and  Mergers).  The  resultant  self-
regulation and governance of English takeovers transactions would later be rubber-stamped and 
adopted in ‘as is basis ‘by the region’s new legal frameworks.  As noted by Armour and Skeel, 481
“The self-regulation of takeovers in England has led to a regime largely driven by the interests of 
official stockholders.482
It is therefore easy to see why the origin of takeover regulation in England has influenced 
the region’s dominant insistence on shareholder’s rights during takeovers (since the originators 
were shareholding institutional investors) than on the rights accorded to firms ‘managers.
This contrasts in a major way with the US takeover context where the origination of 
takeover regulation was not with the shareholders but with corporate managers.  Armour and 
Skeel put its even better in their opined statement that, 
“The dynamics of judicial law-making in the US have benefited managers by making it relatively 
difficult for shareholders to influence the rules.  While the City of London (UK) found it easy to 483
privatise takeover deals, Wall Street (US) found it extremely hard to follow the same privatisation 
route in regulating corporate takeovers because US federal regulation in the 1930s both pre-
empted self-regulation and restricted the ability of institutional investors to coordinate.  This 484
A. Fleischer and A. Sussman. Takeover Defence. Fifth Edition. Aspen Law and Business, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 481
(1995) p. 7.
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explains  why up to  today,  the US takeover regulatory mechanisms have accorded corporate 
directors immense powers to preside over takeover bids, either as offerees or as recipients of 
such  bids,  without  the  obligation  to  seek  for  shareholder  consent  prior  to  making  vital 
decisions”.485
Armour and Skeel point out that:
“in the United States, Easterbrook and Fischer’s shareholder-oriented approach has been far 
more successful in theoretical debates than as an influence on actual practice (mainly because) 
Delaware  courts  have  dismissed  the  shareholder  choice  perspective  in  several  important 
takeover decisions, emphasising instead that the company is managed by or under the control of 
its directors”.486
To exemplify this  phenomenon and the immense powers that  US takeover regulation 
grants to corporate directors, the 1998 case of Kahn v. MSB Bancorp, Inc. is a replica of many 
similar court decisions.  MSB Bancorp, Inc. had been the target of a takeover by Kahn. At the 487
beginning of the bid process, MSB received an unsolicited offer proposing a merger with Kahn, 
Khan being the bidder.  This first letter did not propose the price offer for the takeover but 488
A. Fleischer and A. Sussman. Takeover Defence. Fifth Edition. Aspen Law and Business, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 485
(1995) p. 3.
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simply made Kahn’s intention known and invited MSB to enter into negotiations.  Soon after, 489
MSB received a second letter, this one having a suggested offer price for their stock should the 
bid be accepted. Notably, the second letter also did not specify on the terms of the proposed 
takeover although it gave a bid offer.490
After a brief consideration and consultation with their investment banker in regards to the 
offer, MSB board of directors rejected the bid.  It was at this point that Khan sued MSB, for 491
having made a board decision that breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. According 
to Khan’s suit, MSB’s board rejected the offer before disclosing it to their shareholders and were 
thus in  violation of  fiduciary duties.  After  hearing the case the Delaware Chancery Court 492
found that the plaintiffs were not guilty of violating their directors ‘fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and care in the rejection of Khan’s takeover bid, since they 
“Merely voted not to negotiate the merger offer, “and no superior benchmark of statutory review 
is applicable to that verdict, because “there was no defensive action by the target’s board of 
directors”.493
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This decision would later be confirmed in 1998 by the Delaware Supreme Court.  As 494
can be seen from the foregoing explanation, most states as well as the federal corporate control 
market regulating authority
s only require directors to satisfy their obligations to the best interest of the company and 
its shareholders as provided for in corporate charters and the basic company law . Once this 495
obligation is fulfilled or can be proved as having been fulfilled, directors can proceed to make 
takeover decisions oblivious to shareholder inclinations . This can be gleaned from Fleischer 496
and Susaman’s research as they emphasised on the fact that,
“During takeovers, directors ‘responsibilities in Delaware and most jurisdictions are measured 
primarily  by  the  business  judgment  rule,  a  principle  that  essentially  defers  to  the  decision-
making  process  of  the  directors  themselves  and  that,  absent  special  circumstances  such  as 
personal gain, presumes the propriety of the directors ’actions”.497
The scholars further note that “in cases against directors arising out of completed actions 
involving operational issues, the business judgment rule shields directors from personal liability 
if,  upon review, the court  concludes the directors ‘decision can be attributed to any rational 
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business  purpose”.  This  means  that,  for  any  shareholder  in  a  US  company  to  challenge 498
decisions of  the directors  during a  takeover  bid,  the said shareholder  will  have to rebut  the 
primary assumption of the business judgment rule for it is upheld by many courts particularly 
those in Delaware. 
In  Fleischer  and  Susaman’s  words,  “a  shareholder  plaintiff  must  effectively  provide 
evidence that the “board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision, breached any one of it’s 
‘triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith and due care”.  Examples of precedent rulings that 499
set out these conditions include the Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.  also delivered in 500
Delaware in 1995, Sinclair Oil Corp. vs. Levien.  As was distributed in the Delaware Supreme 501
Court  in 1971, the Cinerama, Inc.  v.  Technicolor,  Inc.  delivered in Delaware in 1995, the 502
McMullin  v.  Beran,  delivered  in  Delaware  in  2000,  the  Partners  v.  Berlin  delivered  in 503 504
Delaware in 1999, as well as the Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.  delivered in Delaware in 1993.505
In  effect,  contemporary  US  takeovers  are  quicker  and  more  flexible  since  the  legal 
framework underscoring takeover transactions have been greatly simplified and liberated in the 
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last  three  decades.  The  US context  nevertheless  tends  to  overly  lend  the  ex-post  flavour  to 
dominate takeover dispute resolution; something that makes the much more expedient UK Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers preferable at least in this regard.  This overly simplified perspective 506
fails to capture why hostile takeovers are more common and often more successful in the US 
than in most European countries with the exception of England where a considerable but still 
lesser  hostile  takeovers  are  executed  as  compared  to  the  US.  The  perspective  also  fails  to 
illustrated on the fact that why U.S mergers, acquisitions and takeovers are by far more than any 
recorded in any country across the globe, including England.  According to the United States 507
International Trade Commission, 
“Takeovers have not been as common in Europe as they have been in the United States, and 
more importantly, hostile takeovers have been fairly rare in Europe.508
The Commission farther states that,
“…only in the United Kingdom is the hostile takeover a common occurrence.509
An ideal explanation to these two questions is perhaps the one offered by Armour and 
Skeel in arguing that, 
A. Fleischer and A. Sussman. Takeover Defence. Fifth Edition. Aspen Law and Business, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 506
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“While US regulation of tender offer bidders is relatively shareholder-friendly, the treatment of 
target managers ‘responsibilities in the face of an unwanted takeover bid is anything but”.510
This means that for those seeking to takeovers other companies, US regulations accord 
shareholders the right to participate in the decision making process, such as of which company to 
acquire,  when  and  at  what  cost.  However,  the  scenario  changes  when  it  comes  to  the 
shareholders of a target company since in this instance, the directors are given an almost sole 
prerogative to make decisions on whether to accept or decline takeover bids. 
As Armour and Skeel further argued that  
…. “managers of  a target company are permitted to use a wide variety of  defences to keep 
takeover bids at bay, …the most remarkable of the defences is the poison pill or shareholder 
rights plan, …designed to dilute a hostile bidder’s stake massively if the bidder acquires more 
than a specified percentage of target stock–usually 10 or 15%”.
The poison pills work miracles for US target companies in averting a takeover bid. An 
example  of  such a  poison pill  defence  strategy is  when the  target  managers  invite  all  their 
shareholders with the exception of the hostile bidder to buy additional shares at a highly reduced 
price, thus giving managers the absolute ability to defend their interests against hostile bidders.511
To make the manager’s power even more absolute US corporate managers can have both 
the poison pill strategies at their disposal as well as staggered boards, 
United States International Trade Commission. The Effects of greater economic integration within the European 510
Community on the United States: First follow-up report.  United States International Trade Commission Publication 
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“Giving them a nearly total discretion to refuse to accept a takeover bid that is not wanted”.
The scholars go on to point out that 
“In addition to poison pills and staggered boards, US targets are also permitted other defences, 
such as breakup fees and other “lockup “provisions that are designed to cement a deal with a 
favoured bidder while keeping hostile bidders at bay”. 512
As this  ensues,  it  also  emerges  that  US  corporate  shareholders  are  among  the  most 
suppressed in regards to voting power allocation as compared to England and Europe at large. In 
a study that accessed the concentrations of voting power among firms across Europe and the US, 
Mayer points out that shareholders in Germany and Austria have clear voting bunching ranging 
within the 75%, 50% and 25% margin of voting blocks. According to the scholar, these two 
countries  have a  voting regulation that  corresponds significantly to the trends of  blocking 513
minority  voting  and  supporting  majority  and  more  so  super-majority  blocks  of  shareholder 
voting. On the other hand, firms in Italy and Belgium usually concentrate their voting blocks to 
slightly more 50% of the shareholders ‘voting power. This can be compared with England, where 
firm’s exhibit few voting blocks that are slightly above 30% since it  is required by takeover 
regulation  to  declare  subsequent  voting  power  accumulation  above  the  30%  shareholding 
potential.514
As Mayer points out this restriction imposed on English shareholders 
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“Corresponds to the level at which mandatory bids have to be made for all the shares of a target 
company  ... since takeover rules have therefore discouraged the accumulation of share blocks in 
excess of  30% in England”.  The one jurisdiction in which shareholders ability  to challenge 
managers through their voting power is highly limited is the US where, “shareholdings in excess 
of 10% and 20% …have regulatory control implications (in terms of disposal of  shares and 
liabilities for federal law violations)”.515
According to Meyer, 
“this is consistent with the concentrations of ownership of US firms below 10% and 20% and the 
small number of shareholdings in excess of 20%”.516
What emerges so far from a closer examination of the US corporate control market is that 
shareholders of a target company (the company of interest to this study since it is the one that 
invokes takeover defences when such defences are deemed most appropriate), have very limited 
options and that US companies are more or less takeover proof at the discretion of their board of 
directors . There is the business judgment rule to contend with, which favours the directors of a 517
target  firm those target  company’s shareholders.  There is  the availability and ease of  use of 
numerous takeover defence strategies if managers feel a hostile takeover bid is not to their best 
interest.  Finally,  there  is  the  dismal  regulatory  allowance  for  shareholder  voting  power  that 
makes a takeover bid almost impossible and which does not give shareholders a lot of clout in 
 Ibid, p. 22.515
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challenging manager’s actions during takeover bids. All these difficulties are heaped upon the 
shareholders and their interests .  518
Nonetheless,  it  is  noteworthy  that  despite  the  limitations  personified  by  the  business 
judgment rule, most US jurisdictions including Delaware have modified the traditional concept 
of the business judgment rule to apply it contextually in solving any dispute arising from the 
defensive takeover actions taken by a target company’s board so as to resist unsolicited takeover 
bids.  Whenever  there  is  shareholder  contention  on  a  board  decision  during  the  sale  of  a 519
company’s control, American courts have begun to accept shareholders to present grievances that 
would  otherwise  have  been  barred  by  the  business  judgment  rule  in  previous  contexts.  520
Fleischer and Sussman argue that on the fact that,
“Because of the nature of contested takeovers and mergers and the very substantial financial 
stakes involved, target board actions in those contexts are frequently challenged in the courts  ... 
(and) thus, numerous cases have adjudicated the nature of a board’s fiduciary responsibilities in 
evaluating and reacting to an unsolicited offer and in entering into a merger or sale of control 
and a sizeable body of law has developed”.521
It thus emerges that, the reputed liberation and flexibility of the US takeover market has 
emerged as a product of many legal battles and policy transformations and adaptations. This 
exemplary development is quite understandable given that the US corporate market has been 
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more proactive in history, than that of any other developed nation.  Several crucial elements of 522
the US takeover legal framework have seen dramatic changes in the last three decades most 
notably the role played by industry regulation, the role of directors in takeover bids in both target 
and acquiring firms as well as the requisite procedural aspects of a takeover process. According 
to  Jensen,  the  US takeover  market  has  been  dodged  with  the  controversy  of  liberating  the 
corporate players to engage in corporate control deals with minimal legal inhibitions and often 
delimiting mandatory requirements, or whether corporate control transactions should be closely 
regulated as a measure of safeguarding against corporate malpractices .523
Most of the scholars and practitioners who take either of the two sides in the legislative 
restrictions ‘controversy agree at least on the basic realisation that, 
“The US market for corporate control has created large benefits for shareholders and for the 
economy as a whole by loosening control over vast amounts of resources and enabling them to 
move more quickly to their highest-valued use”.524
According to Jensen and other scholars and practitioners in this school of thought, the 
high and frequent number of completed and attempted takeover transactions in the US corporate 
control  market  presents  an advantage and not  a  disadvantage as  some liberalists  claim.  The 
school  of  thought  holds that  the future of  the US corporate  control  market  is  in  even more 
liberalisation and flexibility and not in the outdated stiff regulatory practices of the past decades. 
In his words, Jensen states that
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“This is a healthy market in operation, on both the takeover side and the divestiture side, 
and it is playing an important role in helping the American economy adjust to major changes in 
competition and regulation of the past decade”.525
It has, however, been contested that the highly liberated corporate control market and the 
removal  of  many  regulatory  framework  previously  governing  the  sector  as  well  as  in 
consideration of the bad and good experiences of other developed economies across the world, 
the US government should initiate some form of stringent control on modern-day takeovers. 
Jensen notes that,
“The controversy has been accompanied by strong pressure on regulators and legislatures to 
enact restrictions that would curb activity in the market for corporate control”.526
Consequently, there have been tens of congressional bills proposed for adoption by the 
US Congress in the last 20 years or so, most of them proposing new restrictions on corporate 
takeovers, but as Jensen notes, none of these has passed as yet.527
Most notable among the proponents of increased legislative regulation of takeovers has 
been  the  so-called  Business  Roundtable.  The  Business  Roundtable  is  a  lobby  group 528
comprising  of  200  chief  executive  officers  representing  as  many  of  the  largest  US 
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corporations.  The lobby group has in the last 10 years persistently and passionately advocated 529
for  more  restrictive  legislation  on  the  corporate  control  market  especially  with  regards  to 
takeover transactions.  These concerted efforts  have been seen to bear fruits  with the state 530
legislatures  of  Ohio,  New Jersey,  Indiana,  New York,  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  Connecticut, 
Kentucky, Illinois, Michigan and Minnesota have passed some relatively restrictive antitakeover 
laws within the last few years.531
Among the most notable legal frameworks that have so far governed takeovers in the US 
was the initiative of the US Federal Reserve Board to implemented new debt-financed takeover 
restrictions at the beginning of the 1987 fiscal year, as a bid to limit the failures of the prominent 
LBOs of the decade.  As discussed earlier, the 1980s decade recorded one of the most dramatic 532
LBO  booms  in  the  US  corporate  control  market,  only  to  end  up  with  numerous  negative 
economic impacts as many of these LBO deals ultimately led to failure and losses in previously 
profitable enterprises.533
LBO-Advisers. The History of the Leveraged Buy-Out. LBO-Advisers Website - A Venture capital and private 529
equity directory. (2011). p.3.
J. Armour and D. Skeel. Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why? The peculiar divergence of US and 530
UK takeover regulation. Working Paper, No. 331. September 2006. Centre for Business Research, University Of 
Cambridge, Cambridge, (2006).  p. 1.
. Armour and D. Skeel. Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why? The peculiar divergence of US and 531
UK takeover regulation. Working Paper, No. 331. September 2006. Centre for Business Research, University Of 
Cambridge, Cambridge, (2006).  p. 3.
 E. Penrose. The theory of the growth of the firm. Oxford University Press. Oxford, (1959).  532
pp. 23 - 78.
 A. Seth, K. Song and R. Pettit. (2000). Synergy, Managerialism or Hubris? An Empirical Examination of Motives 533
for Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Firms. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 388.
 174
3.5 Conclusion
Evolution of the merger and acquisition activities has been discussed in this chapter. The 
history of takeovers was analysed in two perspectives namely; the evolution path perspective and 
the timeline perspective. In addition, the issues of takeovers in the contemporary corporate world 
were examined. 
The evolution path approach of analysing the history of takeovers particularly looked into 
the issues surrounding it in a chronological manner. It was identified to contain to five phases: 
First to fifth eras. The first era notes the takeover as having begun in 1987 and 1904 with the 
reshaping  of  the  large  business  activities.  Small  firms  initially  got  engaged  in  mergers, 
acquisitions and buy-outs with a major aim of benefiting from large-scale transactions. It was 
noted in between 1916 and 1929, the second era was associated with the “oligopolistic” firms, 
which entered into the takeovers with major’s aims of exploiting new and existing markets fully, 
takeovers in the 1870s, the boom of 1980s decade, takeovers in the modern times.
Finally, the contemporary issues considered were the salient trends of takeovers both in the U.K 
and the U.S.
In the initial phase of Acquisitions and Mergers of cooperation, almost no defence tactics 
existed.  Apparently,  the  concept  of  defence tactics  became evident  in  England and US in  a 
concrete form in the 1960s.  In the process of Acquisitions and Mergers apparently until  the 
1960s  minority  shareholders’ position  was  mostly  disregarded,  although  in  England  Foss  v 
Harbottle was the first case to highlight this issue and the development of defence tactics and all 
forms of it received attention in Chapter 3 of this research. 
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CHAPTER 4:  Types of common takeover defence tactics in England and the US
4.1 Introduction
This  particular  chapter  of  the  research  study  presents  comprehensive  illustration  on 
identifying and discussing the most prominent types of takeover defence tactics practised within 
the  US and England.  As  discussed  earlier,  “takeover  defence  tactics  are  techniques  that  are 
applied  to  deter  acquisition  or  merging  of  the  target  company  with  the  acquirer”. These 534
techniques can be pre-takeover or post-takeover defence tactics suggesting that they can either be 
implemented  before  or  after  a  takeover  bid.  The  defence  strategies  are  in  most  situations 
implemented against hostile takeovers as compared to more friendly takeovers.535
A hostile takeover refers to a situation in which merging or acquiring a target company by 
the acquirer is executed through strategic, legal or the management of the target company rights 
to  retain  their  independence  due  to  a  fear  of  losing  their  positions  or  considering  that  the 
company  is  being  under-valued.  The  other  types  of  takeovers  consist  of  friendly  takeovers, 
reversed takeovers and backflip takeovers.  Various techniques may be used against the hostile 536
take-overs  and  other  strategies.  However,  tactics  discussed  in  this  chapter  are  charter 
amendments, control over the register and control over the debts, cross-shareholding, litigation, 
 Ibid pp. 40534
 Powell, Ronan G., and Andrew W. Stark. "Does operating performance increase post-takeover for UK takeovers? 535
A comparison of performance measures and benchmarks." Journal of Corporate Finance 11.1 (2005): 293-317.
Kleiman,  R   Takeovers,  Encyclopedia  of  Business:  Reference  for  Business,  Second  Edition    <http://536
www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Str-The/Takeovers.html> accessed on 12 March 2016
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self-tender, people pills, poison pills, the crown jewel, golden parachute, greenmail and white 
knight.537
These defence strategies are protected and regulated by the Federal Act, the Williams Act 
passed in 1968 that relates to acquisitions and tender offers.   The formation of this Act was 538
initiated by a large number of takeovers that initiated in the era of 1960s unexpectedly.  The 539
Act was created to identify the difficulties managers and stockholders had in making crucial 
decisions with very little information and preparation. 
According to the Act, 
“The bidders must have all the details of the tender offers filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the target company. Their files must contain the terms, cash 
resources and their intended plans for the company thereafter, among others”.540
 There was also a stipulation about the minimum period, the offer would remain open and as well 
the number of days the shareholders would have to consider and make up their minds, after the 
offering.541
 Bellak,  Christian,  Michael  Pfaffermayr,  and  Michael  Wild.  "Firm  performance  after  ownership  change:  A 537
matching estimator approach." Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik) 52.1 (2006): 29-54.
 The Williams Act 1968538
 Bellak,  Christian,  Michael  Pfaffermayr,  and  Michael  Wild.  "Firm  performance  after  ownership  change:  A 539
matching estimator approach." Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik) 52.1 (2006): 29-54.
 Ibid 5540
 The Williams Act 1968541
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Controversially, those defence strategies deployed prior to takeovers have been seen to be 
more effective, than the post-takeover defences.  In this discussion, the following tactics have 542
been identified as the preventive defences against hostile takeovers; control over the register, 
control  over  the  debts,  cross-shareholding,  golden  parachute  and  changes  of  control  clauses 
which  are  also  referred  to  as  charter  amendment. In  addition  to  that,  the  post  defences 543
identified include; litigation, self-tender, Pac man defence, White Knight and people pill. These 
defence strategies are compared through their process in which they are executed in the US and 
England.544
It is also worth noting that new types of takeover defence tactics are also emerging which 
will also be highlighted in this chapter. The primary purpose of discussing these new defence 
tactics is to validate the fact that there is no ‘one size fit all’ strategy to counter the takeovers, 
which are continually evolving in the corporate world.
4.2 Pre-Take-over defence tactics – “Preventive Measures”
The pre-bid defence tactics are an essential and pivotal strategy of stalling the attempts by 
the dominant company to take over the target company. Furthermore, it can also be considered 545
as a vital step towards taking prior action of protecting the target company and other stakeholders 
 Berkovitch, Elazar, and Naveen Khanna. "How Target Shareholders Benefit from Value-Reducing Defensive 542
Strategies in Takeovers." The Journal of Finance 45.1 (1990): 137-156.
 Shivdasani, Anil. "Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers." Journal of accounting and 543
economics 16.1 (1993): 167-198.
 Armour,  John,  and  David  A.  Skeel  Jr.  "Who  writes  the  rules  for  hostile  takeovers,  and  why-the  peculiar 544
divergence of US and UK takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1727.
 Gilson, Ronald J., and Reinier Kraakman. "Takeovers in the Boardroom: Burke versus Schumpeter." Bus. Law 60 545
(2004): 1419.
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against suffering adverse effects of an unfair takeover by a potential bidder. The pre-bid defence 
tactics  involve  the  strategic  mechanism  undertaken  by  the  board  of  the  target  company  in 
anticipation of a larger company presenting a takeover bid. Another aspect is analysing that the 546
share price remains high, thus making them more expensive to acquire. 
Fighting off  an unwanted takeover by the target  company often paralyses the normal 
operation of the target firm. The minority shareholders are worried as to their position as the 
various events  unfold.  Stakeholders  such as the employees and the management may feel 547
insecure in their jobs. Whenever possible, the company’s management should consider putting in 
place  preventive  measures  rather  than  wait  to  adopt  “reactive  strategies”  which  are  much 
complex to implement.  Some of the pre-takeover defence strategies that can be implemented 548
are: control over the register, control over the debts, cross-shareholding, golden parachutes and 
charter amendments and ensuring that the share price remains high.549
Executing effective preventative measures may be costly and time-consuming. Therefore, 
the company’s board and management may be pre-occupied with identification and dealing with 
such factors that may potentially lead to a takeover. . There are seven major warning signals 550
J.  Porter  and H.  Singh.  An Empirical  Analysis  of  the  Motivation Underlying Takeovers  in  Australia.  Social 546
Science Research Network Working Paper, (2007).p. 2.
Kurp, Melissa M. "Corporate Takeover Defenses After QVC: Can Target Boards Prevent Hostile Tender Offers 547
Without Breaching Their Fiduciary Duties." Loy. U. Chi. LJ 26 (1994): 29.
Gilson,  Ronald  J.  "The  Political  Ecology  of  Takeovers:  Thoughts  on  Harmonizing  the  European  Corporate 548
Governance Environment." Fordham L. Rev. 61 (1992): 161.
 Ibid 549
Gorzala, Jeannette. The art of hostile takeover defence. Igel Verlag, 2010.550
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identified that may indicate the possibility of a take-over in the near future of a company.  The 551
earlier the company notices these factors, the less vulnerable it may be.
These factors could be listed as:
• High notification of unsolicited offers to sell their firm’s share in the recent months.
• When the minority shareholders conduct lawsuits to have their rights protected within the 
firms in the case of a takeover.552
• The company and its board’s reputation are compromised.
• A swift  interest  in  the  company’s  business  by  the  minority  shareholders  who  keep 
requesting for various copies of documents.
• The company is regularly inspected the government authorities that intend to review the 
company’s  register  of  shareholders,  information on the  company’s  assets,  the  lists  of 
creditors and clients of the company.553
• Increase  in  the  magnitude  of  small  stock  exchange  transactions  of  the  shares  of  the 
company.
• When most of the company’s in the same industry have been absorbed. However, this 
might give rise to anti-trust/monopoly issues should the company be a target. 
Stein, Jeremy C. "Takeover threats and managerial myopia." Journal of Political Economy 96.1 (1988): 61-80.551
 Ibid pp 38552
Dodonova, Anna, and Yuri Khoroshilov. "Jump bidding in takeover auctions." Economics Letters 92.3 (2006): 553
339-341.
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4.2.1 Golden Parachutes
This defence technique involves altering the compensation packages of the management 
and executive that would be dismissed in an event of a takeover that they qualify for substantial 
compensation packages.  These benefits are normally substantial and are aimed at warding off 554
impending  hostile  takeovers  as  it  will  substantially  increase  the  acquisition  costs.  The  key 
genesis of such inclusions in the clauses of the corporate charter is the anticipated change of 
control over the company followed by the dismissal of the executive.   This is usually effective 555
when  the  dismissal  is  out  of  the  control  of  the  target  company’s  executives  highlighting  a 
reduction in the workforce or dismissal of the board of directors. The decisions may be arrived at 
a general meeting of the shareholders of the acquirer and in accordance with the provisions of the 
prevailing corporate law.556
The substantial financial packages contained in the executive’s contracts usually included 
benefits such as bonuses, share options and hefty severance pays among others.  The costs may 557
be considered unnecessarily too high for  the potential  hostile  acquirers  to  continue with the 
Singh, Harbir, and Farid Harianto. "Management-board relationships, takeover risk, and the adoption of golden 554
parachutes." Academy of Management Journal 32.1 (1989): 7-24.
Machlin, Judith C., Hyuk Choe, and James A. Miles. "The effects of golden parachutes on takeover activity." The 555
Journal of Law and economics 36.2 (1993): 861-876.
Singh, Harbir, and Farid Harianto. "Top management tenure, corporate ownership structure and the magnitude of 556
golden parachutes." Strategic Management Journal 10.S1 (1989): 143-156.
 Davidson,  Wallace  N.,  Theodore  Pilger,  and  Andrew Szakmary.  "Golden  parachutes,  board  and  committee 557
composition, and shareholder wealth." Financial Review 33.4 (1998): 17-32.
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prospect  of  acquiring  the  target.  The  acquirer  may  not  want  to  retain  the  targets  current 
management and dismiss them with the substantial financial severance package.558
‘Golden parachute’ is a takeover defence measure adopted mainly in the US system. It 
can  be  a  simple  effective  strategy  that  drives  away eventually  several  potential  bidders.  Its 
intention is to put off unwanted hostile takeovers through the extension of lucrative financial 
benefit  packages  to  the  management  and  employees  by  making  the  cost  of  the  acquisition 
substantially  more. Hence,  defence  mechanism  ensures  that  the  management  arranges 559
employment contracts for themselves and the company’s employees in a bid to increase their 
post-employment  compensation  in  an  event  the  company is  taken over.  The  creation  of  the 
golden parachutes for the management and employees ensures that the target company becomes 
less attractive to the bidder due to the substantially increased financial costs of the acquisition of 
these arrangements.560
The motive of the management in advancing a golden parachute does not only lie in the 
fact of protecting the all the stakeholders but also in the fact that they fear to lose their positions 
when the company is taken over.  The fears that trigger the use of golden parachute clauses 561
include the anticipation that there will be “change of control over the company and subsequent 
dismissal of the executive by an acquirer provided that this dismissal is outside the executive’s 
Choi,  Albert.  "Golden  parachute  as  a  compensation-shifting  mechanism."   Journal  of  Law,  Economics,  and 558
Organization 20.1 (2004): 170-191.
Hall, Pamela L., and Dwight C. Anderson. "The effect of golden parachutes on shareholder wealth and takeover 559
probabilities." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 24.3 (1997): 445-463.
 Evans, Jocelyn D., and Frank Hefner. "Business ethics and the decision to adopt golden parachute contracts: 560
Empirical evidence of concern for all stakeholders." Journal of Business Ethics 86.1 (2009): 65-79.
Lambrecht,  Bart  M.,  and  Stewart  C.  Myers.  "A theory  of  takeovers  and  disinvestment."   The  Journal  of 561
finance 62.2 (2007): 809-845.
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control.  For  instance,  reduction in  workforce  or  dismissal  of  the  Chairman of  the  Board  of 
Directors due to the decision of the general meeting of the bidder’s shareholders provided such 
additional ground for dismissal is stated in the labour contract.562
In the history of takeovers in the US, “golden parachute” has been extensively used as a 
tactic having increased to 81% in 2001 from 35% in 1987 according to a survey by Executive 
Compensation Advisory Service (ECAS).  A case in point is the ex-Martel CEO Jill Barad’s US563
$ 50 million send-off package which resulted in the Obama administration in US imposing a 
limit  on  the  use  of  golden  parachute  with  the  aim  of  reining  in  the  compensation  of  the 
management at companies that have been bailed out by the US government. 564
“Companies  receiving  federal  aid  are  going  to  have  to  disclose  publicly  all  the  perks  and 
luxuries bestowed upon senior executives, and provide an explanation to the taxpayers and to 
shareholders as to why these expenses are justified. And we're putting a stop to these kinds of 
massive severance packages we've all read about with disgust; we're taking the air out of golden 
parachutes.” 565
In a study involving more than 850 acquisitions announced in the US between 1997 and 
2007,  the  importance  of  the  golden  parachutes  to  CEOs  when  their  entire  post-acquisition 
 Ibid pp. 34562
Baber,  William  R.,  Patricia  L.  Daniel,  and  Andrea  A.  Roberts.  "Compensation  to  managers  of  charitable 563
organizations:  An  empirical  study  of  the  role  of  accounting  measures  of  program  activities."  The  accounting 
review 77.3 (2002): 679-693.
Murphy, Kevin J., and Tatiana Sandino. "Executive pay and “independent” compensation consultants." Journal of 564
Accounting and Economics 49.3 (2010): 247-262.
 “President Barack Obama”s remarks on executive pay”, February 4, 2009, The New York Times newspaper, 565
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/us/politics/04text-obama.html>  accessed on 11 March 2016 
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compensation package, including potential loss.  In England, the golden parachute schemes 566
have been under attack for some time. This follows a condemnation on the directors for being 
egocentric.  Directors  “forget  their  wider  duties  when  a  fat  check  is  laid  before  them”,  the 
business secretary, Vince Cable reproved the directors and promised to review manner in which 
the  pay incentives  for  top managers  are  drawn up.  It  is  also  worth  noting that  the  Chief 567
Executive Officers, CEOs have been found to settle for lower acquisition premiums when they 
are promised and are eager to receive their ‘golden parachute’.568
 A study by Dran Tran from Cass Business School  and, Professor Eliezer Fich and 569
Ralph,  Le  Bow College  of  Business  has  proved  this  fact  and  established  that  it  is  a  likely 
behaviour by CEOs in most takeover scenarios.  These CEOs are basically letting their firms 570
sell at $249 million, equivalent of £158 million below the value. The study revealed that a 5% 
fall  in acquisition premium was attributed to a 10% increase in the relevance of the golden 
parachutes relative to the takeover send-off package.  This described the $249 million shortfalls 571
in deal value of the average transactions. The research also affirmed that larger parachutes push 
some executives to compromise the interests of shareholders. 
Mullin, George L., Joseph C. Mullin, and Wallace P. Mullin. "The competitive effects of mergers: stock market 566
evidence from the US Steel dissolution suit." The Rand journal of economics (1995): 314-330.
“Golden  parachutes:  as  their  importance  to  CEOs  increases,  shareholders  lose  out  in  takeovers”  <http://567
www.next-finance.net/Golden-parachutes-as-their> accessed 12 March 2016
Hirsch, Paul M. "From ambushes to golden parachutes: Corporate takeovers as an instance of cultural framing and 568
institutional integration." American journal of Sociology 91.4 (1986): 800-837.
 Cass Business School, London, UK.   569
LeBow College of Business, Philadelphia, USA. 570
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"Our results show that as CEOs become more insulated from personal losses due to relatively 
larger  parachutes,  shareholders  obtain  less  favourable  acquisition  terms.  This  suggests  that 
overly  important  parachutes  encourage  some  self-serving  CEOs  to  sacrifice  premium  for 
personal gain”.572
According  to  Richard  Lambert  and  David  Larcker,  golden  parachutes  had  a  positive 
impact on senior directors actions towards the management companies and also has positive 
influence on the price of target company’s shares.  573
However, on the other hand, there are others stating that golden parachutes are not a fair 
defence tactic for a target company. Because they allow too much protection for directors even 
though  they were incompetent or took an incorrect decision.   574
4.2.2 Shark Repellents
Shark repellent is a defence mechanism adopted by corporations in their bid to defend the 
target company from a forceful takeover.  This mechanism is predominantly practised in the 575
US legal arena on takeovers and mergers. The term shark repellent literally means a defensive 
 Fich, M, Tran, L. and Walking, A. Importance of golden parachutes. (2011),572
 Richard  Lambert  and  David  Larcker,  ‘Golden  Parachutes,  Executive  Decision   Making  and   Shareholder 573
Wealth’ (1985) 7 Journal of Accounting and Economics 179, 201
 Randy Myers, ‘Minimise Parachute Penalties’ (Journal of Accountancy, October 2001)   574
<http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2001/Oct/MinimizeParachutePenalties.htm> accessed 
25 October 2016
 Knoeber, Charles R. "Golden parachutes, shark repellents, and hostile tender offers." The American Economic 575
Review 76.1 (1986): 155-167.
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method adopted by an individual or anybody in a bid to protect oneself from unexpected attacks 
by the sharks hence keeping the predator away.576
 In the current business scenario, majority of the organisations have taken the initiative to 
develop  on  their  own fate  in  the  competitive  environment  through  the  application  of  shark 
repellent  that  sends  off  the  hostile  bidders  to  look  for  other  less  feisty  targets.   The 577
management of the target company normally brings this defence mechanism forth by making 
amendments or policies that only take effect when a takeover attempt is announced or advanced 
to the shareholders with the sole objective of making the takeover less attractive or profitable to 
the potential bidder.578
However, the defence tactic is not preferred by several shareholders since the move is 
most  likely  to  tarnish  the  company’s  financial  position  and  further  interfere  with  the  sole 
objective of the management of focus on business operations.  Generally, shark repellent is 579
considered to discourage the bidders from taking over a company through a number of methods 
already discussed in  this  section.  As per  the analysis  of  the legal  experts  and professionals, 
primary reason of executing shark repellent to serve the purpose of reinforcing the ability of the 
company’s board of directors to retain overall  control  by ensuring that  it  is  difficult  to gain 
 Ibid pp. 21576
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Corp. L. 7 (1982): 32.
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control of the board through either a fight or at an annual general meeting.  Delaware registered 580
corporations have essentially made shark repellent a necessary provision in their incorporation 
documents. Shark repellents are varied in nature; some adopted to strengthen the board’s defence 
while others are meant to limit the actions that can be taken by the shareholders. The shark 
repellent tactics include, but not limited to anti-greenmail provisions,  golden parachutes,  fair 
price provisions, etc.581
Linn and McConnell’s view on shark repellents is that the adoption of this defence tactic 
would not have any negative impact on shareholders or stocks. It cannot also negatively "lead to 
any misallocation of real corporate assets”.582
Other scholars mentioned that the implementation of shark repellents may not have any 
significant  impact  on  takeover  activity  and  consequently  the  shareholders  do  not  take  any 
responsibility on consequences if there was any delay in the takeover process and give the board 
of  directors  sufficient  time  to  look  for  a  white  knight  or  demand  a  higher  price  for 
shareholders.  583
 Gilson,  Ronald  J.  "The  case  against  shark  repellent  amendments:  Structural  limitations  on  the  enabling 580
concept." Stanford Law Review (1982): 775-836.
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evidence." Global Finance Journal 18.3 (2008): 373-384.
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4.2.3 Strengthening a Board’s defence
The application of a staggered board as a means of defence is one important mechanism 
under the shark repellent.  It fundamentally ensures that there is a delay in the hostile takeover 584
while at the same time increasing the board’s control over the corporate voting mechanism, and 
facilitated through the division of the board into various classes. The actual working mechanism 
of this defence tactic depends on each of the three classes of directors elected or removed only 
one every set  number of  years.  Viewing it  fewer than 141 (d)  of  the Delaware Company 585
Law,  the ultimate aftermath of this type of arrangement is that it may succeed in dissolving a 586
proxy competition by the insurgent shareholders seeking to overhaul the existing directors, hence 
ensuring the board retains the control measures.587
The defence tactics ensure that the target company is protected from the hostile bidder 
since it ensures that despite acquiring a large proportion of the shares of the target company, the 
bidder does not have the power to appoint the majority of the board until the successful election 
of the board has occurred.  This lies in the fact that only one-third of the board may be removed 588
annually during the elections. The board, in this case, retains two-thirds of the seats on the board 
Stiles,  Philip.  "The  impact  of  the  board  on  strategy:  An  empirical  examination."   Journal  of  Management 584
Studies 38.5 (2001): 627-650.
Hillman,  Amy J.,  Albert  A.  Cannella,  and Ramona L.  Paetzold.  "The resource dependence role of  corporate 585
directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to environmental change." Journal of Management 
studies 37.2 (2000): 235-256.
The Delaware General Company Law, Title 8, Chapter 1 of the Delaware Code,586
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 188
despite  the  majority  acquisition  of  shares  by  the  bidding  company.  Under  the  Delaware 589
Company Law, a company that applies “staggered boards” may have its directors removed only 
by  cause  unless  its  charter  indicates  the  reverse.  Any action  leading  to  the  removal  of  any 
director  as  a  result  of  ‘cause’ must  be  addressed  with  a  reason  in  a  prior  notice  to  allow 
appropriate time for adequate response.  Legal experts in the takeover arena have attributed the 590
use of staggered boards when combined with poison pills to be effective since the bidder would 
be unable to remove the pill without winning two successive elections and thus raised the odds of 
a target company being independent of 34% to 61%.591
The staggered boards are not beneficial to the shareholders in any way.  Studies have 592
indicated that the staggered boards tend to reduce the returns for the shareholders as compared to 
then on-staggered board in the event of a potential takeover.  However, the staggered board still 593
offers  continuity  of  leadership  in  the  company  and  should  not  cause  any  reason  for  alarm 
provided the company is moving in the right direction.594
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Henry,  Darren.  "Directors’ recommendations  in  takeovers:  An  agency  and  governance  analysis."  Journal  of 590
business finance & accounting 32.1-2 (2005): 129-159.
D'Aveni, Richard A., and Idalene F. Kesner. "Top managerial prestige, power and tender offer response: A study 591
of elite social networks and target firm cooperation during takeovers." Organization science 4.2 (1993): 123-151.
Yarrow,  George  K.  "Shareholder  protection,  compulsory  acquisition  and  the  efficiency  of  the  takeover 592
process." The Journal of Industrial Economics (1985): 3-16.
 Pontiff, Jeffrey, Andrei Shleifer, and Michael S. Weisbach. "Reversions of excess pension assets after takeovers." 593
The RAND Journal of Economics (1990): 600-613.
Bainbridge,  Stephen  M.  "In  defense  of  the  shareholder  wealth  maximization  norm:  A reply  to  Professor 594
Green." Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 50 (1993): 1423.
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4.2.4 Limiting shareholders’ action
In  this  defence  tactics,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  super  majority  provisions  rules 
especially when the bidder more than specified shares in the target company hence limiting its 
ability to avoid the influence of the minority shareholders.  It  requires the approval of any 595
business combination that involves the target company and the offeror, who have more shares 
than a specified threshold, hence approved by a supermajority vote of all the target’s shares. 
Consequently, the holders of the majority shares use the power of their voting threshold. Hence, 
setting up a level  higher than that  used for mergers.  The supermajority provisions have a 596
portion referred to as ‘majority of minority’ that provides minority shareholders higher powers to 
eliminate mergers, given that the approval by outstanding voting shares.597
4.2.5 Charter amendments
A Charter  refers  to  a  document  incorporating an institution and specifying its  rights, 
which  also  include  the  Articles  of  Incorporation  and  the  Certificates  of  Incorporation.  It  is 
normally filed with the particular jurisdictional government authority by the founding members 
of the company, its objectives, nature of its operations and ownership styles adopted (identities 
Partch, M. Megan. "The creation of a class of limited voting common stock and shareholder wealth." Journal of 595
Financial Economics 18.2 (1987): 313-339.
 Ibid pp. 52596
Bainbridge,  Stephen  M.  "Director  primacy  in  corporate  takeovers:  preliminary  reflections."   Stanford  Law 597
Review (2002): 791-818.
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and share allocation).  The charters are identified as ‘Certificate of Incorporation’ or ‘Article of 598
Organisation/ Incorporation’ in the US and ‘Article of Association’ in England.599
More debatably, charter amendments denote the changes imposed on the initial corporate 
charter  document  in  order  to  increase  the  value  of  the  takeover  bids,  make  the  bids  more 
demanding  and  defining  the  role  of  managers  in  the  execution  of  takeovers  defence 
mechanisms.  This was noticed in the 1980s boom of corporate takeovers and was based on 600
shareholder’s agreement and empowerment of managers to achieve the ultimate objectives of the 
company.  ‘Anti-takeover  amendments’ have  been  used  in  the  past  to  refer  to  the  charter 
amendments implying the intentions of the company‘s resistance by amending the articles of 
incorporation.601
A company may include in its clauses loan agreements or contracts that bind the acquirer 
on a takeover to accelerate the debts so that all debts immediately become repayable.  The 602
effect of this is that it makes the takeover more expensive for the acquirer as they also have to 
replace the debt finance.  Failure upon which the bidder is expected to terminate the contract is 
the harsh side of the alterations of the clauses. In circumstances like this, the bidder is unsure 
 Madura. J “Introduction to business”, Fourth edition, 2007, pp164-167598
Matthiessen, Peter, et al. "Attempts to assess the environmental hazard posed by complex mixtures of organic 599
chemicals in UK estuaries." Marine pollution bulletin 26.2 (1993): 90-95.
 Damodaran, A “Acquisitions and Takeovers”, in F Fabozzi, John and Wiley, Handbook of Finance, New York, 600
pp55-57
 Gamble,  Andrew,  and  Gavin  Kelly.  "Shareholder  value  and  the  stakeholder  debate  in  the  UK."  Corporate 601
Governance: An International Review 9.2 (2001): 110-117.
 Ibid pp. 84602
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whether it is going to benefit or not from the process.  This tends to discourage away unwanted 603
suitors.  In  some  instances,  a  firm will  make  special  amendments  to  its  bylaws,  simply  the 
charters that are considered active only in the event that a takeover attempt is announced or 
offered to the shareholders. These alterations are designed to make the takeover less attractive or 
profitable to the offer.604
The  idea  of  the  charter  amendment,  also  known  as  a  "porcupine  provision"  is  not 
necessarily a noble measure, as not all the shark repellent measures are in the best interest of the 
shareholders.  This  is  a  result  of  the  damage  that  may  be  caused  by  the  firm’s  financial 605
positions  and  even  the  destruction  of  the  management’s  focus  on  vital  strategic  business 
objectives. 
4.2.6 Control over the register.
A company’s register contains very vital information regarding the company and should 
be guarded against unauthorised personnel to avoid sabotage.  In aggressive take-overs, the 606
acquirer seeks to identify the target company’s shareholders, the quantity of their shares and 
eventually persuade them to sell their shares to them. In joint stock companies, such information 
is contained in the register. The register clearly reveals a lot about the company; the names of the 
Franks, Julian R., Kjell G. Nyborg, and Walter N. Torous. "A comparison of US, UK, and German insolvency 603
codes." Financial Management (1996): 86-101.
 Hirshleifer, David, and Anjan V. Thakor. "Managerial performance, boards of directors and takeover bidding." 604
Journal of Corporate Finance 1.1 (1994): 63-90.
Machlin, Judith C., Hyuk Choe, and James A. Miles. "The effects of golden parachutes on takeover activity." The 605
Journal of Law and economics 36.2 (1993): 861-876.
Travlos,  Nickolaos G. "Corporate takeover bids,  methods of payment,  and bidding firms'  stock returns."  The 606
Journal of Finance42.4 (1987): 943-963.
 192
shareholders, the quantity of shares owned by each, nominal value of the shares and the type of 
shares owned.607
• Ways in which such unauthorised access can be avoided are:The choice of a highly 
reputable registrar to register the company’s shares.
• Verify the registrar’s history concerning any participation in the hostile takeovers.
• Check for the controllers of the registrar’s company.
4.2.7 Control over the debts
The raiders often take advantage of the company’s credit indebtedness, during a hostile 
take-over.  In other words, the acquirer uses the “bankruptcy contract” in order to get the assets 608
of the target company.  Thus the following measures can be undertaken to prevent hostile attack 
in regard to the company‘s debts; 
• Careful monitoring and evaluation of the company’s creditors
• All the debts and risks of the company should be accrued towards a special purpose 
vehicle that does not contain any significant assets of the firm.609
• Avoid overdue debts. 
• A company should fight to eliminate anticipated bankruptcy procedures, by paying 
overdue debts.
Jackson, Gregory, and Martin Hoepner. "An emerging market for corporate control? The Mannesmann takeover 607
and German corporate governance." (2001).
Nathan, Charles M., and Marilyn Sobel. "Corporate Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited Takeover 608
Bids." The business lawyer (1980): 1545-1566.
Atanassov, Julian. "Do hostile takeovers stifle innovation? Evidence from antitakeover legislation and corporate 609
patenting." The Journal of Finance 68.3 (2013): 1097-1131.
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4.2.8 Cross-shareholding
In this technique, a parent company needs to identify at least three subsidiary companies 
in which they own 100% of the share capital of each.  In contributing to the share capital, the 610
parent company may transfer part of its most valuable assets to the subsidiaries. Consequently, 
the subsidiary issues more shares,  which should not be less than four times the initial  share 
capital.  The outcome of such a scheme is that the parent company gets to own less than 25% 611
of the share capital of each of the subsidiaries. In particular, the parent company lacks a blocking 
shareholding. In this way, the goals and ambitions of the hostile acquirer are thwarted. However, 
when  implementing  such  techniques,  the  parent  company  should  be  obliged  to  ensure  the 
subsidiaries are loyal to them.612
4.2.9 Crown jewel
The term ‘crown jewel’ symbolises or rather refers to the valuable assets that a company 
holds. Precisely, it is the most valuable component of a company and is defined by such features 
as profitability, asset value and future prospects.  In circumstances of hostile takeovers, the 613
Gokhale, Jagadeesh, Erica L. Groshen, and David Neumark. Do hostile takeovers reduce extramarginal wage 610
payments?. No. w4346. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.
Dietzenbacher,  Erik,  and  Umed  Temurshoev.  "Ownership  relations  in  the  presence  of  cross-611
shareholding." Journal of Economics 95.3 (2008): 189-212.
Kuroki, Fumiaki. "The relationship of companies and banks as cross-shareholdings unwind: fiscal 2002 cross-612
shareholding survey." Financial Research Group, NLI Research (2003).
Kaye, Judith S. "Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer Criticism of Courts." Hofstra L. 613
Rev. 25 (1996): 703.
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management in a bid to secure their financial benefit and those of the shareholder use the crown 
jewel defence by creating anti-take-over clauses which compel the sale of their crown jewels.614
4.3   Post –Takeover Defence Strategies
The preventive measures may fail to work at times or may be compromised for example 
by  negative  publicity.  The  target  management  may  be  ambushed  by  the  predator.  In  this 615
situation, the company through its board and advice of its investment bankers may be forced to 
identify and implement an effective defence technique.  Investment bankers earn substantial fees 
advising either the predator or the target on either their acquisition or defence strategies.  The 616
post-take defence strategies that have been proved to work are; litigation, self-tender, Pac man 
defence, white knight and people’s pill. In the United States, the majority of the firms adopt a 
minimum of one anti-takeover defence.  The poison pill and the staggered board are the two 617
most common defence strategies widely practised in the US. The staggered board is adopted by 
about   60% of the large firms in order to prevent an acquirer from causing an alteration in the 
total board composition.  On the other side, around 50% of the important firms take up poison 618
pill and this raises the cost of the firm high enough to prohibit its sale. As the takeover scenario 
Zhang, Haijun, et  al.  "Crown Jewel catalyst:  How neighbouring atoms affect the catalytic activity of top Au 614
atoms?." Journal of catalysis 305 (2013): 7-18.
Field, Laura Casares, and Jonathan M. Karpoff. "Takeover defences of IPO firms." The Journal of Finance 57.5 615
(2002): 1857-1889.
Coates IV, John C. "Takeover defences in the shadow of the pill: A critique of the scientific evidence." Tex. L. 616
Rev. 79 (2000): 271.
Hirshleifer,  David,  and  Sheridan  Titman.  "Share  tendering  strategies  and  the  success  of  hostile  takeover 617
bids." Journal of Political Economy 98.2 (1990): 295-324.
Rasolofo,  Yves,  David  Hawking,  and  Jacques  Savoy.  "Result  merging  strategies  for  a  current  news 618
metasearcher." Information Processing & Management 39.4 (2003): 581-609.
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progresses, the release of information into the financial press is critical and it tightly controlled 
by both parties.619
4.3.1 Poison pills
As much as the defence tactics have the desired effect of preventing takeovers, there are 
often those schemes that are detrimental to shareholder value. These tactics are referred to as 
poison pills  and are related to ‘shark repellent’ tactics  are  now becoming uncommon in the 
US.  This gradual decline in popularity is associated with a number of factors, such as the 620
increased  activism  by  institutional  investors  such  as  hedge  funds  and  other  investors.  621
Alternatively, shareholders desire for an acquisition and transition to block boards from adding 
defensive plans and the elapse of such clauses over time. A Poison pill refers to a technique or 
rather simply, “a shareholder’s rights” contract that is designed to put off the acquirers from 
taking over the target company by making the price to be paid for the target less attractive for the 
acquirer in the event of a takeover. This stock is redeemable at the boards’ decision.622
Reynders, Edwin, et al. "Merging strategies for multi-setup operational modal analysis: application to the Luiz I 619
steel arch bridge." Proceedings of IMAC 27, the International Modal Analysis Conference. Vol. 400. 2009.
Pound, John. "The effects of antitakeover amendments on takeover activity: Some direct evidence." The Journal 620
of Law and Economics 30.2 (1987): 353-367.
Jensen, Michael C. "Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers." The American economic 621
review 76.2 (1986): 323-329.
 Painter and Kirchner supra.n.11.622
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The  acquisitions  and  mergers  lawyer  Martin  Lipton  of  Wachtell  is  known  for  his 
invention of the poison pill alongside Katz, Rosen & Lipton in 1982, which was responding, to 
tender based hostile takeovers.623
In the early 1980s poison pills gained in popularity as there were numerous takeovers by 
corporate raiders like Carl Icahn.  The term poison pill originated to the actual poison pill that 624
is carried by spies where they would take the pill after being discovered in order to kill them 
rather than face interrogation by the enemy. 
Shareholders, since the early 2000s, have been expected to act against the authorisation 
of  poison  pills,  because  they  are  made  for  the  resistance  of  takeovers.  On  the  other  side, 
takeovers can be perceived as financially advantageous to the shareholders.625
There are arguments that poison pills can destroy the interests of the shareholders because they 
prolong the present management.  One example is where Microsoft made a non-invited bid for 626
Yahoo! Before subsequently dropping it since the CEO of Yahoo! Jerry Yang counter-argued that 
the company was worth substantially more and unless Microsoft was willing to raise the price to 
USD 37 per share.  A Microsoft executive had views that Yahoo! would go all the way to burn 627
“Poison  pill  defence”  <http://www.money-zine.com/investing/stocks/poison-pill-defence/>  accessed  13  April 623
2016
Dong, Ming, et al. "Does investor misvaluation drive the takeover market?." The Journal of Finance 61.2 (2006): 624
725-762.
Leeth, John D., and J. Rody Borg. "The impact of takeovers on shareholder wealth during the 1920s merger 625
wave." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35.2 (2000): 217-238.
Curwen, Peter. "Microsoft Googles Yahoo!." info 10.4 (2008).626
Smith, Greg, et al. "FacetMap: A scalable search and browse visualization." IEEE Transactions on visualization 627
and computer graphics 12.5 (2006).
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the furniture and harm the place in case they went hostile. Ever since the events of 2001, Yahoo! 
is known to possess a working shareholders rights plan. With respect to the financial analysts, 
raising the price to USD 33 per share was too expensive and that Yahoo! was not negotiating in 
good faith, which subsequently initiated a number of shareholder lawsuits. There also followed a 
proxy  fight  by  the  corporate  raider  Carl  Icahn.  The  stock  price  of  Yahoo!  plunged  after 
withdrawal of the bid by Microsoft, which led to Jerry Yang facing a negative reaction from the 
stakeholders leading ultimately to his resignation.628
There are two kinds of poison pills namely the “call” plan and the “put” plan. The “call 
plan” comes into  play when a  company issues  a  “call  option” which depicts  the  form of  a 
dividend and is associated with every outstanding share of the company. The call poison pills are 
further categorised into “flip in” poison pill or “flip over” poison pill.  The flip in a poison pill, 629
with the exception of the acquirer, allows all other shareholders to purchase the shares of the 
company at a discounted cost.  Consequently, more shares are purchased, thereby diluting the 630
shares held by the acquirer and making it more difficult for the target to be acquired by the 
bidder. The investors obtain substantial profits as a result when the shares are sold. On the other 
hand, a flip over poison pills allows the stockholders to purchase the shares of the acquirer at a 
discounted price after the merger or acquisition. An example of flip over poison pill is when the 
   Steve  Lohr  “  Microsoft’s  failed  Yahoo  bid  risks  online  growth”,  <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/05/628
technology/05soft.html?_r=5&hp&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=slogin> accessed 10 January 2015
 Ibid 17629
 Ibid 39630
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stockholders of the target company are granted the right to purchase the acquirer’s stock on a two 
for one basis after the subsequent merging of the two companies.631
In  the  US  companies,  the  use  of  poison  pill  anti-takeover  techniques  has  reduced 
significantly over  the past  decade.  This  is  due to pressure from proxy advisory firms and 632
investors. In contrast, English companies have been banned from implementing the poison pill 
defence  by  the  corresponding  takeover  Panels.  This  particular  defence  strategy  can  impede 
hostile takeovers especially those by foreign bidders. A current example is the attempt to take 
over Autonomy, in UK by the US buyer, Hewlett Packard in 2011.  The Autonomy’s board in a 633
bid to prevent the process and disinterest the bidder recommended a £7 billion, a price equivalent 
to an $ 11.5 billion takeover by the Hewlett Packard as a more realistic price.634
In other words, poison pills are considered to be a shareholders’ rights plan that requires 
the bidding company to involve consultative talk with the board of the target company. This is 
prior to seeking to acquire a certain percentage of the target company’s stock.  A failure to 635
comply with the condition is likely to cause substantial economic harm to the acquirer as the 
 Ryngaert,  Michael.  "The  effect  of  poison  pill  securities  on  shareholder  wealth."   Journal  of  Financial 631
Economics 20 (1988): 377-417.
 Ryngaert,  Michael.  "The  effect  of  poison  pill  securities  on  shareholder  wealth."   Journal  of  Financial 632
Economics 20 (1988): 377-417.
 Brudney, Victor, and Marvin A. Chirelstein. "Fair shares in corporate mergers and takeovers." Harv. L. Rev. 88 633
(1974): 297.
 Arik Hesseldahl “HP's $5 Billion Fraud Lawsuit Against Former Autonomy Executives Is Now Public", MAY 5, 634
2015    http://www.recode.net/2015/5/5/11562326/hps-5-billion-fraud-lawsuit-against-former-autonomy-executives-
is-now accessed 10 March 2016 
Malatesta,  Paul  H.,  and  Ralph  A.  Walkling.  "Poison  pill  securities:  Stockholder  wealth,  profitability,  and 635
ownership structure." Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988): 347-376.
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rights held by it become void and other shareholders are granted the opportunity to buy shares of 
the target company at half the quoted price.636
The  rights  plan  can  be  undertaken  by  the  directors  without  the  approval  of  the 
shareholders.  They  can  also  authorise  the  rights  to  be  distributed  as  a  dividend  to  the 637
shareholders of the company. The board of directors have the power to redeem or exercise the 
right; the preferred stock might be convertible into ordinary shares at an advantageous price.  638
If this right is exercised it substantially raises the cost of the takeover. This type of poison pills is 
commonly known as flip-over. It allows shareholders of the target company to buy the shares of 
the new company resulting from the combination of the bidder’s and target companies once the 
takeover is effected at a predefined substantial discount.  This discount usually averages at a 639
50% discount on the market price of the shares. The flip over is the only course of action left 
when the bidder has already acquired almost all the target company’s shares. Thereby exercising 
considerable  control  over  the  target  company.  The  bidder  finds  itself  in  a  position  where  it 
necessary  to  sell  off  the  already  acquired  shares  of  the  target  company  at  a  substantially 
discounted market price to the former shareholders.640
Lipton, Martin. "Merger Waves in the 19th, 20th and 21st Centuries." The Davies Lecture, Osgoode Hall Law 636
School, York University 14 (2006).
Haleblian, Jerayr, and Sydney Finkelstein. "The influence of organizational acquisition experience on acquisition 637
performance: A behavioral learning perspective." Administrative Science Quarterly 44.1 (1999): 29-56.
 Ibid pp 37638
 Ibid pp 36639
 Gregory,  Alan.  "An examination of  the  long run performance of  UK acquiring firms."  Journal  of  Business 640
Finance & Accounting 24.7-8 (1997): 971-1002.
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On the other hand, the rights can be purchased by at a higher price over the issue price, 
with the large shareholder left out from the repurchase of the share (flip-ins).   Additionally, it 641
is  worth to note that  this  pill  allows the target  shareholders  to buy additional  shares and to 
increase their holdings over that of the bidder who controls a given percentage stock of the target 
company. Flip in poison pill allows a target company’s board or right holders with a high stake to 
buy new shares in the company (target company) before a takeover is affected. Hence, increasing 
their control over that of the bidder’s control. Further, the additional shares acquired may be 
bought at a discounted market price, to ensure that right holder can always create additional 
stock to overcome a takeover bid.642
This defence approaches to takeovers ensure that any potential hostile takeover attempt is 
very expensive since the bidder either has to buy very expensive shares in comparison to the 
cheaper  additional  shares  bought  by  the  shareholders.  The acquirer  will  have  to  fund the 643
discounts that the target company’s shareholders are offered once the takeover is influenced. At 
this point of the transaction, the poison pills are considered to be provisions that are incorporated 
in the charter of a company giving management and shareholders special rights to act in case of 
such  an  eventuality.  The  poison  pills  are  considered  to  be  a  mandatory  requirement  that  is 
Franks,  Julian,  Robert  Harris,  and  Sheridan  Titman.  "The  postmerger  share-price  performance  of  acquiring 641
firms." Journal of Financial economics 29.1 (1991): 81-96.
Berkovitch,  Elazar,  and Naveen Khanna.  "How Target  Shareholders Benefit from Value-Reducing Defensive 642
Strategies in Takeovers." The Journal of Finance 45.1 (1990): 137-156.
Fornell,  Claes,  and Birger  Wernerfelt.  "Defensive  marketing  strategy by customer  complaint  management:  a 643
theoretical analysis." Journal of Marketing research (1987): 337-346.
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negatively impacting on the takeover bid. They set conditions for hostile bidders to satisfy prior 
to taking over of the company.644
4.3.2 The effects of poison pills on companies
Several companies have failed to maintain their independence after adopting the poison 
pill strategy. As much as the poison pills are effective at warding off the unsolicited offers, they 
reveal  to  the  financial  community  that  the  companies  using  them  have  some  financial  or 
structural weakness and vulnerable to takeovers.645
The antagonists of this technique and advocates of many shareholders are concerned with 
the  negative  impact  of  poison  pills;  many  have  sponsored  proposals  that  would  require 
shareholder approval prior their incorporation into the corporate charter. Their logic is based on 
the fact that rather than safeguard the independence of the firms, poison pills have the tendency 
to  foster  inefficiencies  and  poor  management,  that  lead  to  poor  productivity  and  weak 
competitiveness that eventually results in lower share value.646
On the same note, there is another particular type of poison pill,” dead-hand” which has 
greatly exasperated the shareholder activists. The serving board of directors can only withdraw 
the Dead-hand poison pills.  These kinds of schemes are put in place to keep the existing board 647
and current management in place, going as far as ignoring the interest of existing shareholders or 
 Ibid 29644
Johnson,  Dana J.,  and Nancy L.  Meade.  "Shareholder wealth effects  of  poison pills  in the presence of anti-645
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in conflict with the majority of the shareholders. It actually alienates the shareholders' ability to 
act  by written consent.  Another  variation is  the no-hand poison pill,  which by its  definition 
cannot be altered by anyone for at least a period of one year or otherwise as specified.648
The Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Boards of Directors have often condemned the 
poison pill for the negative impact it has on the share value. Poison pills are brutally effective 
bargaining tools that are suitable for extracting just the most constructive financial terms from a 
bid.  The CEOs have also taken it as an opportunity to gain some control over the company in 649
the future. Especially when the stock market drop sharply and opportunistic raiders began their 
antics of the undervalued firms.650
Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd  represents the cases that 651
involved implementation of a poison pill.  The Committee of the Imperial Tobacco Pension Trust 
wanted the court to allow for a varying of the content of rule 64A with respect to the pension 
scheme with the management’s verification. This action would result in a 5% per annum increase 
in the benefits of the members or the Retail Price Index.  This provision was influenced by the 652
amendment under rule 36 that allowed the committee to make an amendment under the consent 
Read  more:  Poison  Pills<http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Per-Pro/Poison-648
Pills.html#ixzz1kYxdPxCU> accessed on 23 February 2016. 
Malmendier,  Ulrike,  and  Geoffrey  Tate.  "Who  makes  acquisitions?  CEO  overconfidence  and  the  market's 649
reaction." Journal of financial Economics 89.1 (2008): 20-43.
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Steven N. Kaplan. Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the US: Making Sense 650
of the 1980s and 1990s. No. w8220. National bureau of economic research, 2001.
 Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 589.651
Wulf, Julie. "Do CEOs in mergers trade power for premium? Evidence from “mergers of equals”." Journal of 652
Law, Economics, and Organization 20.1 (2004): 60-101.
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of  the  company  management.  Hanson  Trust  Plc  had  taken  over  Imperial  Tobacco.  The 
introduction of the rule was not that favourable since previously the pensions of the employees 
were only incremented for a particular purpose and mostly at the rate of inflation.  Thereafter, 653
the  existing  scheme  was  closed  to  new  entrants.  However,  in  1986,  the  takeover  became 
effective. This time was marked by inflation increasing above 5% hence the committee required 
the management to update pensions by over 5%. The new management declined and countered 
with an alternative idea of the lesser of 15% pa or RPI update.  Employees that had dealt with 654
the old scheme had the capacity to take their share if they transferred (at this time there was 
approximately £130m).  The new scheme however required any surplus to be received by the 655
company and not the employees individually. The trust claimed that if the committee was obliged 
to have the consent of management for the update of deals that would counter inflation, then the 
offer provided was neglecting the duty of good faith since it forced the employees to ignore their 
acquired rights.656
With respect to Sir Nicolas Browne Wilkinson VC, the rule 64A could not be made so as 
to allow the committee to approve increases,  without  the consent  of  the management.  Sir 657
Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC upheld on the fact that the concept of subsection 64A could not 
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be constructed without the acceptance of management of the company. However, the company 
management could not use its discretion to withhold its consent in a way that undermined good 
faith, and mutual trust and confidence. As per the judgement of the case following comments 
were registered:
“In my judgment, it is not necessary to found such a claim in contract alone. Construed 
against the background of the contract of employment, in my judgment the pension trust deed 
and rules themselves are to be taken as being impliedly subject to the limitation that the rights 
and powers of the company can only be exercised in accordance with the implied obligation of 
good faith”.658
On the other hand, the management would not utilise its discretion to consent as such it 
was  undermining  confidence,  mutual  trust  and  good  faith.  In  this  case,  the  company  was 
perceived not  to  be exercising fiduciary power,  this  means it  could take account  of  its  own 
interests and financial burdens; however, there was a need to use its own powers for the right 
purpose. The idea of forcing members to ignore their rights so the company could benefit from 
the surplus was not acting in good faith.659
Criterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC  is an English case which 660
deals with takeover defences that may be employed by a board of directors to hinder the buying 
 Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 589.658
 Criterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC [1991] 1 WLR 589, 597-598659
 Criterion  Properties  Plc  v.  Stratford  UK  Properties  LLC  &  Ors  [2004]  UKHL  28.  Available  on  http://660
www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/28.html accessed on 5 December 2015
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of shares without the consent of the board. Initiating a poison pill so as to counter a takeover bid 
was perceived as an improper use of the directors’ powers.661
Rule  21  of  the  City  Code  on  Takeovers  and  Mergers  sets  aside  the  case  for  public 
companies, which do not entertain any ruling that counters a takeover bid. Aubrey Glasner who 
was the previous Managing Director of Stratford UK had joined the company based on a poison 
pill contract.  In case the Managing Director was to leave office in the event of a takeover 662
happening, the company would owe Criterion Properties an outstanding payment in the form of a 
“put option”.  Oaktree and Criterion formed a joint  venture.  Glasner was dismissed once the 
board learned about the poison pill. Hart J never hesitated to turn down the pill in the initial 
instance. With respect to the judgment in Cayne v Global Natural Resources Plc, he claimed that 
ignoring such reasons should not be entertained and the board should have the capability to 
counter the constitutional rights when considering the threat.  There is a major suggestion that a 663
company should be capable of acting in the face of its ‘impotence and beggary’. Carnwath LJ 
and Brooke LJ were in line with the judge’s conclusion that the directors have exercised their 
powers in the wrong way claiming that he should never have considered the existing director’s 
knowledge.664
 Johnson, Jennifer J., and Mary Siegel. "Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors." University 661
of Pennsylvania Law Review 136.2 (1987): 315-416.
Yarrow,  George  K.  "Shareholder  protection,  compulsory  acquisition  and  the  efficiency  of  the  takeover 662
process." The Journal of Industrial Economics (1985): 3-16.
Armour,  John,  and  David  A.  Skeel  Jr.  "Who  writes  the  rules  for  hostile  takeovers,  and  why-the  peculiar 663
divergence of US and UK takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1727.
 Cayne v Global Natural Resources Plc [1984] 1 All ER 225664
 206
According to Lord Nicholls, ‘knowing receipt’ was not necessary. An agreement could be 
forgone following misapplication of the company’s assets regardless of whether B has any issues 
on the assets.  A is in a position to a hold a personal claim for “unjust enrichment” against B 665
which follows a defence of change of position. If there were proof of fault on B then personal 
accountability, would be required of B, which is then viewed strictly. 
According to Lord Scott, the agreement had the capacity to counter any form of takeover. 
With this, the case is viewed as a discussion or ostensible, apparent, actual or authority.666
In the High Court’s Judgement  of Criterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties 
LLC,  quoting  from  Megarry  VC's  judgment  in  Cayne  v  Global  Natural  Resources  Plc,  he 
criticised on the fact that the non-acceptance  in not considering such facts  should not be taken 
that far. Further, the board needs to have the authority to interfere with these rights related to the 
constitution where the threat is big enough.  In the Court of Appeal  Brooke LJ and Carnwath LJ 
emphasised on the fact that “judge's conclusion that the directors' had improperly exercised their 
powers  was  correct  and  should  not  have  gone  on  to  consider  the  actual  knowledge  of  the 
director”.667
Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd  involves an English company law case that involved the 668
question  of  director  of  liability.  The  court  ruled  that  the  dilution  of  the  stock  value  by  the 
Nicholls, Lord. "Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark." Restitution: Past, Present and Future (1998).665
Nahavandi,  Afsaneh,  and  Ali  R.  Malekzadeh.  "Acculturation  in  mergers  and  acquisitions."   Academy  of 666
management review 13.1 (1988): 79-90.
 Criterion  Properties  Plc  v.  Stratford  UK  Properties  LLC  &  Ors  [2004]  UKHL  28.  Available  on  http://667
www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/28.html accessed on 5 December 2015
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corporate directors for the prevention of a hostile takeover was a breach of their fiduciary duty to 
the entity.669
Mr. Baxter approached Cramphorn Ltd’s Board of Directors with a takeover deal for the 
entity. The directors however viewed that the takeover was not favourable to the company. This 
led to the issuing of 5,707 shares each with ten votes to the trustees, belonging to the welfare 
scheme of the employees. With this, they could outvote the bid by Baxter for majority control of 
the company.  This led to one of the shareholders suing Mr Hogg with the claims that the 670
issuing of the shares was ultra vires. Cramphorn supported that the actions of the directors were 
in good faith. There was the fear that Mr Baxter would fire most of the workers.
Buckley J who wrote on behalf of the court claimed that the new shares given by the 
directors  were  not  valid.  By  issuing  the  shares  with  the  intent  of  barring  the  takeover,  the 
directors had neglected their duties as directors. A fiduciary duty is created by the power to issue 
shares and hence these powers should only be utilised for the purpose of raising capital and not 
for other purposes such as a takeover.  There was no proof that the directors had acted honestly 671
and that their intentions were in the best interest of the entity. The only way giving of shares 
would be acceptable would be if the decision was made by the shareholders in a general meeting, 
 Ibid p. 32669
Baxter,  Michael  St  Patrick.  "The  Fiduciary  Obligations  of  Directors  of  a  Target  Company  in  Resisting  an 670
Unsolicited Takeover Bid." Ottawa L. Rev. 20 (1988): 63.
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wherein the case under consideration there no votes in general meeting on the newly issued 
shares.672
In the final judgment Buckley J stated that the directors could not misuse their powers to 
distribute the shares of the company for the purpose of takeover. However, they can issue the 
shares only to enhance the capital of the company. On the judgement of this case Buckley J 
quoted Piercy and said:
 “With those observations I respectfully agree. Unless a majority in a company is acting 
oppressively towards the minority, this court should not and will not itself interfere with the 
exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights or embark upon an inquiry into the respective 
merits of the views held or policies favoured by the majority and the minority. Nor will this court 
permit  directors  to exercise powers,  which have been delegated to them by the company in 
circumstances which put the directors in a fiduciary position when exercising those powers, in 
such a way as to interfere with the exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights; and in a 
case of this kind also, in my judgment, the court should not investigate the rival merits of the 
views or policies of the parties . . It is not, in my judgment, open to the directors in such a case to 
say, ‘We genuinely believe that what we seek to prevent the majority from doing will harm the 
company and therefore our act in arming ourselves or our party with sufficient shares to outvote 
the majority is a conscientious exercise of our powers under the articles, which should not be 
interfered with”.673
 Mandelker, Gershon. "Risk and return: The case of merging firms." Journal of Financial Economics 1.4 (1974): 672
303-335.
 Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254673
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Moran v. Household International, Inc.  represents the standings of the Delaware 674
Supreme Court that viewed that the shareholder rights plan also referred to as a poison pill as a 
legal  exercise  for  the  board  of  directors  of  the  Household  International  was  the  basis  of  a 
business judgment. This case also represents an instance where the Court of Chancery viewed the 
poison pill as a legal exercise based on the Household’s business judgment. Moran v Household 
International agreed and verified the judgment as stated.  Moran is critically the initial case 675
where  the  U.S  state  acknowledged  a  shareholder  rights  plan.  Household  International  Inc. 
represents an expanded company consisting of subsidiaries in the merchandising, transportation 
and financial services. Vons Grocery and Car Rental were included in its wholly owned entities. 
The Court of Chancery detailed with respect to the Household that poison pills were acceptable 
as a business judgment.  In August 1984, the board of Household International voted for the 676
adoption of a shareholder rights plan. The plan was executed when the board was not facing the 
threat of takeover, which highlights a substantial distinction with other takeover defence cases 
such as Unocal. The board was focusing on the rising instances of ‘break up’ takeovers which 
involved the breaking up of large industrial entities into smaller companies and the Household 
International was considered likely by such takeovers.677
John Moran was a member of the Household International board and did not support the 
implementation of the shareholder rights plan. At the time he was the Chairman of the largest 
 Moran v. Household International, Inc 500 A.2d at 1348674
 L. Bebchuk and A. Ferrell, Symposium: Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from 675
Takeovers, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1168 (1999) at 1179.
 Moran v. Household International, Inc  500 A.2d at 1349676
Hunt,  John W. "Changing pattern of acquisition behaviour in takeovers and the consequences for acquisition 677
processes." Strategic Management Journal 11.1 (1990): 69-77.
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shareholder of Household International, Dyson-Kissner-Moran Company. D-K-M was planning a 
leveraged buyout targeting the Household International, which was never implemented.678
According to the trial Court, the adoption of the shareholder rights plan by the Household 
International  was  a  legitimate  business  judgment.  The  Delaware  Supreme  Court  upheld  the 
ruling of the lower court.679
4.3.3 Pac man
The Pac man defence is a technique that target company uses to secure itself from a 
hostile takeover by making an attempt to acquire it would be a buyer. The term “Pac man” is 
coined from a popular video game, “Pac man”. In the game, the Pac man is pursued by four 
ghosts in maze of dots. When he identifies and eats a ‘powerful pill’ or dot, he gains the strength 
to turn against his enemies and goes in pursuit of them.  Far from that in the corporate history, 680
the term is accredited to buyout guru Bruce Wassertein, Chairman of Wassertain and Co.
In  an  event  that  the  target  company  is  faced  with  an  unwelcome  unsolicited  and 
belligerent bid by the acquirer. In an attempt to send away the acquirer, the target company may 
implement any method in an attempt to successfully see off the acquirer. It might go as far as 
dipping its hands into its war chest for the funds to accumulate the acquirer’s stock in order to 
acquire over half of the company’s stock.
 Schweizer,  Lars.  "Organizational  integration  of  acquired  biotechnology  companies  into  pharmaceutical 678
companies: The need for a hybrid approach." Academy of Management Journal 48.6 (2005): 1051-1074.
 Lipton, Martin, and Andrew R. Brownstein. "Takeover Responses and Directors' 679
Responsibilities—An Update." The Business Lawyer (1985): 1403-1430.
Pearce,  John  A.,  and  Richard  B.  Robinson.  "Hostile  takeover  defenses  that  maximize  shareholder 680
wealth." Business Horizons47.5 (2004): 15-24.
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An  internationally  recognised  instance  of  Pac  man  defence  is  that  of  Volkswagen 
surviving the Porche’s hostile takeover attempt. Porche actually, slowly acquired a stake in the 
much  larger  counterpart,  consequently  to  the  point  where  it  owned  more  than  half  of  the 
company in  2009.  In  the  announcement  that  came later  that  year,  the  Volkswagen Group 681
emerged to be the surviving entity. 
In the US corporate history, Bendix is known as a company that narrowly and cunningly 
escaping an attempted hostile  takeover  by the Martin Marietta  Company in 1982. Initially, 682
Martin Marrieta bought shares in Bendix with the intention of assuming control over the entire 
company.  The Bendix Company then persuaded Allied Corporations to act as a “White Knight”, 
eventually  yielding  to  its  purchase  by  the  Allied  Company  the  same  year.  This  strategy  in 
retrospection was labelled as ‘Pac man defence’.
There are some scholars that raised their voice on the dangers of the Pac-Mac defence. 
Deborah A de Mott stated that the Pac man defence could end up in a cross holding structure 
between the target and the bidder company as the purchased shares could have voting rights. 
Particularly this could be more complicated in the US if the companies are based in separate 
states where they have different legislation on voting rights. As a result this could have impact on 
efficient of the corporate law. 683
Another scholar, Gregory Corcoran sees this as a high risk measure to tackle against the 
hostile bidder. Moreover, if the decision right will be the directors responsibility, they will have 
to make sure that they are behaving in the shareholders interests rather than on their own 
Gorzala, Jeannette. The art of hostile takeover defence. Igel Verlag, 2010.681
Armour,  John,  and  David  A.  Skeel  Jr.  "Who  writes  the  rules  for  hostile  takeovers,  and  why-the  peculiar 682
divergence of US and UK takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1727.
 De Mott A Deborah, ‘Pac-Man Tender Offers’ (1983) 32 Duke Law Journal 116,117, 130683
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interests.  In the US, the SEC considered to abolish the Pac man defence but they also accepted 
that there were some benefits for the shareholders if it was used correctly although there was a 
cause for concern.684
4.3.4 Green-mail
A company may denounce the take-over by the acquirer and purchase back the recently 
acquired stock.  This defence tactic is  commonly known as greenmail  and was most popular 
during one of the trends in 1980’s.  It  comes in handy with a requirement that the raiders 685
company should not make any further attempts of take-over. This is coupled with the fact that the 
shares have to be bought at a premium over the takeover price.
The  term greenmail  is  used  to  refer  to  the  practice  of  buying  the  stock  of  a  target 
company  by  the  company  itself  at  a  substantial  premium  so  that  the  shareholders  gain  a 
significant increase in their stock value as compared to the presiding market charge for similar 
stock.  This type of premium is provided in exchange for the stockholders’ mutual agreement to 686
accept  or  allow the  target  company’s  board  to  reject  a  takeover  bid.  The  premium offer  is 
negotiated when a bidder attempts to gain control of the target company and hence used as a 
defence tactic.
The targeted share repurchase knew as greenmail simply represents the buyback of shares 
owned by a particular shareholder of the target company who has made his intentions known of 
  Corcoran  Gregory,  ‘The  Dangers  of  the  Pac-Man  Defence’  (The   Wall  Street  Journal,  2007)  <https://684
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Arbel, Avner, and Robert H. Woods. "Shark repellent: Anti-takeover measures for the hospitality industry." The 685
Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 29.3 (1988): 28-39.
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taking over the company by presenting a bid.  The greenmail consideration is essentially at a 687
premium above the prevailing market price. At a certain point, a considerable amount of shares 
are  held  by  a  hostile  bidder,  which  forces  the  target  company to  repurchase  the  stock  at  a 
substantial  premium to prevent  any further  attempts  of  the  takeover.  However,  experts  have 
argued that management uses greenmail in their own interest of perpetuating its ability to exploit 
the target company.688
Greenmail  was  popular  in  the  US in  the  1980s and the  legal  system has  since  been 
upgraded to curtail  this  mechanism. This is  due to the fact  that  some transactions involving 
takeover are carried out with a view of making extraordinary profits by selling back the acquired 
shares  to  the  target  company at  a  higher  premium than the  initial  price  with  no real  initial 
intention of taking over the company.  The greenmail mechanism is predominantly adopted by 689
the management who fear the loss of their jobs in the company. The ultimate losers in the process 
are  the  shareholders  who lose  their  money to  the  bidding  company in  form of  profits.  The 
practised has since received criticism especially in the US where it originated.690
Unocal  v  Mesa  Petroleum Co  represents  landmark  decisions  with  respect  to  the 691
Delaware Supreme Court on defensive mechanisms on takeover bids.
Karpoff,  Jonathan  M.,  Paul  H.  Malatesta,  and  Ralph  A.  Walkling.  "Corporate  governance  and  shareholder 687
initiatives: Empirical evidence." Journal of Financial Economics 42.3 (1996): 365-395.
Morck, Randall, and Lloyd Steier. "The global history of corporate governance: An introduction." A history of 688
corporate governance around the world: Family business groups to professional managers. University of Chicago 
Press, 2005. 1-64.
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The business judgment rule was being applied by the Delaware Court until the Unocal 
decision in 1985 with respect to sales, mergers and takeover defences.  The Unocal, board of 692
directors could not prevent a takeover unless there was proof it was “a threat to the corporate 
culture and the defensive tactic applied should be proportional to the threat”. This need was later 
identified as the Unocal test for the board of directors. 
However, in Unitrin v American General Corp, it was considered and slightly switched to 
mean where force was required to be used before Court intercession.693
Mesa Petroleum had made a deal involving a front-end loader that was two-tiered for 
Unocal Corporations where $54 in cash was given for the front end in addition to $54 in junk 
bonds as the finishing of the deal.  Most shareholders usually want to transact in cash rather 694
than bonds, with it was expected that they would tender the present shares and close the deal 
although $54 never seemed like a fair price. If the shareholders did not accept to tender they 
risked paying $54 in risky debts instruments as opposed to cash.
Unocal created a self-tender offer for $72 excluding Mesa share as a response to the 
tender offer  from Mesa.  There were attempts by the Unocal  board to start  a  tender offer  to 
counter the uninvited offer by Mesa Petroleum. Adoption of a tender offer is because Mesa had 
acquired 64 million shares of Unocal. This would translate to Unocal have to purchase back 49% 
Gilson,  Ronald  J.,  and  Mark  J.  Roe.  "Understanding  the  Japanese  keiretsu:  Overlaps  between  corporate 692
governance and industrial organization." Yale Law Journal (1993): 871-906.
 Unitrin v American General Corp 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995)693
Jensen, Michael C. "The takeover controversy." (1988).694
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of their shares where the shares which would have been brought back would never have been 
held by Mesa.695
The court held that this form of selective exchange offer could not be legally applicable and 
ordered the stoppage of the use of self-tender offer defences.
However, the Delaware Supreme Court had a different view of the trial court. The Court 
perceived  the  Unocal  Board  of  Directors  possessed  logical  reasons  for  their  belief  of  the 
existence of a danger to effectiveness or corporate culture.  The response was also viewed as 696
proportional to the threat.  This logical relation analysis triggered a review of the timing, the 
nature and the price of the offer in addition to the effect on the employees, the community, the 
customers, the creditors and the shareholders. 
The Court  considered Revlon and MacAndrews where  it  is  allowed to  look at  other 
constituencies  other  than the  stakeholders.  Although in  Cheff  v  Mathes  wanted the  raider 697
payment or greenmail to disappear the Unocal Court prohibited the payment to the shareholders 
with exception of the raider.698
The Court’s opinion was substantial because the conflict of interest meant that takeover 
defences would not be favourable for the shareholders. In the Unocal case, the Court was careful 
that the board had the capacity of using takeover defences to protect the corporation’s culture 
was in a manner that is not acceptable, in addition to control of the entity by the board. The 
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inclusion of an enhanced duty on the board to direct their decisions for improving the wellbeing 
of the entity and its stakeholders. The board is required to prove that its response is a real threat 
to the corporate culture; this is in addition to proving that their actions were logical as per the 
present threat, so as to be assigned to the security of the business judgment rule.699
In the Judgement of Unocal v Mesa Petroleum Co, it  was analysed that the Unocal's 
board of directors had the valid reasons for emphasising that a danger to incorporate efficiency 
for existing and that the response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.700
Stephen Kenyon-Slade stated that it has never been any requirement in law that the shares 
can  be  bought  at  an  “equal  term  or  in  equal  amounts  for  all  shareholders”  and  the  share 
premiums may not be considered as a part of the company's assets where stakeholders could 
have equally.  701
Mr. Espen Eckbo argued that if the company’s  share price drops down which could result 
to greenmail, and prohibiting this tactic could increase shareholders wealth.  702
Shleifer and Vishnu challenged the traditional approach on greenmail’s negative effect on 
the  share  price  and  they  concluded  that  the  share  price  always  drops  down  as  a  result  of 
greenmail even though the managers improve the value of the target company. Consequently, the 
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share prices performance should not be considered the effectiveness of greenmail as a takeover 
defence measure.   703
4.3.5 White knight
This defence tactic is goodwill by the acquirer to protect the company on a bid from 
hostile take-over. 
As defined by Kokot  ‘’ a white knight is a company (the ‘good guy’) the gallops to 
rescue the company that is facing a hostile takeover from another company (a ‘’Black knight’’) 
by making a friendly after the purchase the shares of the target company”.704
Individual shareholders in the US rarely vote against incumbent management, making it 
hard to replace the directors even if they under-perform.  This also explains why greenmail 705
(this is a situation in which a large block of stocks are held by an unfriendly company. This 
forces the target company to repurchase the stock at a substantial premium to prevent a takeover) 
has been a successful tactic, except when restrained by regulation.
Takeover defences could also be divided into those, which are made when a bid 
was not even expected, so-called pre-bid defences, which are usually carried out. The takeover 
defence tactics should preserve the interests of the company as a whole. The importance of the 
 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest’  (1986) 17 The 703
RAND Journal of Economics 293, 294
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defence  tactics  is  to  protect  the  target  company  from  an  unfair  takeover  bid  which  could 
undermine the interests of the target company.706
The application of the “white knight” as a defence mechanism involves the management 
of a target company approaching a friendly company to purchase its majority shares so as to 
assist it to repel apotential attempt by the hostile bidder to take over the target company.  White 707
knights in this situation are taken to be the target company the preferred acquirer or rescuer 
despite controlling the voting department of the company. Strategically, the white knight is not 
considered  to  be  a  takeover  mechanism or  defence  since,  at  the  end of  the  transaction,  the 
company is taken over by an alternative bidder though, being more acceptable and approved by 
the  management.  The  target  company,  therefore,  has  to  make  a  choice  between  takeover 
transactions by the hostile bidder or instigate a takeover by a friendly alternative bidder.708
Obviously,  white  knight  transactions  are  considered  beneficial  to  the  incumbent 
management and the shareholders as well. The shareholders enjoy the raised bid offer arising 
from the alternative takeover by the white knight, while the incumbent management may remain 
in the same positions or obtain a better one in the newly merged firms. The takeover regulation 
allows the entry of a white knight into a takeover deal initially undertaken by the initial hostile 
bidder.  The  condition  of  such  an  entry  is  by  offering  a  higher  price  for  the  stock  than  the 
unfriendly bidder, to avert the takeover bid. The higher bid will ultimately render the interest of 
Giacomazzi,  Franco,  et  al.  "Information  systems  integration  in  mergers  and  acquisitions:  A  normative 706
model." Information & management 32.6 (1997): 289-302.
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the  hostile  bidder  useless  unless  they  persist  in  fighting  on  further.  Hence,  fulfilling  the 709
objective of protecting the target company from the raid. White knight as post bid defence is not 
easy to come by in the current economic climate due to the economic recession. Hence it difficult 
to get the alternative bidder that is ready to sacrifice their investment to surpass that of a hostile 
bidder. It is important to note in the context of this study that the earlier mentioned advantages of 
white knight to the management is not guaranteed and that the actual reason for adopting this 
type of mechanism is to protect the company from unfriendly takeover and that may result in 
infringement of rights of the shareholders of the target company. 
Kraft’s  hostile  takeover  bid  for  Cadbury  best  exemplifies  case  law in  this  type  of  takeover 
defence.   710
In 2009, Kraft Foods made a hostile bid for Cadbury,  the UK-listed chocolate maker, 
following which, in August 2011, it became apparent that Cadbury’s purchase would allow Kraft 
to restructure and split its business model into two companies within a year: into a $16bn grocery 
and a $32bn global snacks business.711
When the initial bid was made, though, Cadbury was not for sale and aggressively battled 
against this move by Kraft.
The Chairman of Cadbury, Sir Roger Car,  launched a robust defence against the bid, 
stating that the share price offer was “unattractive” and that it “fundamentally undervalued the 
Grossman,  Sanford  J.,  and  Oliver  D.  Hart.  "Takeover  bids,  the  free-rider  problem,  and  the  theory  of  the 709
corporation." The Bell Journal of Economics (1980): 42-64.
 DePamphilis, D, Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Restructuring Activities: An Integrated Approach to Process, 710
Tools, Cases, and Solutions, Seventh Edition, Elsevier Academic Press, New York (2014) pp 579-580
Clarke,  Blanaid.  "Directors'  Duties  in  a  Changing  World:  Lessons  from  the  Cadbury  PLC  Takeover."  Eur. 711
Company L. 7 (2010): 204.
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company”. He even went as far to say that he would rather another confectionery company, such 
as  Hershey,  Ferrero  or  Nestlé,  takeover  the  running  of  Cadbury.  The  British  government’s 
business secretary, Lord Mandelson, who said that the government would oppose any buyer who 
failed to “respect” Cadbury’s traditions, backed up this stance.712
Cadbury recommended that its perceived idea of what Kraft would do to the Cadbury 
business was “an unappealing prospect that sharply contrasts with the Cadbury strategy of a 
pure-play confectionery company”,  though this  would eventually  be  proven wrong by Kraft 
running Cadbury as a separate entity, therefore creating more value for its shareholders.713
In November 2009, Hershey, Ferrero and Nestlé actually showed interest in making a bid, 
thus giving Cadbury more potential options. Roger Carr said that he would prefer to merge with 
Hershey rather than Kraft because this would generate higher earnings per share. It was also 
reported that the directors of Cadbury secretly contacted Hershey's directors to encourage them 
to tender a counter-offer, in order to compete with Kraft. This “white knight” strategy aimed at 
offsetting some of the pressure associated with hostile takeover bids and to defend the target 
company.714
However,  Hershey  did  not  have  the  financial  clout  to  make  a  bid  without  Ferrero's 
assistance,  and  Nestlé  would  have  been  open  to  anti-trust  proceedings,  so  eventually,  Kraft 
merged with Cadbury by offering $19.5 billion.
 “Don't try to make a quick buck from Cadbury, Mandelson tells Kraft”712
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/dec/04/cadbury-bidders-will-face-opposition  accessed  on  3  September 
2015 
 Ibid pp. 56713
 Case  study:  Kraft’s  takeover  of  Cadbury-  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1cb06d30-332f-11e1-714
a51e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3rBDS9KOt accessed on 5 September 2015
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The two companies agreed on a price of 840 pence per share plus a special 10 pence per 
share dividend, which was approved by 72 percent of Cadbury’s shareholders.715
With Cadbury being such a major UK company, the story was front-page news, in the 
financial  press,  for  at  least  four  months.  Added  to  the  takeover  itself  was  the  controversial 
involvement of the UK government-owned RBS bank acting as Kraft’s advisors and financial 
backer.  Nonetheless,  as  there  were no competition issues,  UK regulators  were not  involved, 
which  allowed  Cadbury’s  management  team  to  concentrate  on  the  deal  itself  and  the  real 
decision-makers, namely Cadbury’s shareholders.716
The deal demonstrated that very rational hedge fund managers and other arbitrageurs made up 31 
percent of the share-holding cohort, and these were swayed by the offer price and thus enabled 
the deal to be completed quickly.717
Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.  represents a landmark ruling 718
of the Delaware Supreme Court with respect to hostile takeovers. With respect to the declaration 
of the Court, there are specific situations, which perceive breaking of the entity is unavoidable. 
This is in addition to a substantial narrowing of the fiduciary obligations involving the directors 
of a company that is targeted. The only obligation of the board is maximisation of the immediate 
stockholder value through securing of the highest possible price.  The role of the board of 719
 Ibid pp. 56715
Franks, Julian R., and Robert S. Harris. "Shareholder wealth effects of corporate takeovers: the UK experience 716
1955–1985." Journal of financial Economics 23.2 (1989): 225-249.
Higson, Chris, and Jamie Elliott. "Post-takeover returns: The UK evidence." Journal of Empirical finance 5.1 717
(1998): 27-46.
Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc 506 A.2d 173 (Del 1986)718
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directors shifts from defending the corporate bastion to auctioning for the best price at a sale of 
the entity for stockholders.  A different frame of reference is utilised in the evaluation of the 720
actions of the board. There is no possibility of judicial review of the conduct in such a context 
with respect  to  the traditional  rule  of  judgment.  The logic  is  scrutinised with respect  to  the 
board’s obligations.721
A corporate  takeover  frenzy  is  influenced  by  the  impact  of  this  statement  since  the 
directors want to be auctioneers when their company is perceived to be in play, in order to stay 
faithful to their fiduciary duties.722
Usually, a company that is Revlon compels the board to auction the firm to the highest 
bidder with respect to specific Revlon duties.
This was the decision reached by the Court, while verifying issuance by the Court of 
Chancery that precluded the Revlon, Inc. from taking an intended action with one of the bidders 
involved, which successfully stopped an active auction for the acquisition of the company.723
The Revlon Company was approached by Ronald Perelman the CEO of Pantry Pride with 
the concept of a negotiated transaction or a hostile tender offer that was priced at $42 - $45 per 
share. Revlon’s board rejected the negotiated transaction, as there was a suspicion that the junk 
bonds would finance the acquisition and that would result in dissolution.724
Powell, Ronan G., and Andrew W. Stark. "Does operating performance increase post-takeover for UK takeovers? 720
A comparison of performance measures and benchmarks." Journal of Corporate Finance 11.1 (2005): 293-317.
 Ibid pp. 41721
Boone,  Audra  L.,  and  J.  Harold  Mulherin.  "Do  auctions  induce  a  winner's  curse?  New evidence  from the 722
corporate takeover market." Journal of Financial Economics 89.1 (2008): 1-19.
 Ibid pp. 33723
Powell,  Ronan,  and  Alfred  Yawson.  "Industry  aspects  of  takeovers  and  divestitures:  Evidence  from  the 724
UK." Journal of Banking & Finance 29.12 (2005): 3015-3040.
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The Revlon board hence implemented a defensive action so as to prevent the hostile 
tender offer. This meant the adoption of a “Note Purchase Rights Plan” which is a variation of 
the conventional poison pill which leads to the issuance of debt instead of equity rights to the 
existing shareholders.725
Pantry Pride then shortly announced a hostile cash tender offer for the Revlon shares, 
which they priced at $47.50 with respect to their capacity for financial security and redemption 
of the rights offered to the stakeholders.726
Shareholders  were  however  advised  by  Revlon  board  to  turn  down  the  offer  as 
insufficient as a response and continued on its offer of re-buying a substantial portion of its 
shares while trading for convertible preferred stock and senior subordinated notes that are valued 
at $100 per share.  The offer was immediately oversubscribed and the company issued notes 727
composed of agreements that barred Revlon from issuing dividends, selling assets and incurring 
debt in exchange for 10 million.
Completing the Revlon repurchase program successfully stopped the outstanding tender 
offer from Pantry Pride. Pantry Pride hence issued another one a few weeks later with respect to 
the offer that had just been completed with its value relatively equal to the initial offer. Revlon 
 Ibid pp. 250725
Coffee, John C. "Shareholders versus managers: The strain in the corporate web." Michigan Law Review 85.1 726
(1986): 1-109.
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board also rejected this offer prompting Pantry Pride to revise their offer and a few weeks later 
raised their price to $50 and even $53 per share.728
During this period Forstmann and Revlon board had started a discussion. Some of it was 
based on the buyout that would be organised by Forstmann as an alternative option to the Pantry 
Pride bid.  They immediately came to a deal in principle priced at $56. A waiver was included 729
in the agreements of the deal, which was based on the restrictive agreement contained in the 
previous  Revlon  repurchase.  The  trading  value  of  the  notes  decreased  steeply  after  the 
declaration of the waiver of the covenants, which threatened the company with litigation from 
the irate noteholders.730
Pantry Pride was forced to raise the offer to $56.25 per share. They then publicly declared 
that they were willing to top any bid made by Forstmann even if it’s only by a fraction. This led 
Forstmann  to  respond  by  refusing  to  enter  bidding  with  Revlon  without  their  substantial 
assurance that they would close the deal. Revlon went as per Forstmann’s will.  Shortly after 
Pantry Pride had offered $56.25, they closed a deal with Forstmann at $57.25 per share on a 
condition  that  Forstmann  would  purchase  at  a  discount  one  of  Revlon’s  essential  business 
divisions if there is another entity that would secure more than 40% of Revlon’s outstanding 
stock. This was in addition to a $25 million termination fee, a restriction of Revlon board from 
negotiations with rival bidders in exception of slim situations; there was also the removal of the 
Shleifer,  Andrei,  and  Robert  W.  Vishny.  "Large  shareholders  and  corporate  control."   Journal  of  political 728
economy 94.3, Part 1 (1986): 461-488.
Grossman,  Sanford  J.,  and  Oliver  D.  Hart.  "Takeover  bids,  the  free-rider  problem,  and  the  theory  of  the 729
corporation." The Bell Journal of Economics (1980): 42-64.
 Ibid pp. 46730
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Note Purchase Rights and the waiver involving the restrictive agreement.  On Forssmann’s 731
side,  there  was  an  agreement  he  would  support  the  par  value  of  the  Notes,  which  are  still 
decreasing in value in the market. This would be through their exchange with new notes at their 
first value during the first issuing. This was followed by Pantry Pride raising their offer to $58 
per share. In addition to filing a claim in the Court of Chancery when it sought temporary relief 
so as to stop the asset alternative, the no-shop, the rights and termination fee. There were also 
arguments that the board had neglected its fiduciary duty through restricting Revlon stockholders 
from closing the deal even with a larger cash offer.732
The relief was granted by the Court of Chancery after realising the directors had created a 
challenged deal provision in order to stop the Forstmann deal. This was to prevent a potential 
liability to the shareholders of Revlon. Forstmann however had no issue in restoring the whole 
value of the notes based on the new deal, which seized their concern. With this, the Court of 
Chancery declared that the directors of Revlon had neglected their duty of loyalty while acting in 
their own personal interest rather than in the interests of increasing the sale for the benefit of the 
stakeholders.733
The Court alongside the Revlon board’s defensive actions reviewed the challenges of 
Pantry Pride. These issues included the completion of the repurchase program and induction of a 
poison pill. The Court made its decision based on its previous standings in the Unocal v Mesa 
Petroleum  case  where  the  Court  viewed  that  although  the  business  judgment  favoured  the 
 Ibid pp. 45731
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approval of the board of a proposed merger, it was not required that the board take anti-takeover 
measure. This is with respect to the omnipresent spectre regarding the board where they would 
be  serving their  own interest  while  they are  should  have  been acting  for  the  benefit  of  the 
stakeholders by securing the maximum value.  The directors were required to take action such 734
as logic investigation in order to show good faith, to prove a need to take defensive actions. In 
addition to proving that the actions taken were worth the threat posed.
On applying these criteria, the Court found the actions of Revlon board to have been 
relatively logical which was the adoption of the poison pill during the period that they were 
being offered $45 per share. This is because it led to a visible improvement in the bargaining 
power since it redeemed their rights while waiting for a better offer, which eventually came. It 
also had the same views on the exchange offer.  When the negotiations that led to the merger 735
with Forstmann were reviewed, there was an application of a distinct legal standard with respect 
to the fact that there was no other way other than the sale of the company or its breakup and 
where it ended up being sold to one suitor. With this, it was not being charged with the protection 
of  the  company  and  the  shareholders  from  the  potential  threats  but  rather  giving  them  an 
obligation to increase the entity’s monetary value for the benefit of the stakeholders. This was the 
only  violation  held  against  the  Revlon  directors.  This  was  the  agreement  in  the  previous 
transaction by Forstmann in a manner that  successfully stopped the bidding contest  between 
McConnell, John J., and Henri Servaes. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value." Journal 734
of Financial economics 27.2 (1990): 595-612.
Loderer,  Claudio,  and  Kenneth  Martin.  "Executive  stock  ownership  and  performance  tracking  faint 735
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Pantry Pride and Forstmann. Revlon board was viewed to have gone contrary to their principles 
of pursuing and securing the highest price possible for the stakeholders.736
The Court never considered the fact that the deal with Forstmann influenced a higher 
price  than  it  was  actually  achievable  in  addition  to  promoting  the  shareholder’  interests 
preventing the depreciating market for the notes.737
After Revlon board allowed the merger negotiations by the management or the buyout 
with the third party. This would translate that the entity was meant to be sold. This shows that the 
duty of the board had shifted from the preservation of the corporate entity to increasing the sale 
value of the company to maximise the benefits of the stockholders.   With respect to the Unocal 738
standards, the board’s responsibilities were substantially altered. 
Threats  relating  to  the  effectiveness  and  corporate  policy  or  to  the  interests  of  the 
stakeholders were no longer there. The issue of defensive measures remained questionable. The 
role of the directors shifted from being the defenders of the organisation to auctioneers that were 
required to achieve for the most  favourable sale price for the stakeholders.  It  is  logical  that 
Revlon does not need an auction. The only mandate on Revlon is that the shareholders should be 
free to choose between the two transactions. According to Allen, the most predominant actions 
are a “change in corporate control” and are they acting in good faith for the maximum price for 
the stakeholders.739
Anderson, Ronald C., and David M. Reeb. "Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the 736
S&P 500." The journal of finance 58.3 (2003): 1301-1328.
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According to the Revlon board, their actions were in good faith this meant the protection 
of the shareholders since the considerations of other companies are allowed by Unocal. Usually, 
it is not appropriate to have such concerns for the interests of the non-stockholders during an 
ongoing auction with active bidders. The main objective is not protection of the enterprise but 
acquiring the best price from the highest bidder.
The Court declared that the Revlon board completed the critical bidding contest in an 
unfavourable manner. This led to the failings of not only the Revlon board but also that of the 
Unocal. It continued to outline that stopping the bidding process and the directors acting for their 
own security cannot be the required conduct expelled from directors of Unocal.  This means 740
that duties are created by Revlon, which is also viewed as ‘enhanced Unocal duties’.
Justice Andrew G.T. Moore made the following opinion
When an action is being considered as claims for fiduciary duties, it may be handled under three 
phases. The three levels as declared by the Court in Golden Cycle are the stringent standard of 
entire fairness, the Revlon or Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard and the deferential business 
judgment rule.741
The  deferential  standard  which  is  the  initial  one  is  also  the  business  judgment  is 
frequently applied in the Delaware corporate law in its duty care.  In this case, a legal body 742
 Craig W. Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of Directors' Duties in Delaware: The Rules of the 740
Game (Part II), 42 Vill. L. Rev. 1043, 1066 (1997).
 Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, No. CIV.A. 16301, 1998 WL 892631, at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998) (mem.)741
 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 299-300 742
(1999) ("In practice the duty of care is all but eviscerated by a legal doctrine known as the "business judgment 
rule.'")
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referred to as the business judgment rule completes the duty of care. Also viewed as the default 
standard (where the facts are required to show why this level of review should be ignored). With 
respect to the business judgment, the directors had acted with a view of sufficient information in 
good faith and were truly concerned that their actions would be for the best interest of the entity. 
This was also an overview of how the business judgment behaves and the duties of a director 
under its rule. It can be concluded that the business judgment can be based on more than just the 
inquiry process.
With  respect  to  the  Unocal  and  Revlon  standards,  the  court  inquiry  stated  that  the 
directors were required to prove they had reasonable grounds for their decisions, in addition to 
indicating reasonable grounds behind their beliefs.743
The Unocal standard deals with the affirmation of defensive tactics from the target board 
in  addition  to  logically  reviewing  an  actual  corporate  proportionality  and  threat.  By 744
demonstrating their independence, being well informed and their actions based on good faith the 
board can be perceived as materially advanced. Revlon’s duties can be perceived to be influenced 
by  ‘change  in  control’  and  need  to  be  logical.  The  logic  standard  should  be  based  on 
independence  of  the  board,  while  being  careful  that  the  information  being  used,  during  the 
negotiations should in good faith and the best value for the stakeholders. Finding the best value 
for the stakeholders do not necessarily require an auction based on the situation.
Fairness may entirely stand where most directors to verify the transaction are interested or where 
most  stockholders  agree  with  an  alternative.  If  directors  are  present  on  both  sides  of  the 
transaction,  then they can be assumed to be interested or  in  case they are  expectant  of  any 
 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) and Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 743
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financial  benefits  with  respect  to  self-dealing  rather  than  benefits  encompassing  even  the 
company.745
The corporate board is required to show total fairness by proving that the transactions are 
positive for the shareholders in terms of both a fair price and fair dealing. Subsequent cases of 
Paramount v QVC and Paramount v Time  involved the same issue, where the board takes 746
on the duty of the Revlon which is auctioning the company and neglect defensive measures that 
were appropriate under Unocal. As per the law of Paramount v QVC and Paramount v Time, 
directors of the company are not allowed or given the authority to present favouritism to the 
shareholder by providing them profit on a long term corporate plan.747
On  a  wide  view  of  the  scrutiny  standard  of  judicial  review  that  has  recently  been 
discussed in Moran v Household International Inc.  There was a major academic debate that 748
emerged due to the Revlon opinion. This was based on what should be in order to utilise the 
Revlon. There are still questions on the issue regarding the degree to which the doctrine has been 
applied in  the traditional  duty of  care.  This  is  in  relation to  ownership transactions  such as 
mergers and how it relates to the Unocal test that was earlier applied to the defensive action of 
 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) 745
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the board, in order to clear a hostile acquisition bid. It was applied recently in the dealing of 
protection devices that are present in the merger covenants.749
The Revlon doctrine is still persistent despite the expansion of the Revlon and the fact 
that it is nearly two decades since it was decided. What was expected is that there was some 
assurance for the practitioners that change of control and cash mergers after the outcome of the 
principles declared by Revlon that would enhance closer judicial scrutiny in relation to the vast 
judicial deference, which was early, perceived as appropriate and typical. It is in this manner that 
the board verifies the provisions that hinder it from hearing from any lucrative offers that may 
emerge in the middle of the merger deal in addition to presenting it for shareholder approval. The 
actions of the board that have not made substantial efforts to obtain the best possible price will be 
scrutinised  by  the  courts.  Recently,  Delaware  litigation  considered  the  standing  of  an 
independent board, which hindered negotiations with another bidder that offered higher terms 
after the initial deal had been signed.750
4.3.6 White Squire
In this defence, it is perceived that the target company offers shares to a friendly party 
who not only wishes the company to operate independently but also operate with a management 
that is familiar with him/her. The number of shares issued to the friendly party greatly depends 
on a number of different circumstances. The actual purpose of the transfer of shares is to prevent 
the bidder; the issue does not actually represent a higher proportion of the share capital in the 
 Sudarsanam, P. S. "The role of defensive strategies and ownership structure of target firms: Evidence from UK 749
hostile takeover bids." European Financial Management 1.3 (1995): 223-240.
Loderer,  Claudio,  and  Kenneth  Martin.  "Executive  stock  ownership  and  performance  tracking  faint 750
traces." Journal of Financial Economics 45.2 (1997): 223-255.
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target company.  It  is worth noting that regardless of the intentions of the transactions, the 751
shareholders  must  approve such an action in  order  to  take  effect.  It  follows that  the  power 
conferred upon the directors of the target company to allocate the shares must be pursued for the 
right purpose and should not serve the self-interest of the directors.752
The  friendly  investor  in  this  defence  tactic  does  not  have  any  intention  of  gaining 
majority control in the target company.  The aim is to assist the company under threat to evade 753
attempts by potential hostile bidders from taking control of the company. As mentioned earlier in 
the white knight defence, the white squire also has a similar objective and is conducted in the 
same way. However, the distinctive factor in the white squire defence is that it purchases a large 
volume of the minority stock of the target company and does not gain control of the voting 
power  of  the  company.  The  transaction  is  solely  meant  to  help  the  company overcome the 
takeover bid by the unfriendly bidders. Both the white knight and white squire share the similar 
purpose of  rescuing the  target  company from the threat  of  takeover  by hostile  bidders.  The 
difference is that the white knight assumes the control of the company to drive off the potential 
bidder.754
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4.3.7 Litigation
This  is  a  common  anti-takeover  defence  which  has  the  target  company  filing  court 
proceedings  against  the  aggressive  acquirers.  The  target  company’s  board  should,  therefore, 
identify any breaches of security laws and regulations. The court proceeding can considerably 
prolong the period before a takeover and thus the target company can utilise the time to solicit 
competing bids or alternatively formulate other defences.755
Paramount Communications, Inc. v Time Incorporated Fed Sec L Rep  represents a US 756
case  that  deals  with  defences  against  acquisitions  and  mergers  in  Delaware.  Warner 757
Communications and Time Inc. intended to merge. Time intended that its HBO channel to get 
expand its TV operations with the help of Warner Communications. An offer of $200 per share 
was made by Paramount to all the shareholders starting from $175. Time had its shares trading at 
$120. This is in addition to many defences such as a staggering board where their deadline for 50 
days was hard to have met for any motion and a plan for a poison pill with a 15% enhancer. 
They, however, went further with the Paramount threat. Other than having it as a stock for stock 
merger they instead had a leveraged purchase transaction.  There was a requirement by the 758
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NYSE that any transactions of 20% of the shares would require approval by the shareholders. By 
changing this structure, it meant that the shareholders would not necessarily be informed.
Shareholders never supported the idea of following through with the merger and would 
have wished for a continuation of Paramount’s cash out an offer. 
Chancellor Allen in his judgement stated that, “I note parenthetically that plaintiffs in this 
suit dismiss this claim of ‘culture’ as being nothing more than a desire to perpetuate or entrench 
existing management disguised in a pompous, highfalutin’ claim… I am not persuaded that there 
may not be instances in which the law might recognise as valid a perceived threat to a ‘corporate 
culture’ that is shown to be palpable… distinctive and advantageous”.759
4.3.8 People pill
There are businesses or industries that are unique in the sense that they require hi-tech 
skills to operate and this limited number of individuals is critical to the success of the company. 
In such corporations, the management boasts of its input and uses it as acre tool in resisting a 
takeover bid. It happens in such way that the target’s entire management unanimously threatens 
to quit or resign in an event of a hostile take-over. This leaves the impending raider in a very 
volatile condition; it cannot risk losing the management as these are critical to any post-merger 
success. The people pill defence is rarely used and is common in hi-tech industries.760
 Paramount Communications, Inc v Time Incorporated Fed Sec L Rep  (CCH) 94, 514; affd 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 759
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4.3.9 Jonestown Defence or Suicide Pill
This  is  unique defence tactics  that  involve the target  firm involving in activities  that 
might eventually destroy the future survival of the firm, instead of warding off the hostile bidder. 
It can be said to be an extreme kind of poison pill and also referred to as “suicide pill”.  The term 
Jonestown  trivially  refers  to  the  1998  Jonestown  massacre  in  Guyana  in  which  Jim  Jones 
influenced the members of a religious cult (People Temple) have a group suicide.761
The Jonestown Defence is normally the most extreme of the defence strategies that can 
be  considered.  Among  others  are;  Crown  Jewels  strategies  (which  involve  selling  off  the 
attractive assets at discounted to other potential buyers except of the bidder), share buybacks 
(where the prices of the stocks are raised while the public equity is reduced at the expense of 
cash or debt financing), and any other than in the matching trend of threatening the target itself. 
The difference between Jonestown strategies and the ordinary strategies is not wide though the 
fact it is extremely detrimental to the target firm. Companies that have gone for this strategy have 
found themselves insolvent and thus incapacitated to deter any further.  This is driven by the 762
fact that the target firm lowers the price of the company’s assets such that without remaining 
intangible assets like a brand name or other intellectual property that might be of need to the 
bidder, the acquisitions and mergers of such firms are devastating. 
4.3.10 A staggered board of directors or classified board
Unlike in firms where all the board of directors are granted one year term, a staggered 
board of directors’ or ‘classified board’ is an unusual system and commonly implemented in the 
 Read more:  <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/j/jonestowndefence.asp#ixzz1kgzfaBJw> accessed 24 March 761
2015
 More on: <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/j/jonestowndefense.asp#ixzz1kgzisLz9> accessed 24 March 2015762
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United States. It requires that only a section of the board of directors (quite often a third) of a 
company are elected in every tenure and restructuring the entire board of director.  The term 
classified is attributed to the fact that the board of directors of a firm in the type of strategy is 
divided into specific groups identified as ‘class’ and the classes can be ‘Class I’, ‘Class II’ and so 
forth.763
These classify boards have a high tendency of complicating or rendering the of publicly 
listed companies unachievable. In order that the aggressive acquirer gains control of the target 
firm in a takeover when a board is staggered, it has to ensure that it wins not less than one proxy 
fight  at  consecutive  shareholder  meetings.  In  the  United  States  corporations,  a  duet  of  the 
classified board that cannot be restructured and poison pill forms one of the best prospective 
defence strategies.764
In spite of its relevance, anti-classified boards activists, most especially the institutional 
shareholders have consistently fought against  having a staggered board of directors,  in other 
words calling for declassification. According to a report by the Wall Street Journal in January 
2007, the year 2006 marked the transition towards declassification or annual votes on the entire 
board of directors. The metrics revealed that about more than half (55%) of the Standard and 
Poor’s  500  companies  had  the  un-staggered  boards  of  directors  exceeding  the  47%  of  the 
previous year, 2005.765
 Faleye,O., 2007, Classified Boards, Firm value, and Managerial Entrenchment, Journal of Financial Economics 763
83, 501-529. 
 Lucian Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered 764
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887 (2002). 
 Jared A. Favole, "Big Firms Increasingly Declassify Boards", The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10, 2007.765
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In the same manner, the staggered board effect is felt in the election of U.S. Senators, 
members of the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C) and other public organs. It is in 
such that control of representative bodies by the represented bodies is limited. This means that 
the principals (that could be shareholders, voters, and the president) have restricted power over 
the agents that might be board of directors or the Senate or even the S.E.C among others.
As much as the hostile takeovers are rare,  the election of agents (board of directors) 
continues as usual, especially by the classified system.  Even so, the agents of the staggered 766
board of director are intended to represent and protect the interest of shareholders like the other 
board, besides deterring hostile takeovers. Consequently, the premiums due for shares as a result 
of takeovers may reduce as a result of the staggered board of directors and thus the evolution of 
conflict between the board and the principals (shareholders).  Provided the company is operating 
securely,   the staggered board is considered to offer continuity in high achieving leadership. 
In a study conducted by professors from Harvard and Wharton, 24 governance 
systems were evaluated as to how they influenced their shareholders’ value. It was established, 
that  those  systems  that  protect  and  foster  the  shareholder's  rights  have  a  high  tendency  of 
increasing share price, while those that favour the management just like the staggered board are 
associated with the erosion of shareholder’s value.767
Generally, one can conclude that with pressure from institutional investors, there has been 
a remarkable down-turn in the percentage of the companies that still cling on staggered board of 
directors. For instance, in the Standard and Poor’s 500, just 34 % have classified boards. In line 
with the Risk Metrics, 79 of the publicly listed companies have considered declassification in 
Maseko, Nelson. "Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights Protection."766
 Jared A. Favole, "Big Firms Increasingly Declassify Boards", The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10, 2007.767
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their  2008 elections.  It  also worth mentioning that  there were 54 companies that  sponsored, 
proposals in 2007 and another 72 in 2006.768
4.4 Mushrooming Takeover defence tactics
In every aspect of corporate governance, there are emerging issues that may seem hard to 
deal with using the apparent resources and tools. Just like in corporate governance, takeovers are 
evolving into complex game plans that require more and convoluted resolutions to handle them. 
As much as the available defence tactics, both the pre-takeover and post-takeover defences like 
litigation,  white  knight,  Pac man,  and golden parachutes among others  have been proven to 
work.  The gaps left in the world regarding the takeovers are the rationale for the mushrooming 769
of defence tactics. After a critical analysis of the available defence tactics and the situation in 
both England and the US, insights of effective and efficient defence systems evolved. They were 
basically  three  in  which  two,  ‘star  defence’ and  ‘intact  defence’ were  pre-takeover  defence 
strategies while the last one; ’No retreat’ was a post-takeover defence strategy.770
4.4.1 Star defence
In the face of advance corporate governance, it goes without saying that efficient and 
effective management is the key to success in defeating acquisitions. It calls for leadership styles 
McArthur,  Jerie.  "Mergers  and  acquisitions:  the  human  factor."  Handbook  of  Business  Strategy  1.1  (2000): 768
217-223.
Bradley,  Margaret  M.,  et  al.  "Emotion  and  motivation  I:  defensive  and  appetitive  reactions  in  picture 769
processing." Emotion 1.3 (2001): 276.
HERBERT, A. EINHORN. "Takeovers and Freezeouts." (1979): 2021-2028.770
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that  have  the  desired  high  output  required  by  the  stakeholders.  As  such,  the  democratic 
leadership style and corporate governance should be examined to see what it ultimately realises. 
Indeed,  with effective and efficient  management,  unwanted misfortunes may be kept  at  bay, 
including the risk of takeovers. It is worth recognising the ‘star defence’, which is a pre-takeover 
defence strategy as one of the best strategies that can be adopted.771
 Nonetheless, prevention is a better cure. Takeovers on the side of offerees are often than 
not  associated  with  failed  management  systems;  linked  to  bankruptcy,  failed  planned 
investments, credit-worthiness and poor adoption of defence strategies. Although these vices are 
manageable,  they are not easy to avoid without a ‘star’ management system. This forms the 
rationale behind the star defence system. The rationale is that good management will ultimately 
ensure by their actions that the share price is maintained at a high level, making the company 
more expensive and ultimately more difficult for the prospective bidder to take over. 772
In the absence of an effective management system, the concerned firm is  exposed to 
failures resulting from inferior anti-takeover defence strategies, mismanagement, failed planned 
investment  and  credit  unworthiness.  This  is  illustrated  in  the  figure  below,  which  describes 
briefly the stages of a takeover developing.773
Figure: illustration on how a target firm becomes vulnerable to takeovers in the absence of ‘star’ 
defence 
Rezzolla, Luciano, et al. "The missing link: merging neutron stars naturally produce jet-like structures and can 771
power short gamma-ray bursts." The Astrophysical Journal Letters 732.1 (2011): L6.
Springel,  Volker,  Tiziana Di Matteo, and Lars Hernquist.  "Modelling feedback from stars and black holes in 772
galaxy mergers." Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society361.3 (2005): 776-794.
 Ibid pp. 57773
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Considering the structure of this defence system, it adopts a multi-strategy approach in 
which there is some outlined ‘star’-splendid rules that have to be adhered to by the operating 
management.774
The strategies are:
•   Ensuring a democratic governance of the corporations
Carbonell, Jaime G., and Ralf D. Brown. "Anaphora resolution: a multi-strategy approach." Proceedings of the 774
12th conference on Computational linguistics-Volume 1. Association for Computational Linguistics, 1988.
Stage 1: 
Stage 2:The 
firm is   
Stage 3:The firm 
has regained 
Credit unworthiness 
(bankruptcy and debts)
Failed planned 
investment
     ManagementInferior Anti-
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• Close monitoring and periodic evaluation of the company’s credit-worthiness. 
• Installing ‘golden parachute’ techniques into the charter
• Engaging in diversified long-term and beneficial investments
Ensuring democratic governance of the corporations
Despite,  the minority’s shareholders attitude of disinterest  in the company or “laissez 
fare” kind of role, the agent’s ability to enforce democracy in the operation of the company 
should prevail.  Whether the execution of the board is formed by the major shareholder or not, 775
democracy should be the sense of credibility and integrity upon which the company bases its 
service to the stakeholders. Research in this area to determine which leadership style is effective, 
the democratic leadership style has been considered the most effective. In line with preventing 
take-overs, good leadership styles are capable of ensuring that effective management results in 
the long-term financial viability of the company.776
Even though democracy is practised within the company, it is limited in the sense that 
some aspects may be ignored. The interests of the minority shareholders are rarely protected. 
Most of the corporations that have not yet considered this in their charter, and they should make 
an effort to act. In this way, democracy also helps trim down the conflicts between the agents and 
the  principals  of  a  company.  This  indeed is  a  good move towards  fostering good corporate 
governance in all the company’s transactions. 
Clapp, Jennifer, and Doris A. Fuchs, eds. Corporate power in global agrifood governance. MIT Press, 2009.775
Jensen,  Nathan M. "Democratic  governance and multinational  corporations:  Political  regimes and inflows of 776
foreign direct investment." International organization 57.3 (2003): 587-616.
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Close monitoring and periodic evaluation of the company’s credit-worthiness and levels of bad 
debts.
The way a company runs its business has considerable implications on its credit-worthiness. 
This is to say that credit-worthiness of a firm is such a vital tool it has, to save it when in crisis. 
Beside  other  roles,  the  company’s  management  should  considerably  control  the 
company’s cash flow cycle. In simple terms, the firm should always try to settle its differences in 
cash  flows  with  other  corporations.  In  the  long  run,  this  will  help  improve  the  company’s 
reputation. 777
Introducing ‘golden parachute’ techniques into the charter
Within  the  company’s  charter,  clauses  defining  the  management  redundancy  package 
should be  included.  In  spite  of  that,  they should set  high enough that  would deter  a  viable 
aggressive offeror. One might controversially question the rationale of golden parachute in the 
context  of  poor  management.  Star  defence is  a  democratic  takeover  defence,  there  is  a  low 
probability of having poor management and therefore the logic of antagonists is beaten.778
This mechanism actually entails changing the firm’s clauses to contain benefits for the 
management and executive in the event of a takeover. As much as the benefits are intended to 
ward off takeovers by making the acquisition cost high. The management and the shareholders 
should ensure it  avoids infringing the takeover laws. One such infringement includes annual 
reasonably extreme measure to prevent takeovers from materialising. In normal situations, this 
Lane, Christel. "Changes in corporate governance of German corporations: convergence to the Anglo-American 777
model?." Competition & Change 7.2-3 (2003): 79-100.
Haggerty, Joseph F. "Golden Parachute Agreements: Cushioning Executive Bailouts in the Wake of a Tender 778
Offer." . John's L. Rev.57 (1982): 516.
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mechanism is implemented when a firm is impending a sale. This is not the case in this strategy 
as it is to implement at the early stages even before any kind of offer is announced. The major 
difference with its usual application is that the firm would be abetter position and not threatened 
by a sudden announcement of an unwanted takeover.779
Unlike  in  the  real  golden  parachute  defence  mechanism where  it  is  implemented  to 
primarily defend the management and the executive from the anticipated change of control and 
eventual dismissal.  In star defence, it is solely meant for the well-being of the firm. Golden 
parachutes  are  reportedly common in the U.S system.  They have been proved to  be better 
strategies that drive away prospective bidders. The unwanted aggressive takeovers are kept at 
bay through the extension of lucrative financial and extreme benefits to the management and 
employees. They ensure that the management initiates employment contracts between the board 
of directors and the employees so as to raise their post-employment compensation in the event an 
unfriendly acquisition. In so doing, the target firm is left attractive to the potential offers owing 
to  the  vast  pay-outs  that  may  follow the  dismissal  of  the  operational  management  and  the 
employees, which additionally may destabilise the firm.780
4.4.2 Harmony with the English regulations
In consensus with the fact that this new defence strategy is designated for England, all 
measures have to be considered to ensure the yet to implemented strategy does not violate any of 
the regulations of the takeover. Being that the City Code oversees English takeovers, the strategy 
should match with the provisions of the City Code and where it does not match probably file for 
Ryan, Patrick J. "Corporate Directors and the Social Costs of Takeovers--Reflections on the Tin Parachute." Tul. 779
L. Rev. 64 (1989): 3.
Broughman, Brian. "CEO Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions." BYU L. Rev. (2017): 67.780
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an amendment. Similarly, for those publicly listed firms and private firms that operate in the 
regulated market, it should be considered and therefore indicate that the new defence has also to 
comply with the European Union Directive 2004/EC.
In summary, the star defence strategy should have six principles of the City Code in 
itself. First and foremost, in totality, it has to ensure that all the holders of shares or parts of the 
stock of the same class are given equal treatment. Moreover, when a firm is taken over, the others 
holders of securities must be protected. Secondly, it spells out that in the case of a merger or 
acquisition, the individuals possessing securities in a target firm must have adequate time and 
relevant information to allow them to reach a well-informed decision on the bid. The board of 
director is held accountable to the shareholders regarding the effects of implementation of the bid 
on employment, terms of employment and locations of the firm’s business places.781
Thirdly, the board of directors of a target firm are expected to act in the interest of the 
company as a whole and do not deny the holders of securities the opportunities of influencing a 
bid especially based on its merits. Fourthly, false markets are not expected in the securities of the 
target firm and as the bidder or any other concerned firm such that the increase or decrease of the 
securities  turns out  to be artificial  and thereby interfering with the normal operations of  the 
market. The fifth principle requires the acquirer to announce an offer only when they are sure 
Ibid pp. 54
 Ibid pp 56781
 245
they  can  meet  the  full  cash  consideration  together  with  the  implementation  of  any  other 
consideration.782
Lastly, a target firm must be deterred in its operations for longer that are reasonable by a 
bid for its securities. Through  its  formally  created  timetable,  the  City  Code  recognises  that 
making  a  takeover  offer  may  disrupt  the  normal  business  activities  of  a  target.  The  City 
Code,therefore, lays down time limits governing the overall period of an offer and the different 
stages within it. These rules have to be incorporated into the offer document as contractual terms 
of the offer.
Merits 
(i) It is a multi-strategy approach. Therefore, strong enough to ward off aggressive hostile 
takeovers
(ii) The performance of the firm is high throughout
(iii)  The firm has a good reputation hence the need to raise the negotiations during a takeover
(iv) The management and the executive staff are well taken care of in the corporations charter
(v) The rights of the minority shareholders are taken care of 
(vi) It is associated with democratic leadership style which is a basis for good management 783
Harrison, Jeffrey S., Hugh M. O'Neill, and Robert E. Hoskisson. "Acquisition strategy and target resistance: A 782
theory of  countervailing effects  of  pre-merger  bidding and post  merger  integration."  Advances  in  mergers  and 
acquisitions. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2000. 157-182.
 Ibid pp 49783
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Demerits
(i) It  may seem cumbersome to apply it  entirety, that is to say, all  its constituent 
strategies
4.4.3 Intact defence
It  is  obvious  that  hard  work,  effective  and  efficient  management  will  reduce  the 
likelihood of  an  unwanted takeover,  especially  where  the  bidder  may have limited  financial 
resources. Challenges may materialise that are difficult to comprehend and thus leading to the 
company  being  vulnerable  to  a  takeover.  Therefore,  to  install  mechanisms  that  protect  the 
interests of the principals (the shareholders) and the agents (managers), the board should not 
hesitate to act. This actually describes the ‘intact defence’, which can be said to post the ‘star 
defence’ strategy. 
The clauses  in  the  corporate  charter  are  modified in  such a  way that  changes in  the 
management are not welcomed. Besides, those that protect the interest of the shareholders are 
given more weight. In this way, the objectives of the firm are maintained even after the takeover. 
The  firm  is  precisely  meant  to  benefit  its  stakeholders  and  protects  its  shareholders  from 
unnecessary losses. 
This kind of mechanism ensures that even in the event of a takeover, the shareholders and 
the management benefit from the resulting deal.
When the shareholders are not protected, eventually, the firm collapses and ends up being 
another firm’s property.784
 Ibid 46784
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Merits
(i)  It is more appropriate for firms with unique products and rare expertise
(i) There are no major losses incurred by the management and the shareholders.
(ii) Equal protection of the shareholders both the minority and the majority shareholders
Demerits
(i) It may paralyse the smooth running of the firm in the future should it takeover go 
through.
4.4.4 No retreat
It is better to be late than never or rather to have a half a loaf than none. In this post take 
over technique, the target company’s management fights to the last drop of its strength. Loyal, to 
the  shareholders  both  the  minority  and  the  majority,  it  fights  to  secure  their  interest  of  the 
stakeholders after an occurrence of a takeover bid.   
Demerits 
(i) May face a lot of friction from the government because it likes an attempt to deter 
a takeover.
4.4.5 Most recent English cases on takeover defence tactics
There are three most used defence tactics, which companies mostly use to fend off any 
attempts by other companies to place a bid on acquiring them. These include the white squire 
defence,  employment of restructured voting rights and thirdly the use of “poison pills.” The 
white  squire  defence  tactic  involves  the  target  company selling  out  shares  to  a  legal  entity 
referred to as the “white squire” that holds a permanent position in the company and is normally 
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under the control of the company’s Board of Directors. For instance, in the acquisition of OpSec 
Security Group Plc by Orca Holdings Limited,  by allowing Orca to own 99,024,992 shares, 
which translates to 81.7 %, OpSec could not employ the white squire defence as it had already 
lost a majority of shares.785
The acquisition of John Swann by H7H is another form, thereby allowing the sale of 
shares; the company did not have any defence tactic that it could use. In this case, John Swan and 
Sons agreed on a £8.2 million with an alternative of selling shares. In this case, the acquisition 
was successful since the offerees agreed to take the money.  In the merger between Paddy 786
Power and Betfair, shareholders of the Paddy Power, have acquired 52% of the shares in the 
company as  they would  effectively  be  able  to  deter  any parties  that  would  be  interested  in 
placing the bid as they already had a majority.787
Restructured  voting  rights  are  another  defence  tactic  in  which  voting  rights  of  the 
company are sold to hands that are considered to be safe or friendly.  For instance, in the 788
acquiring of Chime Communications plc by Providence Equity Partners, the shares were sold to 
Providence  Equity  Partners  and  WPP.  Chime  thus  considered  Providence  to  be  a  safe  and 
<http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/AN_1443622350653642300/opsec-security-confirms-no-formal-785
takeover-from-orca-yet.aspx> accessed 27 December 2015
<http://www.n1singer.com/john-swan-sons-plc-approves-8-2-million-recommended-cash-acquisition-share-786
alternative-subject-scale-back-hh-group-plc-hh/> accessed 27 December 2015 
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/08/paddy-power-and-betfair-merger-agreed>  accessed  27 787
December 2015
 Zarin, S., & Yang, E. Mergers & Acquisitions: Hostile takeovers and defense strategies against them. rapport nr.: 788
Management & Organisation  (2011). 11: 85.
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friendly  company  to  take  over  the  business.  In  this  case,  Providence  Equity  parted  with 
consideration of £374 million.789
In  the proposed acquisition of  Darty plc  by Groupe Fnac,  the board of  Darty plc  in 
evaluating the proposal but as a defence tactic, the board wants the company to retain the final 
dividend of  2.625 cents  to  be  delivered  to  the  shareholders.  In  the  acquisition  of  Alkane 790
Energy plc by Barbican Bidci Limited, the company board agreed to the offer since Barbican 
could be trusted with the share capital of Alkane. By doing this, the company locked out other 
prospective bidders whom it considered not so trustworthy.791
BG Group plc has adopted the “poison pill” defence tactic towards the Royal Dutch Shell 
plc offer of a £47 billion bid. The bid is still being evaluated and if BG considers Royal Dutch 
Shell bid not enough, it may raise the amount even further to make it unaffordable.792
In a similar case, Mitsui Sumitomo of Japan’s bid to acquire Amlin plc is projected to 
cost the firm over 500 billion yen. Only a few companies can finance a transaction or this size, 
which is a good tactic for fending off unwanted bidders.793
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/alliance-news/detail/1438328269257821800.html 789
accessed 5 January 2016
http://www.euroinvestor.com/news/2015/09/30/groupe-fnac-potential-acquisition-of-darty-plc/13227640  5 790
January 2016
<http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-news/market-news-detail/12501704.html>  5 791
January 2016
http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-approves-shells-takeover-of-bg-group-1441197626 5 January 2016792
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-07/mitsui-sumitomo-insurance-said-to-be-in-talks-to-acquire-793
amlin accessed 4 November 2015
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4.4.6 US Cases on Takeover Defence Tactics
From the early 1990s, there were two critical rulings of the Delaware Supreme Court 
clarifying roles of a targeted entity management board during a hostile takeover process, and 
covering probable anti-takeover actions. A significant case during this time was the Paramount 
Communications,  Inc.  v QVC Network,  Inc.  Here,  the case was about a proposed merger 794
between Paramount Pictures and Viacom. As a section of the contractual terms of the merger, 
Paramount consented to various defensive tactics, encompassing a no-shop clause, $100 million 
fees for the termination of the agreement and a lock-up choice on nearly 20 % of the plaintiff’s 
ordinary  shares  (common stock).  Nonetheless,  the  defendant  (QVC)  intervened  with  unique 
terms,  ordinarily  a  more  substantial  proposal  for  a  merger,  factored  on  cancellation  of  the 
defensive tactic.  The board of directors at Paramount rejected the situation of conducting an 
official  bidding procedure with  QVC, arguing that  it  was bound to  be inconsistent  with  the 
former’s contractual terms with Viacom. During the ruling, the court indicated that a board of 
directors must be in a position to justify a negotiated value during the opening of the tender and 
in case there are a few competing bids, all should be treated with fairness – arm length bargain. 
Accordingly, the board exercised its capacity to apply anti-takeover tactics such as buyouts or 
poison pill to frustrate possible contested takeovers, which has been applied within the range of 
reasonable legal means and not draconian methods.795
 Paramount Communications, Inc. v QVC Network, Inc 637 A.2d 34 (1994)794
Sneirson,  Judd  F.  "Green  is  good:  sustainability,  profitability,  and  a  new  paradigm  for  corporate 795
governance." (2008).
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4.5 Conclusion: The Takeover Defence Tactics
The takeover defence tactics or strategies refers to the measures taken by a target firm to 
either make a deal attractive and affordable to it or ward it off in case it is considered aggressive. 
The defence measures were categorised into major two categories depending on when they are 
implemented: the pre-takeover defence measures and the post-takeover defence measures. The 
pre-takeover defences were defined as those measures deployed prior to the announcement or 
acceptance of an offer, which involves the mechanism undertaken by the board of the target 
company in preparation for anticipation by the large company to present a takeover bid.796
J. Porter and H. Singh. An Empirical Analysis of the Motivation Underlying Takeovers in Australia.Social Science 796
Research Network Working Paper, (2007).p. 2.
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CHAPTER 5: Interests And Protection Of Minority Shareholders
5.1 Shareholders in Takeovers
A shareholder by definition refers to someone who owns shares in the company through 
which it  can depend on the size of their  shareholding and can influence company decisions. 
Generally,  shareholders  can  be  categorised  into  two,  namely  the  external  and  the  internal 
shareholders.797
In the daily operations of corporations, the external shareholders are never considered in 
the decision making processes and often fall victims of any inappropriate decisions made by the 
firms. During stormy periods, these external shareholders who may have a proportionately small-
holding are also known as the minority shareholders can be badly affected. Defined by the small 
proportion of shares they hold in the company, the minority shareholders are normally ignored in 
the event of takeover negotiations. The majority shareholders (including institutional investors) 
through their agents will defend their own interests and those of their agents. Eventually, the 
minority shareholders may be left in a vulnerable position. The minority shareholders may not 
agree or think that the decision of the directors and majority of shareholders leave them in an 
inequitable situation.798
5.2 Minority Shareholders in Takeovers
It  is  really  perturbing  to  understand  why  the  minority  shareholders  have  been  ill-
considered  in  many  instances  in  both  publicly  quoted  and  private  companies.  In  times  of 
Shleifer,  Andrei,  and  Robert  W.  Vishny.  "Large  shareholders  and  corporate  control."   Journal  of  political 797
economy 94.3, Part 1 (1986): 461-488.
Firth,  Michael.  "Takeovers,  shareholder  returns,  and  the  theory  of  the  firm."   The  Quarterly  Journal  of 798
Economics 94.2 (1980): 235-260.
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financial need, corporations will be expected to acquire more shareholders to raise their capital to 
boost their operations; they have the responsibility to both the minority shareholders just as much 
as the major shareholders. Actions of directors and majority shareholders are bound to ignite fear 
into  the  minority  shareholders  regarding  the  protection  of  their  investments.  The  minority 
shareholders are characterised by having no control over the company, illiquid shares and are 
entitled to residual claims.799
5.2.1 Least Control over the Company
As regards this issue of controlling the company, the minority shareholders have least 
control  in  narrowly  held  share  situations  in  private  companies.  In  contrast,  the  majority 800
shareholders have a controlling interest in the company and can direct actions. 
5.2.2 Illiquid Shares
Owing to the limited market for closed corporate shares of private companies, shares of 
the minority shareholders are normally regarded illiquid. There may be arrangements in place 
where the share has to be offered first to existing shareholders. But the question is at what price? 
This may be very disadvantageous to the minority shareholders.   In most of the occasions, the 801
Cronqvist,  Henrik,  and  Mattias  Nilsson.  "Agency  costs  of  controlling  minority  shareholders."   Journal  of 799
Financial and Quantitative analysis 38.4 (2003): 695-719.
Scharfstein, David. "The disciplinary role of takeovers." The Review of Economic Studies 55.2 (1988): 185-199.800
Yarrow,  George  K.  "Shareholder  protection,  compulsory  acquisition  and  the  efficiency  of  the  takeover 801
process." The Journal of Industrial Economics (1985): 3-16.
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minority shareholders are overlooked or ignored when strategic decisions are made concerning 
the benefits of the majority shareholders. 
5.2.3 Entitlement to Residual Claims
There are no clauses within a company’s incorporation documents that may protect the 
claims of the minority shareholders by defining their benefits.  The minority shareholders are 
without doubts entitled to get their claims in the event of liquidation once all other stakeholders 
protected  by  the  contract  laws,  statutes  and  government  legislation  are  settled.  These 
stakeholders whose rights of claims in the company are protected consist  of government tax 
owed, the executive, the employees, the suppliers, secured and unsecured creditors and debtors/
receivables.  They do not have to be included in the corporate governance whatsoever to be 
secure.  As residual risk bearers, the investments of minority shareholders can either appreciate 802
or depreciate or ultimately in the event of liquidation be worth nothing. Though, with correct 
corporate governance the minority shareholders should always be considered. 
Therefore,  in  order  to  implement  a  proper  corporate  governance  system,  institutions 
should be set up to defend the less fortunate shareholders, who have barely any means to defend 
themselves. This actually forms the basis for this chapter; modes and means should be put in 
place  to  protect  the  interest  of  the  shareholders  especially  in  circumstances  such  as  hostile 
takeovers as well as the friendly takeovers.803
Franks, Julian, and Colin Mayer. "Bank control, takeovers and corporate governance in Germany." Journal of 802
Banking & Finance22.10 (1998): 1385-1403.
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. "Takeover bids below the expected value of minority shares." Journal of financial and 803
quantitative analysis24.2 (1989): 171-184.
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5.3 Interest and protection of minority shareholders in takeovers
This chapter focuses on discussing the interests and protection of minority shareholders 
in  the  takeover  processes.  Takeovers  have  the  effect  of  adversely  affecting  a  number  of 
stakeholders, the most notable of which is the target and bidder companies, the employees of 
both thefirms, the management and the shareholders (both the major and minor shareholders) in 
both of the firms. Minority shareholders are in a disadvantaged situation in takeovers as the 
majority  shareholders  can  easily  ignore  their  rights  during  takeover  process.  The  majority 
shareholders  can also  be  eliminated from the  company even though they have the  rights  to 
oppose the management’s decisions on takeover defences and can reject completely.804
It therefore important for several corporations most especially the private limited firms 
with a small number of shareholders to be better prepared for potential and often fatal financial 
crisis that might arise. It is a necessity that firms should place strategies to prevent losing the 
support of their shareholders.  They should ensure that the price of shares in a quoted company 805
is  as  high  as  possible  as  this  makes  the  target  expensive  and  more  difficult  to  finance  the 
takeover. 
There are several limitations and disadvantages associated with losing shareholders in 
firms. Among others we have;
• The shareholders left behind might not be financially well-off to purchase the lost shares.
Hart,  Oliver.  "Corporate  governance:  some theory  and implications."  The economic  journal  105.430 (1995): 804
678-689.
Hirshleifer,  David,  and  Sheridan  Titman.  "Share  tendering  strategies  and  the  success  of  hostile  takeover 805
bids." Journal of Political Economy 98.2 (1990): 295-324.
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• The shares of deceased shareholders may end up being held by less or inexperienced 
hands of beneficiaries.
• Some or one of the competitors may end up purchasing the shares.
More often shareholder protection scheme has always provided firms with procedures 
that  have ensured the  smooth running of  their  operations  with  minimal  disruptions.  Besides 
continuity  in  operation,  it  has  fostered  their  ability  to  be  in  control.  The  major  benefits 806
associated with shareholder protections are;
• The sale of the firm’s shares to the competitor or aggressive parties is avoided.
• It allows for quick access to the funds by the dependents of deceased shareholders or 
critically ill.
• Fosters stability and continuity of the firm.
• Shareholder protection also allows for quick transfer of shares amongst the remaining 
shareholders at fair market price and tax efficient.
• It elevates the usage of funds, which are meant for far different activities.
• Each of the firm’s shareholders can have the policy to cover their amount of the shares 
among the ones the company owns.
5.3.1 Cases
The case Foss v Harbottle  involved Richard Foss and Edward Starkie Turton, who 807
were the two minority shareholders in Victoria Park. This company was established in 1835 to 
Pound, John. "The effects of antitakeover amendments on takeover activity: Some direct evidence." The Journal 806
of Law and Economics 30.2 (1987): 353-367.
 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189807
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purchase 180 acres of land near Manchester. After the company was incorporated by an Act of 
Parliament, the company became Victoria Park, Manchester. Later, the plaintiff indicated that the 
property of the entity had been misapplied and misappropriated and various mortgages were 
taken out inappropriately over the property of the company. The complainants asked that the 
accused parties be held accountable to the entity and that the court orders an appointment of a 
receiver. The defendants were the five directors of the company and the architect and the solicitor 
and also H Rotton, E Lloyd, T Peet, J Biggs, and S Brooks, in addition to various assignees of 
Westhead, Bryoms, and Adshead, who had been declared bankrupts.808
The Court dismissed the claim and maintained that when an offence is committed against 
the company by the directors, it is only the company that has a legal standing to lodge a suit. The 
court determined two rules. Initially, the court indicated the “proper complainant rule”, which 
indicates that a wrong committed against a company by only be vindicated by the company. 
Lastly, the “majority rule principle” that indicates that if the alleged offence can be verified and 
approved by a simple majority of members in a general meeting, the court has no jurisdiction 
over the matter.809
The  judgement  of  the  case  Foss  V Harbottle   emphasised  on  the  fact  that  only  the 
company would be sued if the directors are not implemented any law. In the judgement, Wigram 
VC highlighted the following aspects:
“The  Victoria  Park  Company  is  an  incorporated  body,  and  the  conduct  with  which  the 
Defendants are charged in this suit is an injury not to the Plaintiffs exclusively; it is an injury to 
 Nenova,  Tatiana.  "The  value  of  corporate  voting  rights  and  control:  A cross-country  analysis."  Journal  of 808
Financial Economics 68.3 (2003): 325-351.
 Ibid.809
 258
the  whole  corporation  by  individuals  whom  the  corporation  entrusted  with  powers  to  be 
exercised only for the good of the corporation. And from the case of The Attorney-General v 
Wilson (1840) Cr & Ph 1 (without going further) it may be stated as undoubted law that a bill or 
information by a corporation will lie to be relieved in respect of injuries which the corporation 
has suffered at the hands of persons standing in the situation of the directors upon this record”.810
Another case is  Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd.  Here,  the facts involve Mr 811
Greenhalgh who was a minority shareholder in Arderne Cinemas and was involved in a long 
court battle to stop the majority shareholder selling control. The company had two categories of 
shares: the first class with shares worth 10 shillings and the other with shares worth 2 shillings. 
The shares worth 10 shillings were sub-divided into two shillings shares and had a single vote. 
Since, Greenhalgh had the initial two shillings; he lost his control of the company.
According to the Articles of Association under clause 10, article (a), 
“No shares in the company shall be transferred to a person not a member of the company so 
long as a member of the company may be willing to purchase such shares at a fair value to be 
ascertained in accordance with sub-clause (b) hereof”.812
The entity altered its Articles through special arrangement at a general meeting that allowed 
existing shareholders to offer shares to members outside the unit. Thus, the majority shareholders 
needed to transfer his six-shilling shares each to another Mr Sol Sheckman worth five thousand 
pounds and his resignation from the board of directors. The judgment on the minority share issue 
held that rather than the plaintiff finding himself with a controlling stake, he is a position where 
Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189810
 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd (No 2) [1946] 1 All ER 512; [1951] Ch 286811
Ibid.812
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he has lost control of the company, and his rights are affected commercially. Lord Green MR 
also indicated that as a matter of law, he is unable to hold that, in view of the nature of the 
transactions, the rights are altered. Effectively, a right to have a single vote per share with the 
ordinary shares for the time offered include the new two shilling ordinary shares that result from 
the sub-division of the 10-shilling shares.813
In the judgement Lord Greene MR stated that, “ instead of Greenhalgh finding himself in 
a position of control, he finds himself in a position where the control has gone, and to that extent 
the rights… are affected, as a matter of business. As a matter of law, I am quite unable to hold 
that, as a result of the transaction, the rights are varied; they remain what they always were – a 
right to have one vote per share pari passu with the ordinary shares for the time being issued 
which include the new 2s ordinary shares resulting from the subdivision”.814
5.3.2 Interests and protection of minority shareholders in England
 Company law provided for very little power over the management of company affairs to 
minority shareholders.  Minority shareholders are protected by shareholder agreements and court 
actions in the case where their rights are violated. Shareholder agreements include controls on 
director’s  appointment,  borrowing,  expenditure,  profit  distribution,  and  exit  mechanisms. 
Minority shareholders can press for terms that protect them in this agreement.  The courts will 815
always give effect to this agreement whenever their rights are infringed. Shareholder right to 
apply to court in case of a dispute for “unfair prejudice” is covered under Section 994 of the 
Ibid.813
 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd (No 2) [1946] 1 All ER 512; [1951] Ch 286814
 Reese, William A., and Michael S. Weisbach. "Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listings in the 815
United States, and subsequent equity offerings." Journal of financial economics66.1 (2002): 65-104.
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Companies Act 2006.  If the company affairs are being conducted in a manner that a minority 816
shareholder feels that he/she is unfairly prejudiced, can make an application to court for the 
correction of the conduct. Unfair prejudice may occur where the company has failed to declare 
dividends, where majority shareholders collude to purchase the interest of minority shareholders 
without their consent at an under-value or undertaking any activity, which is not authorised by 
the  Articles  of  Association.  Derivative  actions  are  provided  for  under  Section  260  of  the 
Companies Act 2006.  A minority director may approach the court for an order prohibiting any 817
harmful  action  taken  by  the  directors  against  the  company.  Shareholders  including  minority 
shareholders may also petition the court under Section 122 of the Insolvency Act 1996 for the 
winding up of the company if they are aggrieved by any actions taken by the company.818
5.3.3 Minority shareholders and agency costs
The  position  of  external  minority  shareholders,  their  vulnerability  is  immeasurable. 
According to William Meckling and Michael Jensen, the costs are regarded as a clash of interest 
involving  the  “principal”  referring  to  the  stockholder  and  the  “agent”  corresponding  to  the 
managers.  Adolf Berle and Gardner in their 1932 work coined the “separation of ownership 819
 Flourentzou, C. L. N. Minority Shareholders: Applicability of unfair Prejudice.816
 “Companies  Act  2006."  Cabinet  Office.  http://www.  legislation.  gov.  uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents,  accessed4 817
(2006): 2013.
 Ibid.818
M. Jensen and W. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure”. 819
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 3, Issue 4, October 1976 pp 305-360 
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and control” in big public companies.   There arises a crisis in solving the interests of both 820
parties; the agents or rather the managers who are seeking their interests which are delegated by 
the  investors  and  principals  to  take  control  over  the  company  and  achieve  the  company’s 
objective of profitability (the shareholders ’interests).821
More often than not the equity investors in corporations are taken advantage of by the 
managers.  In  the  recent  cases  of  Tyco  and  Adelphia,  the  majority  shareholders  in  the 
management and control of the company, appropriate for themselves the assets of the company. 
These conflicting situations of interests have been for long known as ‘control rents ‘or simply the 
‘private benefits of the control’.822
Besides the manipulation of the company’s assets and claims, the majority shareholders 
who  comprised  of  the  organisation’s  management  carried  out  poorly  planned  and  adopted 
decisions. Wrong decisions may include wrong investments, which may result in major losses 
and misuse of the company’s funds. Considering the company’s performance, the firm is ranked 
amongst  the  poor  performers  and  reputation.  This,  in  the  long  run,  ends  up  affecting  the 
stakeholders more than the compensations for the control groups or managers.823
 A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Company and Private Property (New York)820
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1932).
Dang-lun, L. U. O., and T. A. N. G. Qing-quan. "Pyramid Structure, Ownership and Small Shareholders' Interest 821
Protection——Evidence  from  Listed  Companies  in  China  [J]."  Journal  of  Finance  and  Economics  9  (2008): 
132-142.
 Kristin  A.  Kennedy  "An Analysis  of  Fraud:  Causes,  Prevention,  and  Notable  Cases”.   University  of  New 822
Hampshire, 2012, pp 15 -20 
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It thus becomes an issue of concern that the interests and the benefits of the minority 
shareholders  should  be  protected.  As viewed by Jensen and Meckling,  the  agency costs  are 
ubiquitous and are recognisable; they can be regulated and balanced through some of the ways 
listed below: 
1. Legal rule which should to a limited degree, define and enact certain shareholder rights 
1. Effective incentive compensation
2. Board  of  directors  as  shareholders’ representative  should  have  the  powers  and  duties 
specified.
3. The market for corporate control allows for the sale of the company’s stock when poorly 
performing helping eliminate the incompetent management.824
5.3.4 Legal rule
Quite often than not, publicly listed companies are victims of poor performers coupled by 
the self-entrenchment of the company’s board of directors. In the process, both the majority and 
minority shareholders are the adversely affected. If that is not enough, the minority shareholders 
are  badly  placed  if  that  is  the  case.  This  is  attributed  to  the  fact  that  unlike  the  major 
shareholders, they have the least control in the operations of the firm.  Consequently, they are 
often ignored in the decision making process.825
M. Jensen and W. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure”. 824
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 3, Issue 4, October 1976 pp 305-360
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However, poor performance facilitated by a conflict of interest between the agents and 
principals. This explains the overwhelming pressure on the minority shareholders owing to their 
lack of control. 
5.3.5 Protection of Shareholders
U.S Legislation regarding conflict of interest
Originating from the common laws of trusts, the fiduciary duty concept has gained its 
application in corporate governance. It  forms the basic legal doctrine aimed at clarifying the 
position of  conflicting interests.  The officers  and directors  of  a  company are,  as  fiduciaries, 
entrusted with certain duties to the company and its shareholders. One of the major duties is the 
duty of loyalty.826
The  duty  of  loyalty  is  yet  to  have  a  wide  range  of  possible  application.  As  per  the 
moment, it has gained specification in-state company codes and court judgments. As noted in 
Scott, it is a viewer in the corporate context.
“One can postulate a continuum of situations involving conflicts of interest between controlling 
managers and owners, with the conflicts becoming less sharp (and perhaps the legal rules less 
useful). At one extreme would be outright theft, embezzlement, and misappropriation; without 
effective legal (usually criminal) sanctions in these cases, only the gullible would part with their 
money.  A  somewhat  less  transparent  form  of  achieving  the  same  end  is  the  self-dealing 
transaction  between  the  manager  and  his  firm.  By  buying  too  low or  selling  too  high,  the 
controlling party transfer’s wealth from the firm to himself, but the picture can be confused by 
intricate transactions in nonstandard assets or subject to varying degrees of price unfairness. 
Moore, Don A., et al. "Conflicts of interest and the case of auditor independence: Moral seduction and strategic 826
issue cycling." Academy of Management Review 31.1 (2006): 10-29.
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Enforcement becomes more difficult  but still  seems essential if  agency costs are to have any 
bound. The appropriation of corporate opportunities, excessive managerial compensation, and 
consumption of managerial perks can be still more judgmental, and probably the legal rules less 
effective, but the order of magnitude is also often less. And when one reaches conflicts highly 
intertwined with the regular operation of the business, such as excessive diversification, or self-
retention  by  less  competent  managers,  the  fiduciary  duty  of  loyalty  probably  offers  little 
protection”.827
Self-dealing transactions 
This is one of the major conflicts of interest situations that corporate law in the US now 
pays attention to. In most of the provisions, it is defined as 
“  a  transaction  between  a  company  and  one  or  more  of  its  directors  or  officers…or  an 
organisation in which one or more of its directors or officers are directors or officers, or have a 
financial interest”. 828
Such transactions need to be accepted by a vote of impartial directors or shareholders but 
subject to prior full  disclosure.  There are many faults in the regulation and they range from 
reliance on formalities to the inability to distinguish the “abuse of control” from the “abuse of 
trust”.829
 K. Scott, “The Role of Corporate Governance in South Korean Economic Reform,”827
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 10 (1998).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (2005).828
 Bratton, Kathleen A., and Kerry L. Haynie. "Agenda setting and legislative success in state legislatures: The 829
effects of gender and race." The Journal of Politics 61.3 (1999): 658-679.
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The major issue in a self-dealing transaction is that those who stand to benefit from it is 
in a position in the firm to determine its ultimate endorsement. The normal pre-supposition is that 
the two independent parties in a transaction should determine on the transaction after disclosure 
of their own non-interest. The setback of an abuse of trust transaction is that the management 
board has interests and private benefit in the transaction, which is not disclosed under agency law 
and which is not considered by the eventual decision maker. The ultimate decision is however 
given by the principals.  As a result:830
I. The rule, in the way it is stated, is so open that it entails a transaction between a firm 
and any person with an official position of an officer, either a subordinate or an external 
principal who has no influence in the decisions of the management and the board. There 
arises a problem; should an official with hidden agendas have an obligation to divulge 
the information to the Chief Executive.831
II. This  rule  is  narrow and  as  such  does  not  define  in  itself  the  terms  that  cover  the 
transactions involving a controlling entity that is not a constituent of the board such as a 
majority shareholder or  parent  company.  Courts  in an attempt to seal  this  gap have 
ended up considering the controlling shareholder as the fiduciary.
III. So  long  as  the  directors  are  not  benefitting  in  the  transaction  directly,  they  are 
considered as “disinterested”. This is in regardless of whether they have power over the 
selection and their continued presence on boards consisting of the benefiting members. 
The term “disinterested” does not have the same implication in attitudes and actions. It 
Breyer, Stephen. "On the uses of legislative history in interpreting statutes." S. Cal. l. Rev. 65 (1991): 845.830
 Ibid pp. 40831
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means that the consent demanded by law offers is not a guarantee that there would be an 
arm’s length negotiation.832
IV. The approval from the management is acknowledged irrespective of whether or not it 
comes from the shareholders with a considerable holding of shares in the firm. It does 
not take into consideration whether the person in control is a major shareholder or a 
dominant CEO. If that is the case then “formal approval” is likely to offer very weak 
protection.
V. The Justice in this kind of transactions is considered by some jurisdictions as a concern 
that  needs  to  be  addressed  especially  if  the  approval  has  been  obtained  from 
disinterested  shareholders  or  disinterested  board.  Evidence  that  the  self-dealing 
transaction  has  a  controlling  party  involved,  through  outside  and  independent 
legislation, the terms of the deal should be reviewed.  The various obvious forms of 
dealing transactions such as misappropriation and theft do not fall into this category. 
Thus can be handled by criminal  law through the imposition of  fines and penalties 
where the subject has been proved and culpable intent shown.833
Private  law actions  are  left  with  the  responsibility  of  recovering inappropriate  gains.  As 
outlined above, the faults in the legal rules have allowed the controlling individuals to influence 
the formal approval processes in favour of their interests. The degree to which the CEOs have 
exploited the corporate resources to further their own individual expenses has been the focus of 
considerable  attention  in  the  cases  of  John  Riga’s  and  Dennis   Kozslowski  in  Adelphia 
Martin,  Lisa  L.  Democratic  commitments:  Legislatures  and  international  cooperation.  Princeton:  Princeton 832
University Press, 2000.
Macey, Jonathan R. "Promoting public-regarding legislation through statutory interpretation: an interest group 833
model." Columbia Law Review 86.2 (1986): 223-268.
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Communications  and  Tyco  International  respectively.  John  Rigas  was  accused  by  the 834
prosecutors  for  making  the  firm  his  “personal  piggy  bank”  while  Dennis  Kozslowski  was 
accused of using the company as “his personal machine”. In spite of these cases concluding with 
the sentencing of  the CEOs,  the Security  Exchange Council,  and (SEC) emphasised on this 
subject  and  initiated  mandatory  disclosure  requirements  that  are  meant  to  clearly  identify 
prospective self-dealing abuse transactions.835
It  is  a lot  easier  and preferable that  a statue regulating to the self-dealing transaction be 
drafted and implemented. It should emphasise that the individuals with the “controlling power” 
compared with those merely occupying management positions.  The statute should provide a 836
defence that defending on the rationale of the transaction and not on the nature of the process 
(approval and disclosure).  In addition, it  should address the various needs of personnel with 
undisclosed interests. Even though, the legal provisions when necessary offer some protection to 
shareholders but they still fall short of full protection. This means that the courts have to deal 
with unjustness in the protection of shareholders.837
Kristin  A.  Kennedy  "An  Analysis  of  Fraud:  Causes,  Prevention,  and  Notable  Cases”.   University  of  New 834
Hampshire, 2012, pp 15 -20 
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United States (US) Enforcement of Rules of legal liability
Up until  now consideration has been given to the hindrances to corporate conflict  of 
interest  and  as  the  protection  against  such.  This  does  not  exclude  poor  performance  of 
investments made by the investors. If the legal rules are not effectively and efficiently put into 
effect,  there weakness and scope have no effect;  apart  from the influence they may have in 
maintaining morals.
In order to ensure an effective and efficient  enforcement of  the legal  rules,  there are 
several measures that have to be taken into account. First, the plaintiff must have full information 
disclosure of the putative violation. One source of such information is the disclosure rules, which 
are,  implemented  the  capital  market  requirements  on  disclosure  of  information  about  the 
performance  of  the  firm.  They play  a  secondary  role  in  highlighting  the  conflict  of  interest 
transactions deals by people in power. The financial press, outside counsels, accountants, and 
employees  whistleblowers,  amongst  others,  can  be  other  channels  through which  the  public 
authorities  can  be  acquainted  with  instances  of  “conflict  of  interest”  and  accounting  frauds. 
The  Sarbanes–Oxley  Act  of  2002  has  several  provisions  that  assist  these  channels  and  are 
intended to increase the chances of reporting the prospective violation to the boards.838
When awareness  does  not  help  to  correct  the  matter  within  the  firm,  the  conflict  of 
interests may be enforced through placing criminal sanctions violations. The prosecutors may be 
forced or  influenced to act  when;  the high ranking managers  are misappropriating corporate 
assets such as loans in spite of the warnings given or for personal expenses without the formal 
approval procedures of the board. Alternatively, when they make substantial profits from self-
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745838
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dealing transactions brought about by their inside knowledge as to how certain events might 
influence share prices. 839
In the U.S corporate environment, there are cases rising every day and the prosecutors 
with their  limited resources are not  able to handle these frauds and thefts.  They have given 
priority  to  other  crimes,  not  self-dealing  transactions.  Alternatively,  the  Security  Exchange 
Council (SEC) with its restructured staff still may not be in a position to handle every corporate 
transgression that is identified. The affected shareholders in defending their own interests are 
constrained by a number of issues; some practical while some are legal. The legal constraints 
arise when under the provisions of the law in the United States; the shareholders are not allowed 
to directly sue in order to recuperate losses attributed to insider conflict of interest. They are 
instead expected to file a “derivative suit”.840
The logic in these issues entails potential contravention of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
Where the fiduciary duties of directors and the officers belong to the firm as an entity, which is 
separate from its owners. It is therefore clear, that the firm is the one that is entitled to field a case 
against its insiders. The shareholders have to sue the company in order to have transgressing 
members of the management brought to book over the loss of reputation of the firm because of 
the violations.841
Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael S. Weisbach. Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: 839
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Since the board on behalf  of  the shareholders manages the activities  of  the firm, the 
shareholders have demanded that the board files an action on behalf of the firm. It is also worth 
noting, that in situations where there are sensible reservations as to whether the board is biased 
or not, under Delaware Law provisions, these demands have to be examined. Similarly, when the 
board is unwilling to address the demand regardless of the request from the shareholders, the 
shareholders are automatically refrained from pursuing the action. On the contrary, this can be 
made viable, a viable action when the refusal by the board is outside the protection of business 
rules. In essence that it undermines the resolutions to sue any of the insiders for the violation of 842
loyalty. Whereas, when a demand is excused like in case of the board constituents sharing in the 
conflict of interest transactions, the shareholders are allowed to proceed to raise a case.
In  these  particular  types  of  cases,  boards  are  allowed  to  appoint  special  litigation 
committees, which consist of disinterested or extremely new members who are then expected to 
carry out an investigation into the intrinsic worth of the action and see if it can be allowed to 
proceed. This resolution is subject to the scrutiny of a judicial system under various standards 
and  is  meant  to  address  the  constitution  of  the  committee  and  the  procedures  involved. 
Depending on whether the case is handled under Delaware laws or New York laws, it may give 
due attention to the shareholders’ case or not respectively.843
It  might  be  simplified,  but  the  synopsis  of  the  demand  requirement  inflicted  on  the 
derivative suits is an implication of the difficulty the shareholders failed by in bringing the case 
before the court, where the substance in contention can be ruled on at the trials. At every level, 
there is adequate time needed to allow for defensives to be put forward, appeals and delays. 
 Ibid 33842
Kerr,  Jeffrey,  and  Richard  A.  Bettis.  "Boards  of  directors,  top  management  compensation,  and  shareholder 843
returns." Academy of Management journal 30.4 (1987): 645-664.
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There  are  other  unusual  burdens  considered  under  this  class  of  action  the  current  reputable 
necessities for the petitioner, preparing a bond for defendant’s legal fees and as well imposing a 
demand on the other shareholders to allow the petitioner to start the action on their behalf. This is 
done to rationalize the purpose of securing action from being struck out without gain, and the 
issue is subject to a financial settlement.844
The eventualities reveal that the “derivative suits” are surely endangered species. The 
decisions may fall short of making the various vital distinctions required in the derivative suit. 
One, they do not identify the difference between care suits which may diminish the value and 
loyalty suits which are necessary for the protection of the shareholder's interests. Secondly, the 
difference  between  derivative  actions  in  opposition  to  external  management  indiscretion  in 
managing the organisation and against the insiders in which their elected counterparts are not 
trusted to oversee their conduct. The contemporary stand of the law has the shareholders with 
convincing reasons being able to advance towards bringing their grievances in way of direct 
actions. These actions are meant to justify their own rights, unlike the derivative actions, which 
are intended to assert the corporate rights.845
The loyalty violations have to be by way of derivative actions provided they are clearly 
stated. This is so owing to the fact to the fiduciary rights is considered as being owed to the firm. 
This has indeed lead to better procedures under securities laws, which create a private right of 
action, for the buyers and sellers of securities who may receive a recovery. In the course of the 
transaction, the real issue is the failure to reveal it in line with a number of securities transactions 
by the firm or insider and not the self-dealing transaction in itself. This type of action is not deal 
 Ibid pp 33844
Wiegand,  Shirley  A.  "Fifty  Conflict  of  Laws  Restatements:  Merging  Judicial  Discretion  and  Legislative 845
Endorsement." La. L. Rev. 65 (2004): 1.
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adequately with violations of fiduciary duty but does provide protection for some. Practical and 
legal  constraints  to  be  effective  and efficient  enforcement  of  shareholders  rights  need direct 
actions.  846
The Law about the Protection of Members of a Firm
The protection of members of a firm against unfair prejudice is found in Section 1265 of 
the Companies Act 2006. Sections 994 to 998 also restate Sections 459, 460 and 461 which 
provide for a resolution to situations in which the dealings of the firm are performed in a manner 
that  is  unreasonable  prejudicial  to  the  interest  of  its  own  interests.  Section  999  confers 
supplementary provisions in which an organisation’s constitution is changed. This Section makes 
certain that the updated firm’s articles, following a court order under Part 30 (Amending the 
Company’s  Articles),  are  registered  and  a  replica  of  the  court  order  is  distributed  with  the 
amendments incorporated into it.847
Generally,  Part  30  describes  the  provisions  for  the  protection  of  members  of  a  firm 
against  unfair  prejudice.  One of  the  main  provisions,  Section  994 a  company member  may 
initiate a petition. Under Subsection (1A) (1a), the removal of an auditor of the company from 
office is considered as unjustly detrimental to the interests of a section of a firm’s members. This 
may base on a divergence in opinions on audit procedures or accounting treatments or based on 
any other unacceptable basis.848
 Ibid 846
  Companies Act 2006 Sections 460 and 461, 994 to 998, 1265847
 Companies Act 2006, Part 30, Section 994 Subsection 1A, 1a and 1A,2848
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Petition as made by the Secretary of State
This is another instance in which a company can be separated from mismanagement. It 
involves a petition by the Secretary of State. It applies to a company in which the following 
presumptions have been made. First, the Secretary of State has acquired an inspector’s report as 
stated in under Section 437 of the Company’s Act of 1985. Secondly, when the Financial Service 
Authority or the Secretary of State has exercised his/her powers and authority in accordance with 
Sections 447 and 448 of the Companies Act 1985. Including the powers to demand information 
and document or have search warrants.  Thirdly, the Secretary of State or the Financial Service 849
Authority has exercised their powers in accordance with Part 11 of the Financial Services and 
Markets  Act  2000.  This  is  associated  with  powers  that  allow for  acquisition  of  information 
alongside  investigation.  Lastly,  when  the  secretary  of  state  has  been  given  a  report  by 
investigation bodies that he has been appointed or those by the Financial Services Authority 
under part 11 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.850
The Secretary of State may proceed with the petition to apply for an order if it occurs to 
him that the company is infringing on the law, when the company’s’ activities are carried in ways 
that are unreasonably prejudicial to that of its member as a whole or section of it. And also when 
there are an omission and or, actual or proposed activities of the company that is likely to be 
prejudicial.  The Secretary of State, in his decisions, may either decide to, present a petition to 
close the firm or sue the companies for the negligence of the hereby stated provisions or the 
two.851
 Companies Act 1985 sections 443, 447, 448849
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 part 11850
 Ibid851
 274
The term “company “can be used herein or for the purpose indebted to this section, refers 
to any corporate body that is bound to be closed as stated under the Insolvency Act of 1986. For 
the purposes of this section and in the other provisions of this Part, “company “means anybody 
corporate that is liable to be wound up under the Insolvency Act 1986.852
5.4 Conclusion.
In the discussion of takeovers, the major issue that arises is the plight of the minority 
shareholders. This chapter looked into the interest and protection of the shareholders in both the 
friendly and hostile takeovers. Takeovers have the potential to fundamentally affect a number of 
stakeholders, the most notable of which are the target and bidder companies, the employees of 
both firms, and the management and shareholders of both firms. Minority shareholders are in a 
disadvantaged  situation  in  takeovers  as  their  rights  could  be  easily  ignored  by  the  majority 
shareholders during takeovers.  They have been defined as members of a company with small 853
amounts of shareholders and with no voting rights; 
These minority shareholders are deprived of the influence in the company activities and 
thus are left hanging in a precarious position as to what is placed before them by the majority 
shareholders’ actions. In certain cases, the minority shares have a low value compared with the 
majority shares holdings, whereas there is no difference between the share types but rather a 
mere size of the shareholding. Mistreatments can largely be prevented and enforcing provisions 
that advocate for the equal treatment of the shareholders protects the minority shareholders.
In  addressing  the  plight  of  these  disadvantaged  groups,  this  research  analyses  the 
weakness  in  the  regulatory  regimes  within  England  and  the  U.S  takeover  systems.  It  has 
 Insolvency (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/2405 (N.I. 19)).852
 Ibid 853
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evaluated more causes of the mistreatment and even presented resolutions that can be enforced to 
protect the shareholders.
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CHAPTER 6: Comparisons between the English and US Systems In Takeover Bids Law.
6.1 Introduction
This chapter comprehensively and critically examines the takeover defences applied by 
both the US and English systems. It is worth mentioning that the law regarding takeovers as 
developed  in  the  English  system differs  in  substance  and  approach  as  compared  to  the  US 
systems. It is also important to note, that there are significant similarities existing between the 
two systems.  As examined in the earlier chapters, the regulations and control of takeovers 854
existing  in  different  countries  are  of  the  utmost  importance  given  the  rapid  increase  in  the 
corporate control markets in both countries. The major businesses are applying takeovers and 
mergers as strategies to expand and maintain their activities beyond the boundaries of their home 
countries. In the process of carrying out the takeovers or mergers strategies, there are numerous 
challenges and benefits to be faced and procedures need to be followed throughout the entire 
process.  It  is  vital  to  identify  the  various  stakeholders  that  are  affected  by  the  takeover 
transactions of a company such as the shareholders, directors and employees.855
This section of the research focuses on the English takeover system, particularly the self-
regulatory rules (The City Code) on takeovers that are administered by the Takeover Panel. The 
Takeover Panel has statutory powers to enforce and supervise the entire process of a takeover. 
This research also explores the application of the common law rules on takeovers in England and 
how the laws are enforced to control and govern the whole process of takeovers.  The statutory 856
Vyas, Vidhisha, Krishnan Narayanan, and A. Ramanathan. "Determinants of mergers and acquisitions in Indian 854
pharmaceutical industry." eurasian Journal of Business and economics 5.9 (2012): 79-102.
Henderson, William D. "From big law to lean law." International Review of Law and Economics 38 (2014): 5-16.855
Auer, Peter, ed. Code-switching in conversation: Language, interaction and identity. Routledge, 2013.856
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provisions and the Stock Exchange provisions for the takeovers in England are also examined in 
order to understand the set procedure for conducting the entire takeover process.857
In analysing the takeovers regulations in England, the study considers the fact that there 
is full disclosure of financial information to allow the bidder to consider its implications before 
taking any steps towards a takeover or merger.  Disclosure of financial information together 858
with providing information on service agreements or management control, issuing of block of 
shares to friendly shareholders, application of defensive mergers, purchasing of shares from the 
market  and  reconstruction  of  capital  together  with  their  implication  in  providing  a  defence 
against any potential or attempted takeover of the target company.859
This research will also consider the effectiveness of the US systems in handling the issue 
of takeovers and mergers. In the US system, the law governing the takeovers are categorised into 
the US Federal defence law and the US takeover defence law. The two sections are critically 
analysed particularly, the US takeover defence law that is further categorised into the “pre-bid 
defence tactics” including the poison pills, shark repellents, golden parachutes and the “post – 
bid defence tactics” such as the greenmail, white knights, white squire, Pac – Man etc. 860
Kay, John. "The Kay review of UK equity markets and long-term decision making." Final Report 112 (2012).857
Mehdi, Rubya. "The Islamic state in the PostModern World, the Political Experience of Pakistan by Louis D. 858
Hayes.  Publisher  Ashgate,  England.  2014,  ISBN 978-1-4724-1262-1."  Tidsskrift  for  Islamforskning  9.2  (2017): 
149-151.
Kai, Liu, and Hasani Mohd Ali. "Hostile Takeovers and Anti-Monopoly Regulations in China and Malaysia with 859
Special Reference to US and UK Experiences." Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities 22 (2014).
Salvatore, Dominick. "Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. Edited by Alan J. Auerbach. Chicago: 860
NBER—University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pp. ix, 343, $45.00."
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To conclude this chapter, the similarity and differences derived from the analysis of the 
two systems is  projected clearly  in  a  bid to  create  a  harmonised defence tactics  against  the 
potential or attempts by dominant companies to unfairly take-over the target company. The final 
defence tactic that will be derived from the weaknesses of the two systems forms the basis of the 
strategy to be applied in both countries. The chapter is thus vital to the entire context of the 
research as it helps to identify the application of the various laws in the process of takeovers and 
the comparisons assists in establishing a more enlightened approach to defence tactics. 
6.2 English Takeover Defence
This  section  specifically  focuses  on  the  English  system  of  handling  the  process  of 
corporate takeovers. In exploring the English system, it  is important to mention the role and 
conduct of the Takeover Panel. The English Parliament formed the independent, statutory body 
and  granted  them the  power  to  formulate  and  enforce  the  laws  governing  the  processes  of 
corporate control market.  The verdict arrived by the Panel represents the final direction and 861
requirement of the takeover conflict. It conducts its operations independently, especially from the 
Courts of Law of the English system. The Panel is made up of professionals drawn from the 
corporate  and legal  fraternity  to  overview the  implementation  and supervision  of  the  whole 
takeover process. For the purposes of the study and context of the research, it is significant to 
mention how the English system applies the self-regulatory approach known as the City Code, 
Hazel Fox, Q. C., and Philippa Webb. The law of state immunity. Oxford University Press, 2013.861
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the common law rules, statutory and stock exchange provisions in the administration of justice 
on the conflicts arising from the dispute. 862
6.2.1 Self-Regulatory Rules (the City Code) for Takeovers
This approach of regulation and supervision of the takeover in particularly attributed to 
the English system. As discussed earlier, the City Code was developed in 1968 by professionals 
who had a common interest in the field of corporate takeovers. They had a common objective of 
setting up a proper framework to overview that appropriate business standard are adhered to 
during the takeover process to ensure that the rights of the shareholders are not violated. In 
pursuant to the implementation of the Takeover Directive (2004/25/EC) by following the Part 28 
of the Companies Act 2006, the regulations drafted in the City Code have a statutory foundation 
based on the powers conferred upon it  by United Kingdom in compliance with the relevant 
requirements of the directive.863
The  City  Code  on  takeovers  is  based  upon  the  six  principles,  which  underscore  the 
importance of commercial behaviour. The Code is designed with a principle idea of ensuring that 
the  shareholders  of  the  target  company  are  treated  fairly  in  matters  concerning  takeovers, 
regardless of the number of shares held. The City Code is enforced by the Panel and provides the 
direction that is found to be highly essential in directing the firm from acting in breach of the 
City Code or sometimes ensuring there is  maximum compliance.  In certain cases,  the Panel 
through the City Code can ensure the company provides compensation for acts of the breach.    
Kraakman,  Reinier,  et  al.  The  anatomy  of  corporate  law:  a  comparative  and  functional  approach.  Oxford 862
University Press, 2017.
 Companies Act 2006, Part 28, The Takeover Code and the Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC863
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The  Code,  which  predominantly  governs  the  takeover  process  in  England,  not  only 
regulates the powers that are exercisable by the directors of a company but also the applicable 
defences in a takeover bid.  The board in this regard is not allowed by the provision of the 864
Code to take any actions that may result in any offer being blocked when that offer has become 
imminent.  Shareholders’ approval  is  a  requirement  for  the  implementation  of  any  defence 
strategy. The provision of the Code also ensures that the shareholders are consulted during the 
takeover and provide a decision on whether a takeover proposal by the board should proceed. For 
instance, as experience in Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum Ltd where the court rejected the 
intentions of the management of the target company reached a verdict, to transfer shares to a 
preferred offeror, in an attempt to block a takeover bid that was favoured by the majority of the 
shareholders.865
As discussed earlier in this Section, the City Code is based on general principles (six in 
number) that are referred to as standards of commercial behaviour. From these principles arise 
numerous rules accompanied by short notes to offer intuitive explanations on how the principles 
apply. The rules and principles of the Code are expressed in simple and non-technical language 
to enhance understanding and easy interpretation so that the spirit and the intentions are easily 
achieved. The City Code is only implemented to the companies: those which has its registered 866
office in England,  the Channel  Islands or  the Isle of  Man and has its  securities  admitted to 
Aguilera,  Ruth V.,  Michel  Goyer,  and Luiz Ricardo Kabbach-Castro.  "Regulation and comparative corporate 864
governance." (2012).
Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] UKPC 3865
Muchlinski, Peter. "Implementing the new UN corporate human rights framework: 866
Implications for corporate law, governance, and regulation." Business Ethics Quarterly 22.1 (2012): 145-177.
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trading on a regulated market in England (i.e. the Official List and virt-X but not AIM) or on a 
Stock Exchange in the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man;
(i) Which has its registered office in England but its securities are admitted to trading on 
a regulated market in another Member State; or (ii) which has its registered office in 
another  Member  State  and  its  securities  admitted  to  trading  only  on  a  regulated 
marketing England or on a regulated market in one or more Member States, including 
England.   But,  in  these  cases,  the  Panel  will  share  jurisdiction  with  the  relevant 
regulator in another Member State; and which does not fall into the two paragraphs 
above and which satisfies the residency test  (i.e.  it  is  incorporated in,  and has its 
central place of management and control, in England, the Channel Islands or the Isle 
of Man).867
However, there are exceptions as to the institutions or companies that the City Code is 
applicable to.  For instance, in events where the offeree is a private company and it is to be 868
taken over by a public firm listed on the London Stock Exchange. In analysing the City Code, 
below are  the  six  general  principles  that  govern  the  entire  takeover  process  in  England  as 
administered by the Takeover Panel.869
 The Takeover Code - <http://www.thetakeoverPanel  .org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf> accessed 23 867
April 2016
Filatotchev,  Igor,  Gregory Jackson,  and Chizu Nakajima.  "Corporate  governance and national  institutions:  A 868
review and emerging research agenda." Asia Pacific Journal of Management30.4 (2013): 965-986.
Collison, David, et al. "Financialization and company law: A study of the UK Company Law Review." Critical 869
Perspectives on Accounting 25.1 (2014): 5-16.
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a) All holders of the securities of an offeree company of the same class must be afforded 
equivalent  treatment;  moreover,  if  a  person  acquires  control  of  a  company,  the  other 
holders of securities must be protected.
b) The  holders  of  the  securities  of  an  offeree  company  must  have  sufficient  time  and 
information to enable them to reach a properly informed decision on the bid; where it 
advises the holders of securities, the board of the offeree company must provide its views 
on the effects of implementation of the bid on employment, conditions of employment 
and the locations of the company’s places of business.
c) The board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a whole and 
must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid.
d) False markets must not be created in the securities of the offeree company, by the offeror 
company or of any other company concerned by the bid in such a way that the rise or fall 
of the prices of the securities becomes artificial and the normal functioning of the markets 
is distorted.870
e) An offeror must announce a bid only after ensuring that he/she can fulfil in full any cash 
consideration, if such is offered, and after taking all reasonable measures to secure the 
implementation of any other type of consideration.
f) An offeree company must not be hindered in the conduct of its affairs for longer than is 
reasonable by a bid for its securities.871
Gregory, Alan, and Sheila O'Donohoe. "Do cross border and domestic acquisitions differ? Evidence from the 870
acquisition of UK targets." International Review of Financial Analysis 31 (2014): 61-69.
The Takeover Code - <http://www.thetakeoverPanel  .org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf> accessed 23 871
April 2016 
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Through the formally created timetable,  the City Code recognises that  presenting the 
offer  for  a  takeover  may  upset  normal  activities  of  the  target  company.  The  City  Code 
consequently spells out the time limits concerning the general time span of an offer and the 
various steps within it. It is mandatory that these rules need to be included in the offer document 
as contractual stipulations of the offer.  872
6.2.2 Defensive Mergers
One of the provisions of the City Code, a “takeover offer” refers to the acquisition of 
shares in a firm and it is subject to the requirement of the following presumptions. First, the 
acquisition of the shares should entail the entire shares available in that firm. In a situation where 
there are more than one class of shares existing in that company, it should involve the purchase 
of more than one class of shares other than the shares that by the given date are already in the 
possession of the offeror.873
The second condition, as stipulated in Section 975, Article (3) refer to the offer terms that 
are required to be the same for all the shares under that offer, or in situations where the shares are 
divided into classes, it has to be the same across all the classes.  Further in Section 976, the 874
provisions regarding the satisfaction of these terms are contained in subsection (4). According to 
subsections (3) and (1), the term “shares” denotes shares, other than relevant shares, that have 
been distributed on the offer date. However, in connection with subsection (5), a takeover offer 
Hopt, Klaus J. "Takeover defenses in Europe: a comparative, theoretical and policy analysis." Colum. J. Eur. L. 20 872
(2013): 249.
Aguzzoni, Luca, et al. "Ex post merger evaluation in the UK retail market for books." The Journal of Industrial 873
Economics 64.1 (2016): 170-200.
Manuela Jr, Wilfred S., and Dawna L. Rhoades. "Merger activity and short-run financial performance in the US 874
airline industry." Transportation Journal 53.3 (2014): 345-375.
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can include among the associated shares the entire shares or some that are distributed after the 
offer date but prior to a specified date. As well the related shares may be all or any relevant 
shares of that treasury that have then ceased to held as treasury shares before a set date or any 
other treasury shares.875
The “relevant treasury shares” have been defined further in Section (6) as shares, which 
are owned by the company as treasury shares on the date that the offer is made, or become ashore 
of the company as treasury shares beyond that date but prior to a set date. In this context, the 
terms “specific date” are taken to imply a date that is set or determined with regard to the terms 
of the offer.876
The shares that are already held by the offeror in line with Section 974 (2) include a 
reference to shares which he transacted to acquire subject to terms being met or unconditionally. 
This is subject to subsection (2) which unlike Section 974 (2) does include a reference to shares 
that are the focus of a contract. The contract is designated to ascertain that the holder of the 
shares will agree to the offer once made and entered in to. In this scenario “entering into” maybe 
by  deed  and  for  no  consideration,  or  for  consideration  of  negligible  value  or  even  for 
consideration comprising of a promise made by the offeror to initiate the offer.877
In  certain  situations,  it  might  be  necessary  to  review an offer  to  reflect  the  required 
changes. In such situations according to Section (7) that considers where the terms of the offer 
 Wilmarth, Arthur E. "Narrow banking: an overdue reform that could solve the too-big-to-fail problem and align 875
US and UK regulation of financial conglomerates." (2012).
 Saulsbury IV, Albert O. "The availability of takeover defences and deal protection devices for anglo-american 876
target companies." Del. J. Corp. L. 37 (2012): 115.
 Eleftheriadis, Iordanis, and George A. Drogalas. "A Note on Evaluation of Merger Waves Diachronically and a 877
Proposition for Business Risk Reduction in the New Era."
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have made provision for their review and for acceptance of the initial terms, to be considered as 
acceptance of the reviewed terms. When the terms of that offer are reviewed with respect to the 
stated provisions, the revision is not going to be considered as an initiation of a fresh offer and 
the date of the offer is to be read as the date of the initial offer.878
When it is said that the offer is on the same terms,  it also requires the satisfaction of 879
the conditions and terms in Section 974 (3) where the subsections (2) or subsection (3) applies. 
This subsection (2) applies when there exist differences in the value of the contemplated offered 
for the shares distributed earlier as opposed to that offered for those that were distributed later. It 
also applies where shares hold a right to a certain dividend, which additional shares of the similar 
class will not carry when they are later allotted. The disparity may just show the variation in the 
right to the dividend, and the conditions in Section 974 (3) would be fulfilled even though for 
that difference.880
When a takeover has been made and within that period commencing with the date of the 
offer and finishing when the offer can longer be accepted, the offeror is expected to acquire or 
unconditionally contract to acquire any of the shares in which they are associated. They do not 
do it  by virtue of acceptance of the offer.  In elaborating this,  those shares are considered as 
excluded from those, which are associated with the offeror.  The shares contractually acquired 881
or held by an associate of the offeror regardless of whether at the date of an offer or later are not 
Kai, Liu, and Hasani Mohd Ali. "Hostile Takeovers and Anti-Monopoly Regulations in China and Malaysia with 878
Special Reference to US and UK Experiences." Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities 22 (2014).
Terms of offer to be the equal for all shares or  for all shares of particular classes879
Uddin,  Moshfique, and Agyenim Boateng.  Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions: UK Dimensions.  Vol.  59. 880
Routledge, 2014.
Arif, Raja Zahoor. "'The Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) on Share Price'(With Reference to UK Top 881
Five Banks from 2006-10)." (2015).
 286
regarded as shares that relate to the offer. That applies even when the offers extend to those 
shares.  In  the context  of  this  subsection,  the term “contracted” is  taken to  imply contracted 
unconditionally or subject to the terms being satisfied. Above all, it worth noting that this section 
is subject the two subsections 979 (8) and 979 (9).882
Subsection 974 (2) and (3) also apply where the two conditions are considered. First, 
where the regulations of a nation not within England prevents an offer of consideration, that is in 
the form or any of the forms specified in the terms of the offer except after complying by the 
offeror with terms and conditions with which he is unable to comply with or which he considers 
excessively heavy.  Second, the individuals to whom an offer of consideration in the form 883
specified by terms and conditions is prevented are able to achieve consideration in a different 
form that is significantof equal value, and the terms outlined in section 974 (3) would then be 
met but for the reality is that an offer of consideration in form specified to those individuals is 
prohibited.884
Section 978 clarifies the issue of lack of communication or accepting the offer. It states 
that an offer can be stopped from being a takeover, where the holders of the shareholders in the 
target firm are not communicated. However, this is subject to certain terms; for the purpose of 
this chapter, if the shareholders of the target firm do not have a registered address in the United 
 Ibid pp. 19882
GRAY,  SIDNEY  J.  "INTERNATIONAL  MERGERS:  THE  PURSUIT  OF  GLOBAL  MARKET 883
LEADERSHIP?." Perspectives in Industrial Organization 13 (2012): 195.
Budzinski,  Oliver,  and  Jürgen-Peter  Kretschmer.  "Implications  of  unprofitable  horizontal  mergers:  a  positive 884
external effect does not suffice to clear a merger!." (2016).
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Kingdom (UK).   Secondly, if by means of not contravening the law of a territory not within 885
England, the acquirer fails to communicate to the shareholders of the target firm. Moreover, the 
offer can be a takeover without prior communication if either it was available in the Gazette or 
where the offer could be viewed, or a copy achieve at a place that can be on a website or in an 
EEA state, and a notice thereafter printed in the Gazette giving the location details for the place 
or website.886
Whether by means of the law of a territory outside England, the holders of shares in 
target firm are not allowed or are in a difficult position to accept the offer; it has no implication 
that the offer cannot be a takeover. For the purpose of this particular section, it  is not to be 
presumed that an offer not communicated to the shareholders in the firm lest the terms stated in 
paragraphs (a) up to (c) of subsection (1) are satisfied.  Alternatively, it cannot be inferred that 
offers that particular people cannot or find it difficult to accept cannot be a takeover not unless 
the rationale behind the impossibility or difficulty are those mentioned in subsection (2).887
Squeeze-out
This is defined in Section 979 that the interest of the acquirer to buy out the shares of 
minority shareholders.  The subsection (2) of this section is applicable in a scenario where the 888
takeover offer is not concerned with the shares of different classes. In that effect, when an offeror 
Ahammad, Mohammad F., et al. “ Motives for cross border mergers and acquisitions." Mergers and Acquisitions 885
in Practice (2016): 16.
Chen, Juan. "Regulating Takeover Defences: The UK Model in Books and the US Model in Action." Regulating 886
the Takeover of Chinese Listed Companies. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. 137-173.
Yaghoubi,  Reza, et  al.  "Mergers and acquisitions: a review. Part  1."  Studies in Economics and Finance  33.1 887
(2016): 147-188.
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through  acceptance  has  unconditionally  transacted  to  acquire  fewer  than  10% of  the  shares 
associated with the offer and in a situation where the associated shares are voting shares, he 
acquires more than 90% of the voting right by those shares.  Consequently, the offeror may 
notify the holders of any remaining shares to which the offer effects and that he has not obtained 
or unconditionally transacted to get, that he may wish to get them.889
The subsection (4) deals with the situation, which the takeover bid, involve shares that 
are  divided  into  classes.  In  that  case,  when  an  offeror  through  acceptance  has  achieved  or 
unconditionally transacted to acquire more than 90% of the shares of any class associated with 
the offer, and in a case where the associated shares of that class are voting shares, he acquires 
more than 90% of the voting right by those shares.  Consequently, the offeror may notify the 
holders  of  any  remaining  shares  to  which  the  offer  relates  and  that  he  has  not  acquired  or 
unconditionally transacted to get, that he may wish to acquire them.890
There may arise a case where the takeover bid may include in its associated shares, the 
shares that are selected after the date of the offer, or even relevant shares of the treasury,  then 891
the offer’s right to notification outline in subsection (2) and or (4) on any specified date shall be 
as though the shares to which the takeover offer is associated with did not comprise of any 
selected shares, or those ceasing to be held as shares of the treasury, on or after the date.892
Subsection (3)889
Krishnan, C. N. V., et al. "Shareholder litigation in mergers and acquisitions." Journal of Corporate Finance 18.5 890
(2012): 1248-1268.
Which in accordance to section 974, which cease to considered as treasury share beyond the date of offer. 891
 Subsection (6)892
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The subsection (7) is applicable where the terms and conditions for notification stipulated 
in subsection (2) and (4) are met and the share in that firm which the offeror or his associate has 
acquired or transacted to get subject to the term getting satisfied and in line with which the 
contract has not been unconditional.  For the purpose of this subsection, the offer’s right to 893
issue a notice as sates in subsections (2) and or (4) shall be determined as though the associated 
shares of the offer entail shares found within paragraph (b) in section (6) and in line with shares 
found in that paragraph., the terms “by virtue of acceptance of the offer” in were omitted.894
The  offeror  may  as  well  though  not  by  way  of  acceptance  of  the  offer,  acquire  or 
unconditionally transact to obtain any shares associated with the offer. However, this is only so 
when a takeover is made during that time from the offer date of being made to the time when it is 
not accepted anymore. Moreover, subsection (10) is valid, and for the use of this section,  section 
977 (1) does not exclude those shares from those associated with the offer, and that the acquirer 
is considered to have acquired or contracted to acquire the share by virtue of acceptance of the 
offer. 
Similarly, an associate of the acquirer is allowed to acquire or unconditionally contract to 
acquire the shares that are associated with the offer when a takeover offer is made, during the 
time  the  date  of  the  offer  is  given  to  when  it  can  no  longer  be  accepted.  According  to 895
subsection (10) in regard to this section, the acquired shares are not exempted by 977 (2) from 
those, which are associated with the offer. And when the terms are subsequently revised such that 
Roberts, John. "Between the letter and the spirit: Defensive and extensive modes of compliance with the UK 893
Code of Corporate Governance." The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance. London: SAGE (2012): 196-217.
  Subsections  (2) and (4)894
 Subsection (9)895
 290
when the  revision  is  proclaimed at  the  time stipulated  initially,  the  value  of  the  acquisition 
consideration should exceed the value of the one specified in the terms of the offer.  However, 
this  is  subsection  is  subject  to  the  acquisition  consideration  not  exceeding  the  value  of 
consideration placed in the terms of the offer and this is at the time when the shares are obtained 
or contracted to be acquired as stipulated in subsection (8) or (9).896
According to subsection (3) of Section 980, it may be applied to a takeover offer if the 
period that the offer is open is guided by the rules which are under Section 943 (1) that give 
effect to the Takeovers Directive under Article 7.   In the context of this subsection, the term 897
“Takeover Directive” has the definition and implication in Section 943.
In Section 980, further provisions regarding the issuance of notices as stated in Section 
979 (1) are noted. It is required that in the issuance of a notice, a particular procedure as stated in 
Section 979 must be followed. However, no notice might be given as indicated in Sections 979 
(2) or 979 (4) after the end of a three month period as from the day after the last day of accepting 
the offer or six months period starting with the date of the offer I which that period winds earlier 
and the offer is one in which subsection (3) is applicable. 
In subsection (4), the first issuance of a notice is clearly stipulated which is as under 
Section 979, regarding an offer. The offeror must send to the company send to the company a 
copy of the notice and a statutory pronouncement by him in the approved form, declaring that 
terms and conditions of issuing a notice are met. Subsection (5) clearly states that the declaration 
must be signed by a director regardless of the offeror being a company or not. It is, however, 898
 Ibid Subsection (9)896
 Subsection (9)897
 With the meaning of this particular act898
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an offence committed if  an individual fails  to send a notice and a statutory proclamation or 
declaration  as  stipulated  in  subsection  (4).   Better  still,  if  he  signs  a  declaration  for  the 899
requirements of that subsection knowing it is false or with reasonable doubt that it is true.
Subsection (7) provides a defence mechanism for persons charged with an offence related 
to notices.  The defence may require the accused to prove that he undertook reasonably and 900
approved procedures for ensuring he complied with subsection (4). Further, in subsection (8), a 901
person found guilty of an offence under this section,  he is liable on conviction on indictment, 902
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or fine or even both.903
The impact of notices as applicable to courts is discussed in Section 981; this is as stated 
under Section 979 and subject to Section 986. These provisions concern a time when the notice 
is issued to the shareholder by the offeror in line with the requirements.  The offeror has then 904
the right to obtain the shares that the notice refers to on the terms of the offer. The terms in this 
context are such that they offer the shareholder a choice of consideration and in so doing the 
notice  must  provide  particulars  of  the  choice  and  give  certain  requirements.  Firstly,  the 
shareholder is expected through a written document sent to the offeror to the address detailed in 
  See subsection of Section 980: regarding crimes associated with notices899
 Of section 980900
 Issuance of a notice901
 Section 980902
 Part (a) of subsection 8903
 prescribed manner stated in section 979904
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the notice.  Secondly, a state which of the consideration specified in the offer will apply if the 905
offer does not indicate a choice. The reference found in the subsection (2) to the terms of the bid 
is  to  be  read  as  appropriate.  Subsection  (3)  applies  regardless  of  time  limit  or  other  terms 
applicable to choice in the terms of the offer seeking compliance.906
When the consideration offered by the offeror to the shareholder is  not  cash and the 
offeror is not at a position of providing it, or was to be provided by another third party who then 
not any more is bound or unable to provide it, the consideration is presumed to consists of cash, 
due by the acquirer, which is equivalent of the consideration offered or at the date of the notice. 
In subsection (6) it is required that at the end of the six weeks from the date the notice was 
initiated, the acquirer must send to the company, and as well pay to the firm the consideration for 
the shares associated with the notice.907
When the shares associated with the notice are registered, according to subsection 6 (a), a 
copy of the notice accompanied by an instrument of transfer implemented on the behalf of the 
shareholders by an individual appointed by the offeror, have to be sent the company.  Where 908
the consideration is comprised of securities to be selected by the acquirer, the reference found in 
paragraph (b) to the transfer of the consideration will have to be read as a reference to the firm. 
Thereafter, following the reception of the instrument, the target firm must register the acquirer as 
 (a)905
 Subsection 5906
 Or as the case may be chosen by shareholder907
 Papadopoulos, Thomas. "Cyprus Company Law: Board Neutrality and Breakthrough in Takeovers." (2013).908
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the owner of those shares.  On the target firm having to receive the statement, it is obligated to 909
give the acquirer warrants and or other instruments regarding the shares as those that already 
exist concerning the same shares become invalid.910
After the acquirer has transferred the consideration to the target company, the target firm 
is compelled by subsection (6) (b) to hold any money or consideration given to it, on trust for the 
initial shareholders of the acquired firm. The firm’s duties on handling the funds are described in 
Section 982. Perhaps, we should consider more provisions regarding the consideration held on 
trust, which is found in Section 981 (9). This particular section is applicable to a situation where 
the acquirer pays or transfers consideration to the target  firm outlined in Section 981 (6).  It 
requires  that  the  target  pay  or  transfer  the  consideration  into  a  separate  bank  account  in 
compliance with subsection (3) which includes the money it receives and dividend or money 
accruing  from  the  consideration  it  receives  if  any  as  outlined  in  the  same  paragraph.  911
Examination of the bank account provisions reveals that it is compliant if the balance it contains 
bear interest at a market rate and can be withdrawn by notice as is required.912
It is rare to find that the person to whom consideration is entitled is missing however for 
such persons, subsection 4 handles the situation. In line with subsection (9) of Section 981 that 
 Phalippou, Ludovic, Fangming Xu, and Huainan Zhao. "Hunting the hunters: New evidence on the drivers of 909
acquirer’s announcement returns in M&As." Available at SSRN (2012).
 Brouthers, Keith D. "A retrospective on: Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences on entry mode 910
choice and performance." Journal of International Business Studies 44.1 (2013): 14-22.
 As outlined in paragraph (b) of Section 981 (6)911
 If there is any912
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the  person cannot  be  traced then subsection (5)  applies.  It  requires  that  the  consideration 913
includes all the interests and benefits it has accrued be paid to the court.  It is worth noting that 
this applies in a situation where considerable enquiries have been made at reasonable intervals 
and after 12 years after the company was wound or the consideration received still there is no 
such person found.  In  subsection (6),  this  is  described with  respect  to  firms registered in 914
Scotland where subsections (7) and (8) apply instead of (4).  Subsection (7) states that when the 
person being sought cannot found and subject to subsection (5), the trust winds up the firm or 
when the firm is also ready terminated, a liquidator has to sell  any consideration except the 
benefits such as cash that have accrued from the consideration.  After which a sum denoting the 915
consideration provided is in cash the progress of any sale as outlined in paragraph (b), and any 
benefits including dividends and interests that have thus resulted from the consideration have to 
be deposited in the court’s accountant name in distinct bank account complying with subsection 
(3).The deposit receipt should then be transferred to the accountant of the court.916
 Subsection 4 (a)913
 Subsection 5914
  7 (a)915
 (c)(i) and  (c) (ii)916
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US and English Cases
In  the  United  States,  Weinberger  v.  UOP,  Inc.,  the  case  involves  the  1974  Signal 917
Companies, Inc. acquisition of a 50.5 % stake of UOP, Inc.’s shares. During the period, Signal 
selected and chose six of the thirteen board directors at the former’s board. Three years later, in 
1977, Signal Companies, Inc. showed interest in the acquisition of the remaining shares of the 
UOP at an unsettled price of a maximum of $24 per UOP shares. Signal obtained a fairness 
opinion from the Lehman Brothers, indicating that $21 per share price was fair, despite the fact 
that the fairness opinion may have been founded on inconclusive and rushed assessment.  The 918
board of directors at Signal passed a unanimous vote that proposed a merger at the stated price of 
$21. After obtaining the offer,  UOP’s board indicated to the shareholders the significance of 
accepting the merger; it was ratified in May 1978. Later, the plaintiff lodged a class action, acting 
for the minority shareholders of UOP, and challenged the fairness of the merger contract terms. 
919
In  its  judgment,  the  Court  indicated  that  in  long-form  squeeze-out  takeovers,  the 
defendants are tasked with the role of ascertaining the “Entire Fairness Test”, which has two 
phases of fair price and fair dealing. First, in terms of fair dealings, the case is concerned with 
the  process  of  the  agreement;  the  methods,  duration,  location,  and  approval  processes.  The 
obligation of loyalty, as indicated by a manifestation of good faith, is intrinsic to fair dealing. 
Further, when directors and the majority shareholders are on either side of the agreement, it is 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)917
 7 (B)918
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)919
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almost impossible to indicate that the agreement was in fact conducted at arms-length. What is 
more, the directors can attempt to mitigate their burden through the creation of a non-partisan 
negotiating committee of external directors. Second, the fair pricing aspect is involved with the 
terms of the contract; to determine whether fair pricing was involved, it is important to consider 
all the relevant factors in the company’s stock.920
Against  this  background,  the  Court  dismissed  the  applicability  of  the  need  for 
complainants  to  satisfy  the  commercial  purpose  of  the  fairness  test.  With  regards  to  the 
effectiveness  of  the  exclusive  assessment  remedy  and  the  high  standard  of  manifesting 
wholesome  fairness,  the  business  objective  test  does  not  offer  any  add  further  meaningful 
protection to the minority shareholders of a company.921
Fiske Nominees Ltd v Dwyka Diamond Ltd is a case that involved a take-over bid and 922
acquisition of shares of dissentients. The majority shareholders were unfair in accepting the offer 
made by the defendant. Later, the plaintiff made an application to the dissentient shareholders for 
a  court  declaration  that  Dwyka  Diamond  Ltd  is  neither  bound  nor  entitled  to  acquire  the 
company  stocks.  Lastly,  the  case  questioned  whether  the  defendant  had  offered  sufficient 
information for the shareholders to make an informed decision.923
In the case, the proceedings arising out of a takeover offer by the defendant for the share 
company of  the  company,  the  Court  ruled  “inter  alia”,  that  the  defendant  had  not  provided 
Ibid920
 Ibid921
Fiske Nominees Ltd v Dwyka Diamond Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 123922
Ventoruzzo, Marco, et al. Comparative corporate law. West Academic Publishing, 2015.923
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sufficient information that would have assisted the plaintiff to make an appropriate decision with 
regard to the offer and thus entered a declaration that the defendant should not be entitled and 
bound to obtain the shares.  924
6.2.3 Sell out
Unclassified Shares 
“Sell out” as seen in previous chapters refers to the purchase of the minority shareholders 
by  the  offeror.  The  rights  of  the  minority  shareholder  to  be  purchased by the  acquirers  are 
contained  in  Section  983  of  the  Companies  Act  2006.  In  a  situation  where  the  takeover 925
concerns all the shares in a firm, subsections (2) and (3) apply. In that effect, an offer will involve 
all the shares in a firm if it is an offer to acquire all the shares in that firm with respect to the 
interpretation of Section 974.  The subsection (2) states that  such an acquirer who wants to 
purchase the minority shareholder may be able to do so if he has by virtue of acceptance of the 
offer  or  unconditionally  contracted  to  acquire  part  of  the  stock  relating  to  the  offer  and  in 
exception of the shares he had initially purchased. This is valid only when done during the period 
the offer is open and the purchase has met certain requirements of the voting rights and voting 
shares. This means that amount acquired should be more than 90% in value of the entire voting 
shares in the company and similarly contain more than 90% of the voting rights in the firm.926
 Ibid924
 Ibid 925
 But would do so for section 990 (1)926
 298
Classes of shares
In cases where the takeover involved the sale of shares of various classes, the offeror can 
only be allowed to purchase those shares if within the period the offer is open, he has by way of 
acceptance of the bid acquired or unconditionally contracted to acquire part of the stock relating 
to  the  offer.  In  addition,  they  have  to  exclude  those  classes  of  shares  they  have  already 927
acquired in that firm or had contracted to acquire in regardless of whether it was unconditional or 
subject to satisfaction of the requirements. In so doing, the acquirer must ensure that they have 
obtained an amount greater than 90% of the entire shares of that class if the shares of that class 
are voting shares. It is then that the acquirer will able to purchase the shares of those who have 
not accepted the offer.928
Section (5) is relevant to sections (2) to (4) defining precisely the shares already acquired by 
an offeror at the time the offer is still open. This has significance in the calculation of the 90% of 
any shares expected as a requirement. It outlines that the shares held by the company as treasury 
shares are shares already acquired by the firm. Subsection (7) is applicable where a shareholder 
is  putting into effect  his  rights  as  found in subsections (2),  (3)  and or  (4).  By the time the 
shareholder is exercising his rights, there should be should shares in the firm that the acquirer has 
already contracted to acquire on satisfactory terms and with respect to which the contract has not 
become unconditional. 929
The shareholder is however regarded not to have exercised his rights with due regard for 
Section 985 of the Companies Act 2006 not unless the requirements defined in paragraphs (2b), 
 Contained in Section 4927
 Ibid pp 29928
 Section 4929
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(3b) and (4b) would be satisfied and subject to certain terms.    Firstly, the reference to other 930
shares  in  the  firm found in  that  paragraph,  which acquirer  has  already contacted to  acquire 
conditionally  or  not  was  a  reference  to  shares  that  the  acquirer  himself  has  unconditionally 
contracted to acquire. Secondly, the periods within which the offer can be accepted as outlined in 
the  subsection were  a  reference  to  the  period in  Section 98 (2).  It  is  worth  noting that  the 
references in subsections (2b), (3b), (4b), 6 or 7 to shares acquired by the acquired or contracted 
are comprised of a reference to shares which a fellow acquirer has acquired or contracted to 
acquire.931
Section 984 is also furthering the rights of the shareholder as outlined in Section 983 (1) of 
the Companies Act 2006.  It clarifies that a shareholder by virtue of subsections (2), (3) or (4) 932
exercises his right through written communication to the acquirer.  These conferred rights are 933
only valid and can be put into effect provided it is within three months from the time the offer 
was closed or if later, the notice date should be given as outlined in subsection (3). That is to say 
within the one month of the period stipulated in subsection (2), (3) or (4), the acquirer has to 
issue the target  shareholders who have not consented to the offer  a notice in the predefined 
manner of regards to the rights that are liable to the shareholder within that subsection and the 
 Outline in subsection (7)930
 Section 7931
Sheikh, Saleem. A guide to the Companies Act 2006. Routledge, 2013.932
 Under Section 983 of the Companies Act 2006933
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period of putting the rights into effect.  The notice should indicate the offer remains open for 934
acceptance provided it is not yet the end of the offer period. 
In subsection (4), when acquirer gives the shareholder a notice regarding the shares under 
transaction in Section 979,  then subsection (3)  does not  apply.  According to Section (5),  an 
acquirer who does not comply with subsection (3) commits an offence. In case of a company the 
officer  who  is  his  ignorance  has  caused  the  failure  that  is  ultimately  responsible  for  the 
offence.  Where an offeror is charged with an offence rather than the firm for non-compliance 935
with subsection (3), in defending himself, he is required to establish that all reasonable steps 
were taken so as to ensure compliance with subsection (3).936
An individual found guilty of an offence under the subsection (3) is held responsible on 
conviction  on  indictment  to  a  fine,  which  is  determined  by  the  verdict,  but  not  exceeding 
maximum set by the statute. For continued breach of the laws, the offender is fined for each daily 
default not overlapping the maximum set out by the statute.937
Section 985 of the Companies Act 2006 refers to the impact of the requirements stated in 
Section 983 (1) with respect to Section 986 of the Companies Act 2006. It is applicable where a 
shareholder puts into effect his rights stated in Section 983 of the Companies Act 2006 regarding 
the shares he holds.  The acquirer is hence obliged to obtain those shares on the terms and 938
 Sections 983 and 984 of the Companies Act 2006934
 Sub section (4)935
 Subsection (3)936
 Subsection (3)937
Clark, Gordon L., and Eric RW Knight. "Implications of the UK Companies Act 2006 for institutional investors 938
and the market for corporate social responsibility." U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 11 (2008): 259.
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conditions of the offer as concurred.  When the offer is one in which the acquirer wants to 939
provide the shareholder with a choice of consideration, the target firm should indicate its choice 
of terms on which the acquirer can acquire the shares. In that situation, the notice given to the 
target firm or shareholder is stipulated in Section 984 (3) of the Companies Act 2006, it must 
specify the available options and of the rights accorded by the section. Moreover, it should state 
which consideration outlined in the offer would apply if it does not indicate a choice. Even so, 
the reference outlined in subsection (2) to the conditions of the offer is to be read as required.940
In subsection (4), the subsection (3) is applicable regardless of the time limit or other 
terms  that  apply  to  the  designated  choice.  Subsection  (5)  outlines  a  situation  where  the 
consideration offered to the shareholder is not in a cash form and the acquirer is not in a position 
anymore of providing it. The consideration is to be regarded as comprising of cash, due by the 
offeror, which when required by the shareholder should be equal to the consideration offered. 941
Under Section 986 of the Companies Act 2006, applications may be made to the court 
regarding the content. The subsection one under this refers to a situation where a notice is issued 
to the shareholder as required by Section 979.  The court on an application of the shareholder 942
declares that the acquirer is entitled and bound to acquire the shares of the offer on the terms and 
conditions applicable for the entitlement as the court sees fit.  Subsection (2) requires that the 
application under (1) be made within six weeks from the date the notice was given. The Section 
 Subsection (2)939
 Subsection (2)940
 Subsection (4)941
Armour,  John,  and  David  A.  Skeel  Jr.  "Who  writes  the  rules  for  hostile  takeovers,  and  why-the  peculiar 942
divergence of US and UK takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1727.
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981 (6) does not have any impact unless the application has been disposed of. This is so when at 
the end of the period, the application to the court as outlined under subsection (1) is still pending. 
The shareholder under this process utilises his rights as mentioned in Section 983 regarding any 
shares he owns, the court will declare the terms that the acquirer is entitled to and bound to 
acquire the shares as it deems fit under subsection (6).943
In subsection (4) of Section 986, subject to an application made under the subsection (1) 
or (3), the court might not require consideration of a higher value exceeding that in the terms of 
the offer to be issues for the shares in the transaction unless the target shareholder shows that the 
offer value is not fair. Similarly, following the application under subsection (1) or (3), the court 
may not require a consideration of a lower value than the offer value to be accorded to the 
shareholder.944
Considering subsection 5, the court may consider ordering for costs or expenses on a 
shareholder for making an application as outlined in subsection (2) and (3) if the application is 
unnecessary  and  improper,  there  was  unreasonable  delay  in  the  application,  and  that  the 
shareholder conducted the proceedings of the application in an inappropriate and unacceptable 
manner.  As required in subsection (6), an acquirer should be issued with an application made 945
under subsection (1) and (3) by the shareholder. Further, in subsection (7), an acquirer issued 
with the notice must issue a copy of the notice to any other individual who has received a notice 
 Subsection4943
 Subsection 1944
 Subsection 6945
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under  Section 979 of  the Companies  Act  2006,  and anyone who has  practised his  rights  as 
outlined in Section 983. 946
In subsection (8), any acquirer who writes an application in subsection (3) is required to 
issue a notice of the application to anyone who under Section 979, a notice has been issued and 
anyone exercising his rights as outlined in Section 983. In a case where a takeover bid has not 
been acknowledged to such a degree that he is required to issue notices as outlined in subsections 
(2) and (4) , the court may allow them to make the notices under those subsections following 947
an application they have made and meeting certain requirements. Firstly, the offeror has made 
enquire about the shareholder of the shares mentioned in the offer and it is all in vain. Secondly, 
that the offeror and the shareholder accepting the offer would have led to the satisfaction of the 
requirements. Lastly, if the consideration offered is just and reasonable. This is however subject 
to subsection (10). The court may only make an order if it has considered it “just and equitable” 
with regard to the shareholders who have been traced but have not acknowledged the offer. 948
Joint offers
In Section 987 of the Companies Act, 2006 where a takeover bid has been made by two 
or more persons combined, known as joint offers, this section with the subject to other parts of 
the chapter will have an effect.  In this scenario, putting into effect the rights conferred under 949
 Ibid 946
 Of section 9797947
Langevoort, Donald C. "Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. 948
Dynamics Corp. of America, The." Harv. L. Rev. 101 (1987): 96.
 Subsection (1) of section 987949
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Section 979 are met when the acquisition involves acceptance of the offer by the joint acquirers 
acquiring  or  unconditionally  contracting  to  achieve  the  relevant  shares  combined.  In  other 
situations, it may be the combined acquirers acquiring or unconditionally contracting to acquire 
the relevant shares either as a group or individually.950
In terms of putting into effect the rights mentioned in Section 983, they are met when the 
takeover involves acceptance of the offer by the combined acquirers acquiring or unconditionally 
contracting to acquire the relevant shares together. Alternatively, it may be the mutual offerors 
unconditionally  contracting  to  acquire  or  acquiring  the  relevant  shares  either  as  a  group  or 
individually.  Subject  to the provisions of Sections 979 to 985  as in subsection (5) of  this 951
Section,  subsection  (4)  of  this  section  states  that  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the  acquirer 
outlined in Sections 979 to 985 are joint rights and joint obligations of the combined acquirers. 
The subsection (5) states that a provision of Sections 979 to 986 that authorises a notice to issue 
to the joint acquirers is only achieved compliance when the notice or other document is sent to 
any of the acquirers.952
According to Subsection (6), the joint acquirers and where at least one is a company, the 
director must sign the statutory declaration demanded by Section 980 (4). The references  to 953
the acquirer are to read as references to any or all of the join acquirers. Further, in subsection 954
 Subsection 2950
 As outlined in subsection 5951
Morse, Geoffrey, and Sarah Worthington. Palmer's company law: annotated guide to the Companies Act 2006. 952
Sweet & Maxwell, 2009.
 That are found in  sections 974 , 977,  979 (9), 981 (6) , 983(8) and 988953
 Subsection (7)954
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(8),  the references in Section 981 (7)  and 981 (8)  to the acquirer  are to be regarded as the 
references to the joint acquirers. The Subsection covers the failure to provide the consideration 
by the acquirers. As outlined in Sections (5) (a) and 985 (5) (a), the references to the failure of 
the acquirer are to be read as the references to none of the joint acquirers being able to provide. 
Subsections  10  outlines  that  the  references  found in  Section  986 to  the  acquirers  are  to  be 
regarded as references to the joint acquirers in except in the following reasons. Firstly, that an 
application may be made by any of them as outlined in subsections (3) or (9).  Secondly, the 
references in subsections 9(a) to the failure of an acquirer to find any of the shareholders of the 
target firm are to be read as a reference to the joint acquirers being unable to get the shareholders 
of the target firm.
6.3 Takeover Defences in England
While in the U.S,  the regulations of the are undertaken by judicial  laws and statutes 
which consider takeover defences as one which is run vastly by the internal management of a 
company, the English system of a legal and regulatory framework has placed a legal framework 
to  be considered by institutional  investors  who in  many situations  make up the bulk of  the 
shareholder.  The  outstanding  regulatory  structure  towards  takeovers  is  directed  towards 
protecting the interest of the shareholder.  It has been argued that the predominant difference in 955
English  and  the  US  takeover  regulation  lies  in  the  handling  of  the  takeover  defences.  The 
takeovers in England are regulated by the Takeover Code, which oversees the powers bestowed 
upon the directors of a company in an occurrence of a takeover and the applicable defences.
 Skeel, D, Armour J, “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?-The Peculiar Divergence of US and 955
UK Takeover Regulation” Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, September 2006
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The board of directors is often barred from involving in deeds that may hinder or frustrate 
takeover processes  when the offer  is  forthcoming.  The shareholders’ approval  is  always a 956
preconditionfor  the  adoption  of  any  takeover  defence  by  the  firm  through  the  board  of 
directors.  The code has provisions that entitle the shareholders to rights of assessment and 957
decision making with regard to acknowledging takeovers.  For  instance,  in  takeover  between 
Howard Smith  v  Ampol  Petroleum Ltd,  the  target  firm was prevented from transferring the 
treasury shares to a favoured offeror by the court.958
6.4 U.S Takeover Defence Law
Just as in any other legal battle, the board or management of the target company may 
choose to accept a takeover bid or reject it by pursuing a legalsuit in a bid to defend it against a 
hostile takeover bid launched by a dominant company. The measure involves the employment of 
an effective legal mechanism to stall every attempt by the raiders from succeeding in carrying 
out their takeover operation.  The management may advance the takeover defence mechanisms 959
after the bid has been made or may have been advanced prior to the making the bid. However, 
before discussing the available defence tactics under the US takeover law, it  is  important to 
mention that  the most obvious method for defending the target  company against  any hostile 
 Rule 21.1(a)956
 Supplemented by the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006)957
Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] UKPC 3958
Armour,  John,  and  David  A.  Skeel  Jr.  "Who  writes  the  rules  for  hostile  takeovers,  and  why-the  peculiar 959
divergence of US and UK takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1727.
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takeover is by rejecting an initial bid, citing that the company is seeking to receive a higher bid 
offeror intending to invite a competitive offeror.
If the target company is in a stronger position to receive a better and higher bid it may 
initiate a vigorous defence against any potential attempt thus prolonging the takeover attempt. 
The defence may also be based on the fact that the company’s net worth is higher than the 
available takeover bid or that there are hidden assets.  Such a defence is only possible if the 
management  has  highly  sensitive  and  confidential  information  about  the  firm  that  would 
substantially increase the market value. By advancing such a defence tactic, the board may be 
able to increase the net value of the target company, hence blocking the bid offeror ultimately 
fetching a higher price for the shareholders should the bid be successful. Additionally, the reason 
for mounting a defence by the management is the strategic belief that the firm would operate as a 
going  concern  by  remaining  independent.  The  other  important  element  to  consider  in  this 
research is the fact that any transactions involving takeover bid will only gain acceptability or 
rejection depends on the social and political viewpoint of the country.  
Lately, there has been vast attention accruing towards the takeover regulation in the U.S 
by judicial proceedings and academic researchers. The review of this literature is not within the 
limit  of  the discussion.  It  is  of  significance to consider the legal  framework of the takeover 
regulation in U.S. In so doing, certain issues must be addressed; the coercive aspects of the two-
tier offer.  It is also important to note that the European takeover bid is not explicitly concerned 960
with shareholder value rather more fundamental issues.961
Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive960
Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Business Law. 247  (1989).
Berglöf, Erik, and Mike Burkart. "European takeover regulation." Economic Policy 18.36 (2003): 171-213.961
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Generally, there are various laws, which govern the takeovers in the US. These are the 
state statutes, federal statutes and common law judicial decisions.  At this instance, the Williams 
Act, the Unocal/ Revlon case decisions and the state anti-takeover statutes will be considered.962
6.4.1 The Williams Act (1968)
The contemporary federal regulation in US expanded with the passing in 1968 of the 
Williams Act in the form of an amendment that passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 963
The Act was intended to 
“Make the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to make their own 
decisions”.964
The Act contains the rules in order to manage takeover bids. It  basically requires the 
offerors to disclose information regarding the offers and as well establish procedures directing 
the tender offers.  The disclosure of information by the offeror is outlined in Section 13 (d) of 965
the Act. Where an offeror has acquired a certain percentage of shares exceeding a specified limit, 
a duty to disclose relevant information regarding the offer is activated. The offeror has to reveal 
its  identity and background; the source of funds he is  using in the acquisition,  the rationale 
behind the acquisition, whether they aim to liquidate the target firm or restructure the business 
and the shares they have already acquired in the target firm.
Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 962
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
 Ibid963
  This is in line the sponsor of the amendment, Sen. Harrison Williams, S. REP. No. 90-550, at 3 (1967).964
15 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), for a similar analysis.965
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 The Williams Act in Section 14 (d) outlines the rules and principles that define how the 
process should proceed.  An offer initiated should remain open for a period of at least 20 days 966
and those shareholders who tendered their shares may withdraw them within the first 7 days of 
the tender offer period. In circumstances where a large number of offers have been tendered 
exceeding the expectation of the offeror, then the purchases will have to be made through a “pro 
rata”  strategy.  Significantly,  the  acquirer  must  pay  equally  for  all  the  shares  tendered  in  an 
offer.967
The Security Exchange Council (SEC) regulations also monitor closely and find a firm 
liable for false and misleading information with respect to the tender offer.  The duties of 968
directors in a firm especially during the takeover process are outlined and regulated by their 
fiduciary duties. 
6.4.2 Unocal/ Revlon Duties
In the U.S the majority of the regulations regarding takeovers are predominantly to be 
found in  the  Unocal/Revlon case  decision. This,  therefore,  has  an  implication  that  Federal 969
regulation forms only a portion of the takeover regulation in the United States. The state law 
fiduciary duties are highly considered for addressing cases pertaining to the duties of directors of 
a company in the event of a takeover.  The controversy arises as there are over 50 varied state 
The Williams Act 1968, s 14 (d). 966
The Williams Act 1968, s 14 (e).967
Security Exchange Council Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C § 78n (1995); 17 C.F.R § 240.14e13 (2008).968
 Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 969
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
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based jurisdictions in the U.S. Even though, the situation is eased by the fact that the corporate 
laws  in  U.S  are  predominantly  influenced  by  Delaware  case  law.  The  Delaware  Court  of 
Chancery through its proficiency and suppleness has meant that many large corporations /holding 
companies are registered under Delaware law. Consequently, the Delaware court rulings impact 
on the cases across the various states.  Over time, the Delaware courts have developed an 970
“intermediate  standard”  of  review for  the  actions  of  the  directors  in  the  course  of  takeover 
bids.971
In a takeover bid between Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, the Delaware Supreme 
Court maintained that “directors are of necessity confronted with conflict of interest” due to the 
threat of removing the serving board of directors.  As a result of conflict in interests, the court 972
disregarded the defence measures that were in place and established a “bi-influence” type of 
rules  that  impacted on both the target  and the offeror.  This  had an intention of  determining 
whether the target board was allowed to put in place defensive measures. In response the board 
was expected to have grounds for believing that the takeover would have a non -positive effect 
on the firm. On the same note, the defences that were to be implemented were to be reasonable as 
compared to the threat imposed. The rationale for resisting a takeover is shown by good faith and 
 For example, the famous case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), has been cited 970
favourably by 12 of the 13 circuit courts and 15 state courts. See Dana M. Muir and Cindy A. Schipani, New 
Standards of DirectorLoyalty and Care in the Post-Enron Era: Are Some Shareholders More Equal ThanOthers?, 8 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. and PUB. POL’Y 279, 354 (2005) (describing how Delaware courts have scrutinised director 
decisions to resist hostile takeovers).
For a more extensive examination of this “intermediate standard,” see generally Gilson and Kraakman, supra note 971
11. (2009)
493 A.2d at 955972
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the  attempt  to  carry  out  a  reasonable  investigation.  The  shareholders’ approval  was  not 973
required by the court for the board of directors to initiate a defence mechanism. 
In the Unocal test, the court allowed the application of a poison pill defence in Moran v 
Household Int’l,  Inc. Merely,  a  year  later,  the Supreme Court  of  Delaware constrained the 974
freedom of director’s by holding in Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc. that, 
provided a sale was initiated, the duties of directors were  expected to be minimal towards the 
protection and the maintenance of the firm  and extending towards seeking the highest price for 
the benefit and interests of the shareholders.  In simpler terms, the directors should not engage 975
in frustrating the sale but instead be auctioneers who are attempting to acquire the highest bidder. 
In the case of Paramount Communication Inc. v Time, Inc., the board of directors was given an 
opportunity of initiating a defence by the court, even when it had been inevitable that the firm 
was to be sold.  The verdict of the court had it in its reasoning that the board of directors of the 976
target firm could still consider factors such as the information available to the shareholders, the 
terms and conditions accompanying the offer,  and the timing of the offers besides monetary 
value of the offers. To some extent, these factors were believed to justify the need for defensive 977
measures.
Bid.973
 Moran v Household Int’l, Inc. 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985).974
Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc.506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985).975
Paramount Communication Inc. v Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).976
Id. at 1153977
 312
The two resolutions arrived in the 1990’s clearly meant out the duties of directors during 
takeover fights and elaborated more on the availability of defensive measures. Considering in 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v QVC Network, Inc. the Court asserted that a more advanced 
scrutiny to be implemented towards the directorial defensive actions in, though only once the 
Revlon duties were activated, or, simply, when the sale of a firm was inevitable.  The QVC 978
network proposed that the pre-bid anti-takeover strategies were presumptively more reasonable 
and sensible owing to the fact that was applicable prior to an occurrence of a potential threat. 
In Unitrin, Inc. v American General Corp  the Delaware Supreme Court extended the 979
discretion of directors to resist aggressive takeovers. In its judgment, it considered the defensive 
measures acknowledged by an independent board as being permissible provided they were not 
draconian  and  were  reasonable.   The  effect  of  these  cases  in  Delaware  is  that  boards  of 980
directors  in  companies  in  the  United  States  have  a  range  of  mandate  to  deter  aggressive 
takeovers provided they do it in “good faith” after adequate analysis and measures taken should 
be measurable to the threat posed.
6.4.3 State Anti-Takeover Statutes
Alongside,  the  federal  regulations  and  the  state  law  fiduciary  duties,  there  are 
antitakeover statutes overseeing the takeover activities. The mentioned statutes offer protection 
to the firms within the state against the potential acquirers who are outside of the state.  These 981
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)978
Unitrin, Inc. v American General Corp.  651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).979
Id. at 1387-88.980
See, for example  ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-45.57.120 (2000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (1995 981
and Supp. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-103-101—48-103-505
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statues  have  undergone  evolution  in  three  generations  and  within  the  various  states.  It  can 
consequently be observed that:
“State takeover acts are similar to snowflakes—if you think you have found identical ones, you 
are probably not looking closely enough”.982
The  first  era  of  takeover  statutes  oversaw  the  takeovers  in  a  manner  that  gave  the 
regulator  the  mandate  to  review the  advantages  associated  with  a  bid  or  how much  it  has 
disclosed itself.   In most of the cases, the regulator or rather the administrator frequently held 983
hearings on bids and even imposed waiting periods within the time period remained open. Many 
aspects of the takeover statue were exempted from the federal regulations, concluding in the 
Edgar v MITE Corp decision.  Where, the Supreme Court proclaimed the Illinois anti-takeover 984
statute unconstitutional. In line with the view of the court, 
“While  protecting  local  investors  is  plainly  a  legitimate  state  objective,  the  State  has  no 
legitimate interest in protecting non-resident shareholders”.985
Symposium, State Rergulation of Tender Offers, 7 J. CORP. L. 603 (1982) (footnote omitted) quoted in James D. 982
Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen, 3 COX and HAZENON CORPORATIONS 1491 (2d ed. 2003).
See, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1501(E) (repealed 1987); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. § 74(d) (Supp. repealed 1993). 983
Most of these statutes were implemented to secure particular local industries. A lively example is Indiana which 
enacted its first anti-takeover statute to shield a company notably Arvin Industries. The company was a distinctive 
member of the  community in Columbus, Indiana, with 2000 employed  workers and giving support to local schools. 
In the vicinity of  the Belzberg family, known green-mailers, a takeover was looming, Arvin influenced a state 
legislator  to  draft  the  takeover  bill.  More  information:  Michael  W.  Miller,  How Indiana  Shielded  a  Firm and 
Changed the Takeover Business, WALL ST. J., Jul. 1, 1987, at 1.
 Edgar v MITE Corp  457 U.S. 624 (1982).984
Id. at 644.985
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Thus, a negative infliction on the transaction of the in-state firms breached the commerce 
clause.  In such a case, the Illinois statute allowed for hearing regarding the tender offer’s terms 986
and the waiting period.
The  second  era  of  anti-takeover  statutes  was  aimed  at  protecting  the  target  firm by 
considering the disclosure of information. The remarkable aspect of these statutes was the 
The “control share acquisition” statute, in which most the of the minority shareholders were 
required to consent on an offer to acquire the firm. In the case between CTS Corp. v Dynamics 
Corp. of America, the Supreme Court endorsed the Indiana’s control share statute. The statute 
required that the voting rights were to be denied to any shareholder with shares exceeding 20% 
of the target firm’s not unless the autonomous stockholders have allowed such voting rights in a 
general meeting. Other statutes within the second era were “fair price” which required that the 
offers were to consent on by a super majority of shareholders except when they had a good price 
from the offeror and we also had “stakeholder” statutes, which allowed the management to put in 
mind the interest of the stakeholders rather the stockholders.987
Eventually, the third era of takeover statutes has improved on the protection of the in-
state  targeted  firms.  These  statutes  are  of  two  kinds  namely,  the  freeze  statute  and  the 
disgorgement statute. The first one has an implication in the state of New York where it forbids a 
merger, which may accord the offered control over the target firm within five years unless the 
directors the target firm before the acquisition began acknowledged it. The disgorgement rule is, 
however, Pennsylvania oriented in that it has a requirement that any owner of shares exceeding 
20% of a firm’s shares to issue out any profits realised within a period of eighteen months. 
Id. at 645.986
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)987
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Generally, the third era statutes have endured the challenges that have been mounted under the 
constitution in the federal courts. The states in giving the boards of directors wide capacities to 
consider more defensive measures shows how much they have protected the target firm against 
the hostile takeovers.
 Duties of director and controlling shareholders
In US, the directors of target companies are constrained by their fiduciary duties under 
the  national  law  determined  by  the  target’s  incorporation.  When  adopting  the  defence 988
techniques, Delaware has an extensive system of corporate case law and considered the most 
vital jurisdiction for publicly traded companies in the U.S. Under Delaware law, the application 
of defence tactic by directors of the target company is preceded by a scrutiny of the target's 
board. In the event that the acquisition entails the sale of control of a company, Revlon duties 
apply and the board is mandated to determine the best reasonable bid price available for the 
shareholders.989
However, in plan, share for share mergers, the Revlon requirement on duties does not 
apply. They are characterised by widely held holdings of the public company’s shareholders with 
no individual holding forming a controlling block of shares.  Even though in these cases, the 990
target firm’s intentions to adopt defence mechanisms are viewed the Unocal standard. In this 
standard, the target company is required to have valid grounds in believing that the acquirer is 
Gilson, Ronald J., and Jeffrey N. Gordon. "Controlling controlling shareholders." University 988
of Pennsylvania Law Review 152.2 (2003): 785-843.
see Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)989
Paramount Communications,Inc. v. Time Inc., 673 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989)990
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likely to launch an aggressive acquisition that it is a threat to the policy before it can launch an 
appropriate defence mechanism. Further, the target firm should resolve on a mechanism that is 
equally reasonable in response to the threat.  Better still, there is a general rule that prohibits a 991
target’s board from adopting takeover defence tactics that, either individually or by acting with 
another would deter a higher bid from materialising.992
6.5 Divergence in the US and English Takeover Regulations
        In spite of the close interrelationship of the different issues of the takeover laws in the 
U.S  and  England,  they  fundamentally  differ  in  the  control  and  regulation  of  the  unfriendly 
takeovers.  These  conflicts  are  discovered  in  the  legal  tactic  available  for  publicly  traded 993
companies in the stock markets. For instance, the application of higher termination fees and a 
wide range of unwelcome provisions in the U. S as compared with England. Judging from the 
Delaware  jurisdiction  when  controlling  public  companies  in  the  US,  Target  Company’s 
management is barred from using shareholders’ sustained agreements and other tactics that are 
not specified under the procedures of the takeover in a bid to prevent a takeover bid from taking 
place.994
  Comparably, in England, a bid that observes the rules and regulations hence attaining 
the requirements  is  by law permitted to  continue in  the quest  to  take over  the company by 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (1995)991
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (1995) 992
Armour,  John,  and  David  A.  Skeel  Jr.  "Who  writes  the  rules  for  hostile  takeovers,  and  why-the  peculiar 993
divergence of US and UK takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1727.
Aguilera, Ruth V., et al. "Corporate governance and social responsibility: A comparative analysis of the UK and 994
the US." Corporate Governance: An International Review 14.3 (2006): 147-158.
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acquiring the target’s shares, if exceeds a considerable amount of the total shares, successfully 
ensures the takeover is successful. The existing variations have sparked a lot of argument in the 
various jurisdictions, legal forums, the legal Panel’s, various professional researchers and other 
interest  parties  in  light  of  the  new era  of  globalisation.  In  this  context,  it  is  important  that 
insightful understanding of the control and regulation of takeovers specifically with regard to 
England and the US, will involve analysing the following aspects:
• The divergence in acquisition deals in England and the US; 
• The rationale for protection mechanisms in the US; 
• The English deal protection mechanisms
Structure and regulation of negotiated acquisitions in England the US
In the United States, a very short deal merger achieves the merger of the publicly traded 
company or otherwise a tender offer. The shareholders are vital in consenting to all the decision 
and agreement reached by the management of the company concerning the takeover.  In the 995
first instance, concerning the merger, the shareholders will give their consent through voting for 
the  transaction,  while  in  the  other  instance,  concerning  the  provisions  of  the  tender  offer; 
shareholders  are  expected  to  tender  their  shares.  The  terms  of  acquisitions  or  mergers  are 
conferred by parties, offeror and offered, are to be contained in the acquisition agreement. The 
US acquisition and mergers agreement include an obligation for the offeree firm to terminate the 
agreement should they find the deal to be inconsistent with the fiduciary duties of its directors 
and management. 
 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers governs the activities of the takeovers scene, 
including the recommendations of the takeovers of England companies that are publicly traded. 
Miller, Geoffrey. "Political structure and corporate governance: some points of contrast between the United States 995
and England." Colum. Bus. L. Rev. (1998): 51.
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The Takeover Code comprises of the General Principles (fundamental standards of commercial 
behaviour)  and  Rules,  intended  to  defend  the  shareholders.  The  Code  is  implemented  and 
imposed by a Panel on Takeovers and Mergers selected to oversee the entire process. The update 
of  the  Code  in  May  2006  concerning  the  implementation  of  EU  Directive  2004/25/EC  on 
takeovers in England was aimed at converting the takeover Panel into a statutory framework in 
order acquire legal authority. This actually managed to confer upon the Panel powers to regulate 
and govern the takeovers. It is otherwise vital to note that the 2006 amendments did not result in 
any important effects on application of takeover deal protection.996
Most of the publicly traded companies in England are severely affected when as target 
firms; they are exposed to unfriendly bid offers.  Similarly,  proper provisions are in place to 
enforce an agreed takeover where the share capital of the offeree is acquired so as the use of 
schemes of the agreement are increasingly becoming popular in England with most of the firms 
planning any takeover moves adopting this approach.  However,  there is a lot of argument 997
concerning the level of control over the takeovers bid offers by the “shareholder activists” who 
become very vocal when the schemes are being considered. A practical scheme is subject to the 
consent of the majority of the offeree firm’s shareholders corresponding to 75% in value of the 
target’s shares and endorsed by the court of law.  In comparison to the US system, the two parties 
do not by law have a bid in the transaction unless they are enforced by the schemes in the 
 Ibid996
Kapstein,  Ethan  B.  "Resolving  the  regulator's  dilemma:  international  coordination  of  banking 997
regulations." International Organization 43.2 (1989): 323-347.
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agreement. In view of this, the acquirers examine closely the implementation of the scheme of 
arrangement by the target.998
It  is,  however,  emerging  as  a  trend  that  in  order  to  facilitate  a  takeover  the  target 
companies ensures payment of a “break fee” to the dominant company regardless of whether the 
takeover is being enforced by means of a scheme of arrangement or not. This fee is payable 
when the bidder is not ultimately successful, which includes being defeated by other competitive 
bids. 
6.6 Reasons for deal protection mechanisms
Deal protection mechanisms are basically contractual agreements between the acceptable 
bidders and offered that are intended to dishearten competing bids and to shield the preferred 
bidder if  a competing bid is  received. From a bidder’s perspective,  the requirement for deal 
protection arises as a result of the board of directors of Target Company not having the capacity 
to bind fully the target company to a change of control transaction.  The bidders have to be 999
worried about losing to other competitive bids. Transactions are very expensive, both in terms of 
actual out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs. The approach is not only time-consuming but 
also  diverts  the  management’s  attention  from  the  daily  operations  and  strategies  of  the 
Angwin, Duncan. "Mergers and acquisitions across European borders: National perspectives on preacquisition 998
due diligence and the use of professional advisers." Journal of World Business36.1 (2001): 32-57.
Lampson,  Butler  W.  "Dynamic  protection  structures."  Proceedings  of  the  November  18-20,  1969,  fall  joint 999
computer conference. ACM, 1969.
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organisation. The takeover where the bidder is then outdone, particularly if it is a competitor, 
may be viewed as an advantage over the bidder and its management.1000
Consequently,  bidding  companies  are  unwilling  to  enter  into  contracts  involving  the 
acquisition of  public companies without  safeguarding the deal  against  the competition in all 
manners  possible.  Most  target  companies  decline the deal  protection mechanisms since they 
perceive that it is in the interest of their shareholders, if a higher bid is presented. However, there 
may be reasons that may facilitate the target companies’ boards to comply with the demands of 
the bidder.  In a share-for-share transaction, the target company’s board and management may 1001
have assurance on the long-term prospect offered by this arrangement. It may be an element that 
continues the board and management of the combined company. The board and management of 
the offeree may believe the anticipated transaction benefits its stakeholders including employees, 
customers,  suppliers  or  community.  Furthermore,  providing  the  bidding  company  with  deal 
protection may be crucial to ensure the success of the deal. The target company’s management 
may be criticised for serving their self-interest in agreeing to protective mechanisms.  The 1002
recommended bidder rather than potential competing bidders may enhance their protection of 
sustained employment, promotion and improved compensation. For instance, the recommended 
bidder is venturing into a new market and requires the current management, while the opponent 
bidder is a consolidator with an aim of saving costs and rationalisation. 
Varallo,  Gregory  V.,  and  Srinivas  M.  Raju.  "A  Process  Based  Model  for  Analyzing  Deal  Protection 1000
Measures." The Business Lawyer (2000): 1609-1647.
Rutter, Michael. "Psychosocial resilience and protective mechanisms." American journal of orthopsychiatry 57.3 1001
(1987): 316.
 Ibid1002
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The legal  barriers  against  the  use of  some of  the deal  protection mechanisms,  either 
single-handedly or in combination with other existing mechanisms, have been imposed due to 
the fact that there is too much deal protection; hence will indirectly exclude the materialisation of 
a  better  offer  or  inconvenience  to  the  target’s  shareholders.  Those  barriers  are  basically 1003
imposed in the form of common law decisions by law courts in the US. On the other hand, in 
England,  these  types  of  constraints  are  enforced  by  Rule  21  of  the  Code,  which  efficiently 
precludes measures by the target that would discourage a competing bid once it has appeared and 
as well through the common law.1004
6.7 Deal protection mechanisms in the US
6.7.1 Duties of the director
The  directors  of  most  US  target  companies  while  accepting  the  deal  protection 
mechanisms are limited by their fiduciary duties under the law of the state in which the target 
companies  are  registered.  Delaware  is  the  most  significant  state  for  publicly  traded  holding 
companies in the US stock markets  and has the largest  body of  company case law. Despite 
lacking the power to supersede other jurisdictions in the courts of law, the Delaware precedents 
are often, constantly, cited and relied on by other state courts of law.  From the Delaware law, 1005
Adjaoud, Fodil, and Walid Ben-Amar. "Corporate governance and dividend policy: shareholders’ protection or 1003
expropriation?." Journal of business finance & accounting 37.5-6 (2010): 648-667.
 Ibid1004
La Porta,  Rafael,  et  al.  "Investor protection and corporate governance."  Journal of financial economics  58.1 1005
(2000): 3-27.
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the  insertion  of  deal  protection  mechanisms  in  a  transaction  agreement  increases  the  close 
examination of the target company’s board of directors. 
If the business deal in question involves the acquiring of control of the company, Revlon 
duties  are  used  and  the  board  is  tasked  with  the  obligation  of  securing  the  transaction  by 
presenting the best value sensibly available to the shareholders.  Despite this situation, Revlon 1006
duties are not relevant in calculated, share-for-share mergers, where the shares of the existing 
public  company  are  widely  held,  without  allowing  individuals  to  hold  a  voting  block.  1007
Additionally,  in  a  share-for-share  merger  where  Revlon  duties  are  not  pertinent,  the  target 
company’s directors’ decision to apply deal protection mechanisms will be scrutinised under the 
Unocal standard. In this standard, the management of the target company must be justified in 
supporting the fact that a third party bid would correspond to a threat to business policy, and that 
the protection mechanisms engaged in to defend the preferred bid stands for a rational response 
to the apparent threat.  The common rule under both of these views lies in the fact that a target 1008
company’s  board  cannot  approve  deal  protection  mechanisms  that  are  either  alone  or  in 
combination since it would prevent a higher bid from emerging.1009
Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)1006
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 673 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989)1007
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (1995)1008
In re Toys “R”Us Shareholder Litigation, 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005)1009
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6.7.2 Frequently used deal protection mechanisms
The most regularly applied mechanisms to safeguard US takeover transactions include 
the following:
Termination or break-up fees
In this transaction, termination fees are “mentioned fees” to be paid to a bidding company 
under certain situation if the transaction with the bidder is not accomplished. The termination 
fees lessen the value of the target company and boost the price tag to a challenging bidder. The 
target companies in most cases request for the termination fees, which materialise only if the 
transaction is concluded and an optional transaction is accomplished within a given time period. 
They are not always successful in restraining the disbursement of the fee in those situations. The 
Delaware courts have upheld breakup fees even though the shareholders may discard the deal 
without  a  substitute  deal.  In  this  case,  the  Delaware courts  gave priority  to  a  stipulation 1010
whereby half of the 3% fee was to be paid under such conditions. Termination fees are often 
explained in the business agreement as liquidated reimbursement. Delaware courts give priority 
to termination fees provided there is no exclusion of higher bids. The courts of law examined the 
legality of termination fees particularly focusing on protective mechanisms in the transaction 
agreement as a whole, and the extent to which the directors of the target argued practically in 
approving the termination fee. The termination fees ranging from 2.5% to 4% of the overall 
transaction are quite  common in US public  acquisition deals.  However,  the termination fees 
cannot be found within that range under a number of conditions.1011
H.F. Ahmanson and Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp., C.A. No. 15650, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84 (1997)1010
Melis, Andrea. "Strong blockholders and corporate governance structures that improve minority shareholders’ 1011
protection: the case of Telecom Italia." International corporate governance. A case study approach (2006).
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Non-solicitation provisions
The Non-solicitation provisions are promoted by bidders to reduce the target company’s 
application of its “Fiduciary Out”, by placing barriers on the target’s ability to request or react to 
optional offers. A “no-shop” clause normally stipulates that a target cannot persuade, look for or 
ask for third party offers for the duration of the offer while providing rules on the situation under 
which targets may provide information to and confer with a third party that has made known its 
concerns in a transaction.1012
Delaware courts have ruled out some no-shop provisions and mechanisms including the 
no-talk provision, which hamper absolutely the ability of the target to provide information to or 
settle with a third party, and the factors, are no longer distinctive.1013
Commonly negotiated terms
The  Non-solicitation  provision  and  the  Fiduciary  Out  are  most  commonly  used 
provisions of US business agreements in the takeovers. There are a great number of variables to 
reflect  on  when  judging  the  provisions  to  satisfy  that  a  given  situation  and  the  parties’ 
requirements. The following is the list of some existing options.1014
Cohn,  Stuart  R.  "Securities  Markets  for  Small  Issuers:  The  Barrier  of  Federal  Solicitation  and  Advertising 1012
Prohibitions." (1986).
Ace Limited. Capital Re (C.A. No. 17488 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999) and Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc., 1013
818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003)
Babenko, Ilona, et al. "Clawback provisions." (2015).1014
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Conditions to providing information or negotiating with third parties
1. The target company is by law required to obtain advice from outside counsel, written or 
uttered, that failure to offer information to or confer with a third party would be most 
likely lead to a violation of the fiduciary duties or may be inconsistent with the fiduciary 
duties.1015
2. The  target,  therefore,  must  ensure  that  some  factors  in  relation  to  the  proposal  i.e. 
realistically are likely to lead to, an increased proposal, in most cases, needed to be based 
on the recommendation from financial experts. 
3. The  target  must  inform  the  bidder  concerning  information  stipulations  to,  or  in 
commencing negotiations with the third party.
4. The target must alert the bidder of offers obtained from the third party of details and the 
timing of providing notices.
5. The target must enter into a discretional agreement with third party i.e. needed to be no 
less limiting than in the accord between the bidder and offeree.
Conditions to exercise of fiduciary termination rights or fiduciary right to alter recommendation
1. The target must acquire guidance from external counsel, written or uttered, indicating that 
the failure to end or modify its proposal would contravene the fiduciary duties.
2. The target company must establish that the greater proposal standard is adhered to. 
3. The  target  company  must  give  prior  notice  to  the  bidder  concerning  termination  i.e. 
advance written notice including terms of the offer.1016
 Ibid p.491015
Rydqvist, Kristian. "Takeover bids and the relative prices of shares that differ in their voting rights." Journal of 1016
Banking & Finance 20.8 (1996): 1407-1425.
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 Additional negotiated points
Determination of the fact that the bidder will bear a matching or top right in connection 
with a Fiduciary Out, including timings and parameters. Similarly, facilitation for payment and 
training of the termination fee. The situations in which the board of directors can disown its 
proposals to its shareholders and whether it is capable of acting similarly in the absence of a 
better proposal.1017
Matching or topping rights. 
The Delaware law allows the target companies to offer bidders matching or topping rights 
in relation to a competing bid. In Toys “R” US Shareholder Litigation case, the matching right in 
inclining towards the preferred bidder specifically with the information in favour of the target’s 
board.  These requirements require the target to inform the bidder of the particulars of any 1018
third party suggestion, and the bidder is at liberty to match or improve such a proposal.1019
 Force the vote requirements.
In 2013, the Delaware General Company Law (DGCL) was amended to ensure directors 
presented  a  transaction  to  the  shareholders  despite  the  board  disagreeing  with  the  proposal. 
Consequently, transaction agreements can require that the deal is disclosed to the shareholders of 
the target company, despite the existence of a competing bid and the target company’s directors 
Grossman,  Sanford  J.,  and  Oliver  D.  Hart.  "Takeover  bids,  the  free-rider  problem,  and  the  theory  of  the 1017
corporation." The Bell Journal of Economics (1980): 42-64.
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick. "Corporate governance and equity prices." The quarterly journal 1018
of economics118.1 (2003): 107-156.
Toys “R”Us Shareholder Litigation,877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. June 24, 2005)1019
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disowning the proposals. The “force the vote” provisions may assist the bidder, since they can 
delay the proposed agreement of an optional transaction. The target company is often incapable 
of signing an agreement with the contending bidder, hence beginning “the proxy solicitation” 
and control approval process, at such a time when the shareholders reject the initial deal. As a 
result,  the  provisions  may  call  for  the  target  company’s  shareholders  to  select  between  the 
transactions at hand, that is available for a short period after the voting, and the prospect of a deal 
with a higher value in the future. Such a provision may offer contract protection, particularly if 
the competing, higher bidder offers anti-trust issues.1020
The efficiency of a “force the vote” stipulation in certain situation is exhibited by the 
battle between Cnooc and Chevron where the Chinese government supported Oil Company, to 
take over the control of Unocal. Chevron and Unocal had contracted into a merger accord which 
endorsed  a  force  the  vote  provision,  providing  that  Unocal  present  the  Chevron  deal  to  its 
shareholders. In spite of a significantly higher offer from Cnooc, actually disowned at the time of 
the  vote,  the  shareholders  of  Unocal  endorsed the  Chevron transaction,  citing fears  that  the 
Cnooc transaction had regulatory downturns, partially since some US government officials were 
predicting the likelihood of advancing a legislation to block the Cnooc bid.1021
  
 Kathleen A. Kelley “Significant Amendments To Delaware General Company Law Enacted" August 6 1020
2013   http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/256218/Securities/Significant+Amendments+To+Delaware+General
+Corporation+Law+Enacted, accessed 26 April 2016 
  Ben  White   “  Chinese  Drop  Bid  To  Buy  U.S.  Oil  Firm”  August  3,  2005  The  Washington  Post,  http://1021
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080200404.html
accessed 26 April 2016
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 Shareholder support agreements (voting agreements, options, and others). 
In this situation, a bidder generally seeks to develop its chances of success by engaging in 
an agreement with a significant number of shareholders of the target company, in connection 
with  getting  into  the  transaction  contract.  Considering  the  structure  of  the  fundamental 
transaction, the support agreements may take the form of voting agreements or agreements to 
tender shares. The bidder is specifically using an enforceable option to acquire the shareholder’s 
shares in the target company, should the shareholder be unsuccessful to fulfil its obligations. The 
practitioners once considered shareholders’ support agreements to be an indisputable means of 
shielding the underlying transaction. Many cases have called into question how far a bidder can 
go in  using the  support  accords  in  concurrence  with  other  mechanisms.  In  the  case  of  Ace 
Limited v Capital Re Group, the Vice Chancellor Leo Shrine found a severe no-shop provision 
unenforceable  when used  in  combination  with  support  agreements  from the  shareholders  of 
33.5% of  the  target’s  shares  where  the  bidder  held  an extra  12.5% of  the  target  company’s 
shares.  The  court  ruled  that,  in  the  absence  of  an  efficient  Fiduciary  Out,  the  support 1022
agreements impermissibly prohibited the target company’s shareholders from receiving increased 
optional offers.1023
Under Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc., The Delaware Supreme court prohibited a 
set  of  transaction  protection  mechanisms  enclosed  within  the  agreement,  which  included: 
supportive agreement from the shareholders of a majority of the shares of the target company. 
NCS Healthcare, a Delaware company, had been the object of rival bids, one by Genesis Health 
Ventures and another one by Omnicare. NCS ultimately approved the acquisition by Genesis 
 Ace Limited v Capital Re Group, 747A.2d95 (Del. Ch. 1999)1022
 Ibid1023
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Health Ventures and the transaction agreement had the three deal protection mechanisms detailed 
earlier, that together made the undertaking of the transaction a sure.1024
The Omnicare case established a combination to be irrationally preclusive, despite NCS 
had been systematically considered before approving the acquisition by Genesis and the NCS 
directors had carefully observed corporate formalities. The Omnicare resolution can be defined 
as  meaning acceptance of  a  rule  prohibiting board approval  of  locked up transactions (even 
though  the  entire  span  of  the  decision  is  still  open  to  deliberation).  After  the  decision, 
practitioners have been involved in including lock-up measures that totally preclude higher bids 
in  transaction  agreements  governed  by  Delaware  law.  Despite  all  this,  shareholders  support 
agreements that do not exclude higher bids, which are still allowed under Delaware law.1025
6.8 Stake-building
The transaction accord between the bidder and the target company is critically analysed. 
The span of these provisions is dependent on concession, but bidders will often look for ways of 
preventing the target  company from finding any competing offers,  engaging deliberations or 
negotiations with a third party, or from providing any information to a third party unless Rule 
20.2 of the Takeover Code that requires the target company to provide a competing offeror with 
similar information on the target company disclosed to the earlier bidder, is used. The board of 
the target company will try to narrow the span of the non-solicitation obligations to safeguard the 
board’s flexibility and defend them against any violations of their fiduciary duties. Realistically, 
 Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003)1024
  Ibid1025
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no shop and non-solicitation in England transaction agreements tend to be quite short, and do not 
have as too much scope as non-solicitation agreements in the US merger agreements.1026
Bidders enhance the possibility of succeeding in their offer by acquiring the shares in the 
target company. Stake-building is actually a scheme used with increasing success in takeovers in 
England. However, stake building may not be viable due to reason such as, the fact that adequate 
shares may not be present and the fact that purchases beyond stated amount must be provided. 
Provisions of rule 6 states that where a bidder has acquired shares in the target company in a 
particular time period before the declaration of a firms intent to make a bid, any offer presented 
by  the  bidder  to  the  shareholders  of  a  similar  level  must  not  be  made  on  less  affordable 
conditions. After making a declaration of a firm intention to present a bid for the target company, 
the bidder buys shares in the target company at price over the offer price, it is deemed to increase 
its offer to not less than the uppermost price paid for the shares it has bought.1027
A bidder, therefore, needs to consider the information it has about the target company 
before undertaking to acquire the shares in the company apart from the fact of the intention to 
bid, in a bid to evade committing an unlawful offence under the Criminal Justice Act 1993. This 
is a civil offence of market abuse extracted from the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, or 
to keep away from violating Rule 4 of the City Code.1028
In addition, Rule 5 of the Code stops the purchase of a stake of 30% or more of the share 
capital, except if the attainment immediately goes before the announcement of a suggested offer. 
Rule 9 of the Code needs a bidder to make a compulsory cash offer for the company’s share 
 The Takeover Code, pp199-200 1026
 The Takeover Code, pp 109-1141027
 The Criminal Justice Act 1993, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and The Takeover Code, rule 41028
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capital if it takes over 30% or more of the voting pattern in the target company. Moreover, stake 
building  through  open  market  operations  is  an  intimidating  way  to  starting  off  negotiations 
without any prior information hence not recommended the deal.1029
6.9 Comparison of deal protection mechanisms in the US and England
The major distinctions between deal protection mechanisms in the US and England legal 
systems as detailed below:
In spite of the prospective span of any non-solicitation obligations, it is arguable 
that in England, in practice non-solicitation necessities tend to have fewer limitations on the 
behaviour of English targets and directors in comparison to competing for bid offers. This is as a 
result of the collaboration of the target company’s board being less significant to a contending 
bidder in England. It is, however, likely to lock-up a transaction in England by the use of 1030
irreversible undertakings, while it is not easier to apply the same in the US, particularly where 
Delaware law is applicable right after Omnicare. Existences of ‘Force the vote’ provisions are 
not applicable to takeovers in England is due to the fact that takeover initiated by way of an offer 
has to be voted on. Stake-building is often applied in England, but is not a common method in 
negotiated dealings in the US.1031
In England, deal protection mechanisms are principally governed by the takeover Panel 
by means of the provisions of the Takeover Code. On the other hand, higher break fees are 
 The Takeover Code, rule 5 pp 105-1081029
 Ibid 1030
 Ibid 1031
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acceptable in the US as compared to England (almost 4% of the offer value has been mentioned 
under certain conditions by a Delaware law court, relative to a cap of 1% in England system).
6.10 Difference between the use of takeover defence tactics in England and the US
The use of defence tactics in England and the United States differs depending on the 
circumstances and the defence in question. For instance, the use of white squire defence in the 
United States  is  a  prerogative of  the Board of  Directors  but  the New York Stock Exchange 
demands shareholders’ approval for listing newly issued stock that exceeds 18.5% of the whole 
stock. Concerning restructuring the voting rights, the Unites States does not need shareholder 
approval when issuing proffered class of shares. In England, there is a need for shareholders’ 
approval concerning issuing of certain voting rights.  The use of poison pills in US is justified 1032
by  case  laws,  where  it  has  the  main  purpose  of  furthering  the  company’s  development  and 
expansion  plans.  The  same  defence  has  not  been  used  extensively  in  England  due  to  the 
provisions of the City Code, which prevents target board of directors from granting options over 
unissued shares of the entity after a bid has been made without shareholders’ approval. It appears 
that the differences in the use of defence tactics in England and the US is based on whether 
shareholders’ approval is needed or the board’s decision is final. It therefore, depends on specific 
defence tactic being used.
 Matsusaka, J. G., & Ozbas, O. (2012). Shareholder empowerment: The right to approve and the right to propose. 1032
University of Southern California Law School, California, USA, Law and Economics Working Paper Series, Paper 
142
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6.11 Conclusion
This chapter has compared the English system of takeover regulation with that of the U.S 
system. It began with the English position of the takeover defences and this was found to be in 
two  categories.  In  the  first  section,  the  regulation  of  the  takeover  defences  with  particular 
reference to the Self-Regulatory rules (The Takeover Code), Common Law rules and Statutory 
and Stock Exchange provisions on takeover defences have been discussed. The second section 
analysed  defence  methods  such  as  disclosure  of  favourable  financial  information,  service 
agreements or management controls, issuing of block of shares to protect where necessary or 
friendly holders, defensive merger, purchasing shares in the market and reconstruction of capital 
among others. 1033
On the other hand, the US position on the takeover regulations has also been viewed in 
two sections. In the first part, the regulation of the takeover defences in the Federal law has been 
exhausted. The second phased engaged in evaluating the both the pre-takeover and post-takeover 
defence tactics.1034
In general the both systems laid emphasis on the following issues:
• Protection of a firm’s shareholders’ rights;
• The duties of the board of directors and their election and demotion;
• The role of the shareholders of a firm;
• Fostering of reasonable takeovers or protecting takeovers
 Ibid pp.461033
 Ibid pp. 401034
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CONCLUSION
The prevailing mystery as to what factors cause merger waves has not been resolved yet. 
The number of mergers has been increasing since 1980s. Looking at the history of mergers in the 
US and England and it has been analysed that every merger had based on a different rationale. 
The difference in methods of payment, role played by companies involved and dealing types 
changed the nature of waves. A single explanation will never be sufficient enough to explain the 
growing existence of  merger waves.  Furthermore,  even in their  history,  no model,  theory or 
research has ever been able to explain this phenomenon.
Will  it  ever  be possible to devise a model  that  will  be able to explain the excessive 
growth of merger waves and as to why this is happening? Several models have been developed 
to  explain  and  analyse  the  relationship  between  acquisition  and  merger  activities  and  the 
economic growth/decline in the preceding periods.  The superseding issue is  that  all  of these 
models have failed to work outside the market and timeframe over which they were created.  1035
This  has  compelled  researchers  to  conduct  extensive  research  on  acquisition  and  merger 
activities over different periods of time. Formulating a hypothesis that every merger does not 
have a similar reason behind it and that there is no particular mystery behind their development 
will save countless hours of concentration wasted on the history and nature of merger waves 
throughout the last century. Furthermore, with time variation comes variation in factors and it is 
also not necessary for all the characteristics to remain consistent, these change overtime too. 
Conclusively, economic and legal conditions of a company are the core causes of merger waves. 
 Gaughan, Patrick A. Mergers, acquisitions, and corporate restructuring. John Wiley & Sons, 2010.1035
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Responding to both internal and external pressures is the responsibility of an entity known as a 
company.1036
It is no longer acceptable to address firms by biological analogies but there are many 
similarities which efficiently explain the general life-cycle of a firm. First of all, a company after 
being born, struggles to stay alive it  goes through the stages of adolescence and then finally 
becomes mature enough to exist independently.  Even after its establishment, sooner or later it 
has to die. The reason for its death is either natural causes or slow descent because of old age or a 
predatory firm might become strong enough to absorb it. Acquisition and merger activity acts as 
a substitute to these options and provides a safe way to transfer assets of the company to another 
company. The attempt at literature study indicates that companies resort acquisition and merger 
activities  due  to  economic  factors.  These  companies  are  believed  to  react  more  to  external 
pressures rather than internal ones and it is also believed that the changes in an economy are 
what  pressurise  a  firm  to  enter  into  a  market  for  corporate  control.  Continuous  changing 
economic  conditions  are  what  affect  the  economic  value  and  opinions  of  companies.  The 
generated  differences  of  opinions  in  companies  is  what  leads  to  an  increment  in  levels  of 
acquisition  and  merger   activity.  This  theory  works  particularly  well  as  a  generalised 1037
statement in order to implement it  in reality,  it  could be extremely necessary to identify the 
economic conditions that contribute to the formation of this relationship. Stock markets seem to 
be a dominant factor that can explain this phenomenon in existing literature on this topic. The 
rise in share prices is a strong indication that the economy of a country is strengthening. 
 Barney,  Jay  B.  "Returns  to  bidding  firms  in  mergers  and  acquisitions:  Reconsidering  the  relatedness 1036
hypothesis." Strategic Management Journal 9.S1 (1988): 71-78.
 Datta,  Deepak  K.  "Organizational  fit  and  acquisition  performance:  Effects  of  post-acquisition 1037
integration." Strategic management journal 12.4 (1991): 281-297.
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The strengthening of economy leads to an increment in the profit levels of the many 
firms. This chain reaction also increases the level of acquisition and merger activities. The main 
advantage of rise in stock markets is that instigates acquisition and merger activity either by 
giving the companies a choice to increase finance and profitability by issuing new shares or by 
giving them a chance to use new shares as the medium of exchange in the deal. If declining 
interest rates are coupled with the above stated factors then it becomes easy to raise finance and 
the main roadblock which hinders acquisition and merger activity is removed.  1038
However, it must also be noticed that how easily these advantages overrule the fact that 
the target firm’s market price will also face an elevation due to rising share prices. The overall 
size of an economy is a factor that cannot be neglected while determining the level of acquisition 
and merger activity. These sorts of deals are easier to make in a large economy. It is easier to find 
a company of the same level for an acquisition or merger when considering entering into the 
market for corporate control. There are noticeable differences between the levels of activities in 
various industries when considering the behaviour of the market for corporate control.  The 1039
time to conduct acquisition/merger is industry specific is a fact that cannot be overlooked. These 
patterns  vary  with  the  shocks  that  industries  receive  and  these  shocks  result  in  changes  in 
economic/regulatory  conditions.  It  becomes  a  necessity  for  an  industry  to  make  changes  to 
survive when a sizeable shock is received. In numerous situations these acquisition and merger 
activities are the fastest way to respond and many times prove to be cheaper than any other 
alternatives to it. The important stipulation to all of these theories forming a relationship between 
 Bruton, Garry D.,  Benjamin M. Oviatt,  and Margaret  A. White.  "Performance of acquisitions of distressed 1038
firms." Academy of Management Journal 37.4 (1994): 972-989.
 Ibid 31039
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economic factors and the level of acquisition and merger activity is that a common assumption 
has been made that external factors seen to dominate internal factors and indeed based on these 
external factors decisions within the firms are made.  This case might be true the majority of 1040
times but there will be instances where internal factors will either instigate the entry of a firm 
into the market for corporate control or will either disallow it. More challengingly, whilst these 
theories prove to be effective/efficient within the data sets they are constructed, they do not show 
the same behaviour and accuracy when implemented in other data sets.1041
Despite the availability of the defence tactics for avoiding acquisitions and mergers of corporate 
entities, in most cases, the acquiring company being very powerful, the defence tactics do not 
seem to have any positive impact on a proposed acquisition and merger of corporate entities. In 
England, the provisions for the protection of minority shareholders in the Companies Act, 2006, 
provide such shareholders an opportunity to resist acquisitions and mergers, but examples of 
“squeezing out” are also available. 
The Takeover Panels in England seem to be more concerned with the issue of whether the 
required procedures for acquisitions and mergers have taken place rather than the over-use of the 
financial muscles of the acquiring company. As explained in this research that the social issues, 
namely, the consequential unemployment of a large number of employees do not seem to have 
receive much attention during an acquisition and merger process. 
In this context it should be pointed out that the hypotheses laid in the Introduction to this 
research have been confirmed   Furthermore, by studying the acquisition and merger processes in 
both England and the US, it may be observed that neither the Panels nor the business community 
 Shaw, Richard A. "Merger and Acquisition Strategies." Atlanta. Law. Review. 34 (1995): 630.1040
Cartwright, Sue, and Cary L. Cooper. "The psychological impact of merger and acquisition 1041
on the individual: A study of building society managers." Human relations 46.3 (1993): 327-347.
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pays much attention to the issue of corporate social responsibility in effecting acquisitions and 
mergers. 
This research also identified the existing legal regimes in both the jurisdictions, but the 
irony is  that  on  balance,  all  the  jurisdictions  also  have very  elaborate  legislation promoting 
acquisitions and mergers. Thus, it is also suggested that the adverse social effect of acquisitions 
and mergers and the issue of protecting the interests of minority shareholders be considered by 
all the jurisdictions discussed in this research be paid very serious consideration by them.
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